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This research developed the enabling theory from classic theories and built a hypothesis on that 
basis.  The enabling theory theorizes that has granted Norwegians with welfare and standard of 
living to allow them to be concerned about the welfare of refugees and the human rights of 
refugees during the Covid-19 Crisis and the economic turbulence that the Covid-19 pandemic 
brought. The Enabling Theory seems to explain Norwegians having positive attitudes towards 
refugees’ rights and human rights. Three of the participants became more negative towards 
refugees and in one case ideology explains while in the other case, one person being apolitical, 
and the other saying that it welfare chauvinism (as in a welfare state for natives that is more 
generous and more expansive and another welfare state that is less expansive and generous for 
non-natives) is fair but later said that he did not agree. In the theoretical background, I explain 
the Norwegian welfare state and how societal cleavages helped develop the welfare state and 
the ideologies such as Keynesianism and Neoliberalism that influenced the welfare state. I 
develop a three-pronged dependent variable that runs along a continuum with welfare 
chauvinism to communitarianism (soft cosmopolitanism) to cosmopolitanism (hard 
cosmopolitanism).  I find that Norwegian citizens value the principle of popular sovereignty 
highly, while at the same time valuing the rights of refugees and their human rights. 
Furthermore, that Norwegians value the welfare state highly and want to protect it, while at the 
same time they do not view refugees as a threat to the welfare state. The methodology the 
research uses is quasi-experiments, the research injects two arguments. One from a neoliberal 
perspective cuts to the welfare state and a welfare chauvinist argument that refugees are a net 
economic burden to the welfare state from Jon Engen-Helgheim, who is a parliamentarian from 
the welfare chauvinist and populist radical right party the Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet – 
FRP). Norwegians seem to not be susceptible to the neoliberal argument across the political 
spectrum to the point of becoming welfare chauvinistic regarding refugees, however, they do 
come more negative and do I do capture a rightward shift in people who are centre-right and 
right-wing. The arguments presented to the participants did seem to have implications for 
democracy. The findings suggest that the two arguments made the treatment group less 
committed to democratic values and I capture that Norwegians in the treatment group become 





Chapter 1: Introduction  
In this paper, I shall investigate and explore the research question: Does the Norwegian welfare 
state enable Norwegians to be concerned about the welfare and human rights of asylum seekers 
and refugees during an economic recession and the Covid-19 crisis? This could also be phrased 
another way: “Does a theoretical cut to the welfare state make Norwegians become welfare 
chauvinistic towards refugees and asylum seekers?  
A question that has struck many, especially communitarians and cosmopolitans (Miller 2016, 
20-40; Carens 2013, 1-19; Hosein 2019, 6-30) is “Does humanity stand united in protecting the 
rights of refugees and their human rights? The increase of populistic radical right-wing parties 
and the rise of welfare chauvinism do paint a stark picture for migrants and refugees. Moreover, 
the rise of neoliberalism as a political ideology and movement also poses some challenges to 
the welfare state, and indeed, to the rights of refugees. Neoliberalism poses a threat to the human 
rights of refugees since it is posing an ideological attack on the welfare state and its universalist 
principles. Indeed, the Norwegian welfare state draws its legitimacy from its universality, 
therefore if the welfare state’s character changes this may undermine the rights of not only 
natives but refugees and migrants as well. This question has never been more relevant than 
during the amid of the Covid-19 pandemic and the economic recession in Norway.  
Indeed, I shall test whether cuts to the welfare state make Norwegians reconsider their views 
and attitudes toward refugees and asylum seekers. Furthermore, one of the aspects of the 
Norwegian welfare state is that social security has three core functions according to Aksel 
Hatland, Stein Kuhnle and Tor Inge Romøren (2019). Firstly, it provides security as the name 
suggests and it provides people with the material well-being they need if they fall on bad times. 
This is not only for individuals but for firms as well. Secondly, it has a redistributive function 
to reduce the number of inequalities between different socio-economic groups. Thirdly, it 
affects behaviour. Indeed, if it affects behaviour, it also affects preferences, views, and attitudes 
(Hatland et al 2019, 98-99; Pedersen 2019, 197-218; Pikkety 2013, 471-513). Indeed, even in 
these times of crisis in Norway with an economic recession, and a global pandemic, the 
discussions, and debates about immigration and refugees have persisted. To be sure, throughout 
the spring, summer, and fall of 2020 the debates about what course of action should be taken 
with regards to the children in the Moria camp located on the Greek island of Lesvos in the 
Aegean Sea near mainland Turkey persisted. The debate was concerned whether Norway 
should permit and grant refuge to child refugees. Activists advocated for 50 refugee children, 
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other activists advocated for more than 50, from the Moria camp to be granted refuge in 
Norway. However, in the fall of 2020, a critical juncture occurred. On the night of the 8th of 
September 2020, while most of the inhabitants of the Moria camp were sleeping three different 
places in the camp in rapid succession were set ablaze, and the camp burned down. Four 
Afghans were sentenced to 10 years in jail by a Greek court (Reuters 2021). The camp was only 
built to house 3000 people, and it was impossible to have any kind of measure against a Covid-
19 outbreak in such conditions. Due to the chaotic situation on the Moria camp and the lack of 
control over the situation only estimates are given as to how many people lived at the camp 
before it burned down. The number according to the UN Refugee Agency was 18,342 migrants 
in February 2020. Furthermore, the Greek asylum system was completely overloaded with over 
90 thousand cases and overhauls to the asylum system had to meet certain requirements, this 
reform was slow, and many asylum seekers were negatively affected. Moreover, the UNHCR 
continues with: “Nearly 2,000 children without parents or relatives in Greece are at risk at island 
reception centres. Over 5,300 unaccompanied children are now in Greece and only less than a 
quarter are in shelters adequate for their age” (UNHCR 2020). The debates in Norway fumed 
on. For example, the Norwegian Medical Association which represents 96% of Norwegian 
doctors published an article and an open letter in their journal to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(Utenriksdepartmentet) urging the government to not just take 50 refugees from the camp but 
to do more and to show solidarity (Baugstø 2020). They stated the fact that many Norwegian 
municipalities had already agreed and publicly stated that they could grant refugee status to 50 
migrants. Norwegian opinion on the matter according to Kantar on behalf of TV 2 (Norwegian 
media company) showed that Norwegians were very positive towards refugees during the 
period. Kantar is a data analytics and consulting company from London, and they asked a 
representative sample of the Norwegian population about whether the Norwegian government 
should take in 50 refugees from Moria, where 59.2% thought the number was too little. 12% 
thought the amount to be reasonable, while 23.3% thought the amount was way too high, and 
5.4% did not know what to think about the amount (Vatne and Solheim 2020). Jon Helgheim 
has been extremely critical and commented on the opinion poll from TV 2 and said that he 
understood why people thought 50 people was too little, and further argued that we could help 
those refugees with a powerful policy where they are so they do not need to flee. Minister of 
Children and Families Kjell Inge Ropstad from the Christian Peoples’ Party said that they do 
not have the majority in parliament, but despite that, they had managed to make a breakthrough 
and have 50 refugees from Moria, and another 3000 quota refugees are accepted into Norway. 
He hoped that the Moria situation would accelerate the process in Europe on policies of 
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responsibility sharing and distribute refugees in Europe on a fairer basis (Vatne and Solheim 
2020). Furthermore, the poll shows a big difference between genders, and gender is therefore 
controlled for in my research as well. Of those 6000 that answered with; “Norway should take 
in more than 50 refugees from Moria” were 69.4% of them, women. This is very interesting, 
and this is one of the reasons I apply a gender quota in my research where I must include at 
least 4 women in each group to accurately represent the Norwegian population (Ibid 2020). 
Furthermore, not only was it unsanitary, but it was an inhumane living condition for most of 
the people at the camp. This had already sparked controversy and discussion around the 
fundamental human welfare of the children and other refugees living at the camp. The camp 
burning down changed the debate, and many activists, pundits, and politicians demanded that 
taking in 50 children from the Moria camp was not enough and that more should be done. 
Indeed, the demand became that the EU and EU countries should take many more and some 
demanded that all the children should be granted a right to safety in Europe. Indeed, there was 
a demand for more responsibility-sharing among EU member-states, as Minister of Children 
and Families, Kjell Inge Ropstad hoped for (Vatne and Solheim 2020). The debate was not only 
centred around the unsanitary, unhygienic, and horrifying conditions that these children lived 
in but as well the fact that the EU had not done enough, and that Norway had not done enough 
also became an issue. Many highlighted the injustice of this.  Indeed, in cosmopolitan theory, 
if you have water to spare you would of course give water to the hiker in need metaphorically 
speaking. Despite the recession and the global pandemic issues regarding the human rights and 
welfare of asylum seekers and refugees persisted, and indeed, it seems that the support for the 
welfare state has risen during the pandemic, and this is reflected in the findings of this research. 
Not a single participant said that they did not appreciate the welfare state, and according to 
research from 2014 as a comparison only 8 out 10 said they appreciated the welfare state (SKL 
Nyheter 2014).  To be sure, and this fundamentally underlies the point of justice and injustice, 
when people have the material well-being, and can spare resources to give to others then it will 
not be perceived as an injustice to give asylum seekers and refugees welfare and human rights. 
To be sure, this makes the welfare state’s impact on an individual’s attitudes and views towards 
migrants an interesting topic to research. The research question at hand is topical because all 
three functions are currently being fulfilled during the Covid-19 crisis. It redistributes resources, 
often monetary, from those who have excess resources to people who lack resources, it has 
provided people with a minimum standard of living, and this as discussed might have affected 
behaviour and enabled the debates around the children of Moria. I have outlined in detail the 
theoretical and literature review in the thesis outline, but I shall touch upon it again in the 
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conceptualization of variables. This is also a clarification and a justification for why I am 
researching the topic. The method being used to uncover this question is quasi-experimentation 
and interviews during the spring of 2021. However, I do not just conduct mere interviews, they 
are quasi-experimental interviews. I shall explain how I am planning to conduct the quasi-
experiments, and I shall include the questionnaire, which shall be discussed, and justification 
of each question shall be given. The Enabling Theory, as William Keech points out, is that a 
healthy democracy during a crisis needs state guidance to overcome the economic trough and 
to have a healthy democracy in the meanwhile (2013, 104-124). Moreover, it is possible as 
outlined in Keynes general theory to use government intervention in the economy to overcome 
an economic trough and to maintain the welfare of citizens during the economic recession. This 
can be done through a combination of two economic macroeconomic policies: 1) a welfare state 
and 2) direct real capital investment in the economy through the state (2017, 115-151). I would 
like to briefly touch upon this conundrum of interviews during a pandemic. I have now 
expounded on the economic theory behind the concept of the Enabling Theory of the welfare 
state. Having done so, how is it then possible to verify such a theory in practice? In this thesis, 
this happens through open, quasi-experimental interviews. Let me now explain how such 
interviews were conducted under the constraints imposed by the pandemic, and why.  
 
Section 1.1: Interviews during the Corona Pandemic: Challenges and 
Opportunities 
The reason for interviews as the methodology and Norway as the case is two-pronged: 
feasibility and theory. Interviews during the Covid-19 global pandemic was always going to be 
challenging, while it is feasible with the help of new technologies that people have started using 
during their daily life such as Zoom and other video call applications. Indeed, these new 
technologies created a brand-new everyday life and this means people will know how to use 
these technologies such as Zoom. As well it presented a unique opportunity to study how 
peoples’ attitudes towards refugees and asylum seekers may change during a global pandemic. 
Therefore, while the enabling theory (which I discuss at length later) is interesting and can be 
tested frequently since capitalism does tend to produce boom and bust cycles (Sherman and 
Meeropol 2013, 97-113). However, a global pandemic is much rarer and the interplay between 
an economic recession and a global pandemic presents a unique opportunity. In the past, it 
might have been challenging but due to new technology, it was possible to conduct this 
research. I conducted interviews without any risk to my participants. It allowed me to collect 
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data on what people feel about whether the pandemic makes them reconsider the human rights 
of refugees. I collected data from 20 participants, who all shared their views. Zoom was the 
application used in this research, and it was used to communicate with the participants and 
record the audio. For example, travel outside of my own country (Norway) would pose 
problems notwithstanding the isolation and quarantine measures I would have to go through 
upon returning to Norway. At various times of writing this essay, from the summer of 2020 till 
the 2nd of July 2021, there were lockdowns, travel restrictions, travel bans and therefore, it made 
any other case very difficult. Although the selection of cases was limited during my research I 
have developed a theory that is pertinent and interesting that can be tested in various contexts, 
settings and cases. Therefore, despite the strict limitations, it did not hamper the development 
of this theory and testing it in Norway. Therefore, I was limited in my choice not only due to 
the Covid-19 pandemic, but also in terms of time and resources to interviews in Norway, this 
is due to feasibility, but also theoretical reasons such as the Enabling Theory and Norway being 
the best fit to test this case. Indeed, the Enabling theory that I have developed through a 
historical analysis of Norway with the ideologies, structures and cleavages underpinning the 
welfare state can be tested in a broader sense – though the theory was developed and rooted in 
a Norwegian context this theory could also be tested internationally with complementary 
research, although this task would be far too much of an undertaking by one person.  
However, moving on to the structure of the thesis and the research.  
 
 
Section 1.2: The Structure of the Thesis  
The way this thesis is structured can be reduced to two main overarching parts.  
1. A theoretical background and a literature review on the ethics of refuge and a theoretical 
background of the Norwegian welfare state and the cleavages that influenced it.  
2. Empirical research on citizens’ views and perceptions based on qualitative fieldwork, 
interviews, and quasi-experimental interview methods. 
Chapter 2 deals with cleavages of the Norwegian welfare state that developed the welfare state 
and developed the ideologies that developed the welfare state. Chapter 3 is the theory chapter 
that deals with the dependent variable. While chapter 4 is about research and data ethics; there 
I outline the dilemmas that one faces with qualitative data and sensitive data and how such data 
10 
 
should be treated. In Chapter 5, I highlight the methodology being used, namely semi-structured 
interviews and a quasi-experimental design. In chapter 6 I discuss the nature of the data and 
how I recruited the participants for the interviews. In chapter 7, I outline the questionnaire and 
how the quasi-experimental design was conducted in practice. Chapter 8, there I present all the 
data clearly and objectively, where I give a summary of each of the participants in the control 
group and treatment group before I conclude the chapter with a comparison of the groups. 
Chapter 8 is the real meat and potatoes of this research since I collected such a vast amount of 
data to analyse. In chapter 9, I take all the findings of chapter 8 and see if the Enabling Theory 
or if Rokkan’s cleavages influenced the Norwegian welfare state and influenced the ideologies 
(Keynesianism and Neoliberalism) that influenced Norway can explain the findings. In Chapter 
10, I summarize and conclude, and I suggest further research.  
Chapter 2: The Norwegian Welfare State: Cleavages and Ideology  
 
In this chapter, I would like to discuss the cleavages of the Norwegian welfare state, and how 
that has manifested itself in the political victory of the early socialists of Norwegian society. 
They pushed for power and with this power, they sought to empower the working class. Indeed, 
to give security to workers in a time where a worker did not know whether he or she would 
have a job the next day. The early socialists pushed for an expansive welfare state with a 
professional bureaucracy. This chapter is to discuss how the Norwegian welfare state is today, 
and how it differs from other welfare states. I would like to discuss two fundamental paradigm 
shifts within Norway. Contemporary Norway has influences from both Keynesian and 
neoclassical economics (mainstream neoliberal economics) and due to structures and cleavages 
and ideas that were formed in the previous era, the succeeding era has not abandoned all of 
what used to be. The debates surrounding Neoliberalism and Keynesianism is old, however, it 
has been reinvigorated after the recession in 2008 (Skidelsky 2009, 30-110; 150-220; Keynes 
2017; Sherman and Meeropol 2013; Skidelsky 2018, 99-129;132-190; 215-241; 345-380; 
Skidelsky 2015). Although, the neoliberal era has clear and defining characteristics that the era 
of socialism in Norway. Norway has not abandoned its clear and defining characteristics, and 
this makes Norway unique and worthwhile to study. Indeed, two of those defining 
characteristics from the socialist/Keynesian era are countercyclical deficit spending and its 
expansive, generous and universal welfare state. The starting point of the Norwegian welfare 
state and the starting point of this chapter is post World War 2. Firstly, this is the beginning of 
human rights as a concept in international law. Secondly, for Joseph Carens, this is crucial to 
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his idea of cosmopolitanism where he argues that any system of justice must ask itself (2013, 
10-39): “Would this be just in World War 2, where Jews are being systematically murdered in 
the holocaust?” Indeed, he argues that we just view any question of justice towards migrants in 
the light of the holocaust. The holocaust was the critical juncture that started the discussion on 
human rights, and that all humans have a fundamental value because we are humans (Carens 
2013, 23-145). Indeed, and thirdly, this is the start of the massive developments in the 
Norwegian welfare state shaped by those early socialists. Indeed, the starting point is three-
pronged; human rights codified in international law, migration justice in the light of the 
Holocaust, and the start of the most major developments of the Norwegian welfare state. 
However, let us look at those cleavages.  
Section 2.1: Cleavages of the Norwegian Welfare State 
I would like to provide the background perspective on the welfare state and its developments 
due to the Norwegian socialists, and that being a result of Stein Rokkan’s cleavages. 
Fundamentally the Norwegian welfare state was borne out of a pattern of conflict, this pattern 
of conflict being the labour capital cleavage and the rural-city cleavage (Vike 2018; Heidar et 
al 2013, 10-34; Hatland et al 2019. 15-36; Merkl 1969, 496-485). 
Moreover, these cleavages can be exemplified in Norwegian party politics today with the 
Labour Party, the Agrarian Party, and the Conservative Party. Although, the Labour Party and 
the Agrarian Party has conflicted over those interests where both parties seek to represent the 
rural working class (Heidar et al 2013, 20-29). The labour-capital cleavage is about a pattern of 
economic, social and political conflict. To be sure, I am here guided by Stein Rokkan’s work, 
where he thought that party politics and systems are the results of conflicts. The two main 
conflicts that one can see in Norwegian politics is the rural-city and the Labour-Capital 
cleavage. Stein Rokkan developed a theory based upon earlier theories of Ibn Khaldun that 
being the centre-periphery dynamic. To be sure, the centre affects the periphery by 
implementing laws, norms and culture, however, in return the periphery will demand that their 
interests also be represented (Aarebrot and Evjen 2014, 79-102). The importance cannot be 
understated this cleavage theory alongside Dahl’s theory of free farmer societies creating 
pluralistic democracy (Norway fits empirically with the latter theory) is what leads to 
multiculturalism, democracy and inclusion (Ibid 2014; Dahl 1971, 35-70; Lipset and Rokkan 
1967). These cleavages are sources of interest conflict, in some cases, the sources of 
revolutionary action as one saw in the 20th century. These cleavages alongside the structure of 
society (free farmer society instead of a land-owning elite) created a pluralistic party system, 
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where power is unified in parliament but shared through coalition government where each party 
(here political party means a coalition of intense policy-demanders) represents an interest group 
and activists that screen for politicians and representatives to represent their interests in 
parliament (Bawn et al 2012, 571-580; Rocco and Haeder 2018, 274-278). These cleavages 
between the city and rural mean that Norwegian citizens, while to a very large extent is 
homogenous, but has differences in terms of culture and mindset (Dahl 1971; Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967, Aarebrot and Evjen 2014). Indeed, considering rural villages in Norway being 
small, they live in tight-knit communities that rely upon each other and they value the 
community more. I, therefore, suggest that rural participants will care more about cultural 
cohesion since local and rural communities are ofter more cohesive in terms of culture. Aarebrot 
and Evjen explain that the centre will exert cultural influence upon the periphery, however, the 
centre (in this case cities) will have multiple influences from multiple peripheries known as 
counter cultures. Meaning that those who live in cities are more accepting of multiculturalism 
since they have been exposed to it through state and nation-building (2014, 75-100). Moreover, 
in the industrial era where the countryside came into cities to get jobs in factories and industry 
(otherwise known as urbanisation), this exposed those in cities to migration and since they have 
experienced this migration before through the urbanisation of the industrial age (this occurs 
today as well where students must move to bigger cities to get a college or university degree) 
those in cities are more positive towards migration and refugees. Those who live in cities being 
exposed to multiculturalism and migration are therefore more accepting of migration but also 
they will not value culture as highly and stress the importance of culture as much as those living 
rurally. Indeed, and the need for the community is lessened due to the welfare state, while those 
living rurally may live far away from services and therefore rely more upon the community to 
solve problems. Therefore, becoming a part of the community and participating and partaking 
in language, culture, and national holidays becomes important to those living rurally. They will 
therefore stress and emphasize that refugees must participate, learn the language and work. This 
also interplays with egalitarian solidarity, where hard work is valued and cooperation with 
refugees. Indeed, the rural working class is also affected by the labour movement and 
unionisation, where they argued for solidarity with the working class and empowering them. 
The ideology of social democracy and Keynesianism became deeply imprinted in the 
population (Keynes 2017; Aarebrot and Evjen 2014, 85-120; Lipset and Rokkan 1967). 
Moreover, the welfare state then had to develop into local and regional services to universally 
cover Norwegians with the same welfare rights. Although, before this, the local population had 
to heavily rely upon each other to solve issues as mentioned. An interesting point is that this 
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does not necessarily mean that rural participants will be more negative about refugees and 
asylum seekers it can be to the contrary due to the depopulation of rural areas in favour of cities. 
Those who live rurally will then be welcoming and accepting of asylum seekers and refugees 
although they will want refugees and asylum seekers to integrate with ways like learning the 
language, accepting and partaking in their culture.  
 
However, I would like to discuss the ideologies that these cleavages brought forth that also 
influenced the welfare state.  
Section 2.2: Keynesianism, Neoliberalism and the Welfare State in 
Norway 
Although the neoliberal era has had profound effects upon Norway, it has remained very much 
distinct from neoliberal and was much more stubborn about its Keynesian legacy, however, I 
shall argue that this Keynesian form of economics is better at handling crises, and this can be 
shown empirically. See figure 5.1 below.  
 
 
Figure 5.1: Development in GDP in the first years following the 2008 Recession, OECD statistics (Aamo 2018). 
 
Indeed, empirically Norway handled the crisis much better than those major countries above, 
as well as outclassing its Scandinavian neighbour countries with similar systems. Indeed, the 
Stoltenberg labour government handled the crisis while having the automatic stabilizer of the 
welfare state as well as implementing policies that increased the state’s involvement in real 
capital investment (Aamo 2018; Skidelsky 2009, 160-230; Sherman and Meeropol 2013, 325-
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358). This is remarkable it would not be apt to describe the Norwegian experience after the 
global 2018 recession as a recession since a recession is a significant decline and contraction in 
the economy. However, the national economy managed to stave off the recession with 
Keynesian policies, and not neoliberal austerity measures.  Indeed, the Norwegian experience 
was that of some economic turbulence, but goods and services outside of the Norwegian 
economy became cheap, and Norway could therefore get goods and services at lower prices 
(Aamo 2018). Indeed, moreover, the Norwegian currency (NOK) remained strong in 
comparison to other currencies, meaning each NOK got you more USD. Indeed, empirically 
austerity measures across time and spaces do not facilitate recovery as well as Keynesian policy 
prescriptions. This has also been argued in the Economist’s article about the Nordic model 
being the next supermodel (2013). Moreover, as Foster and McChesney note the after the 2008 
recession the neoliberal ideology was not capable of creating the growth that the Western 
capitalistic democracies had grown accustomed to in the short term and neither in the long run 
(2012, 5-30; 135-180). They show empirically that neoliberal ideology unlike the Nordic model 
did not produce stability and security. All of this might seem disconnected from the original 
point; however, this is connected to the Enabling Theory, I argue that the welfare state has 
granted Norwegians the welfare to be concerned about the welfare of refugees. One of the 
elements of the Nordic model is the welfare state. When I use the term Keynesian and 
Keynesianism, I mean post-Keynesian economics and not the neoclassical synthesis. Indeed, 
this is true across time and space. Interwar Europe is a perfect example, Germany and its 
economic recovery in terms of unemployment was remarkable and it outclassed its Austrian 
who followed Austrian economic advice as prescribed by Mises, which was Austrian austerity. 
Germany outclassed its counterpart till the annexation of Austria on the 12th of March 1938, 
Anschluss Österreich, where German policies were implemented which can aptly be described 
as Keynesian. Furthermore, one can the same trend in Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s the United 
States of America, where they implemented Keynesian policies of state intervention in the 
economy to create jobs through real capital investment, however, austerity was implemented 
afterwards which saw the unemployment rate quickly rise again (Skidelsky 2009, 85-130). To 
be sure, while theoretically there is still an ongoing debate on whether the Keynesian stimulus 
is effective or not this cannot be said empirically. Empirically there is strong evidence that 
Keynesian counter-cyclical deficit spending and modern monetary theory are effective tools to 
prevent mass unemployment, and economic catastrophe (Eichengreen and Hatton 1988; Keynes 
2017; Skidelsky 2009; Skidelsky 2018; Sherman and Meeropol 2013). This empirical evidence 
can be found in various contexts from continental Europe in Germany to the Nordic countries 
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to the Anglosphere countries in Roosevelt’s reign as President of the United States of America. 
To be sure, Austrian and neoliberal economics have sought to challenge Keynesianism, 
however, the empirical evidence is undeniable. In some regards, neoliberalism has very 
successfully challenged Keynesianism in areas such as increased privatization, free trade and 
to be sure, the policy recommendation from the OECD is to increase privatization in markets 
that are successful and competitive (OECD Economic Surveys: Norway 2018, 96). They write: 
  
“Slim down the wide-ranging portfolio of state stakes in business through privatisation, especially where these are 
held in companies operating in competitive and well-functioning markets.” 
 
They further emphasize maintaining the current free trade, which all are neoliberal economic 
policies. Indeed, neoliberalism as a political ideology has more and more become deeply 
impregnated with Norwegian politics, and this is also the case with the Norwegian labour party 
as well (Peters and Tatham 2018, 100-120). Moreover, one can see a trend of privatization 
across the European Union as well (Peters and Tatham 2018, 170-220). Moreover, Norway 
implemented new public management measures and centralisation of bureaucracy, which goes 
against the contemporary paradigm. Moreover, the Agrarian Party challenges this centralisation 
as they are the party that represents the rural cleavage. While be the neoliberal advance in 
Europe has facilitated a stronger commitment to privatization even in Norway with the 
privatization of some railways under the current conservative government and railways are a 
natural monopoly, and it has facilitated a stronger commitment to free trade and free movement 
of peoples, which are two of the European Union’s core pillars this is codified in article 26 and 
article 34 of the TFEU or Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Article 26 states 
the following:  
 
“1. The Union shall adopt measures with the aim of establishing or ensuring the functioning of the internal market, 
in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaties. 2. The internal market shall comprise an area without 
internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with 
the provisions of the Treaties. 3. The Council, on a proposal from the Commission, shall determine the guidelines 
and conditions necessary to ensure balanced progress in all the sectors concerned.” 
                                                                                                                      (Chiochetti 2017).  
 
 Article 34 simply states that there can be no barriers to trade between the member states. To 
be sure, Norway is not in the European Union, and instead in the EEC, therefore, it can maintain 
trade barriers with the EU, which could not have been done if Norway were in the EU, therefore, 
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Norway has maintained its protectionist policies. Indeed, one could look at cases such as 
“Commission v Ireland of 1982” otherwise known as the “Buy Irish Case”. Indeed, having a 
campaign that encourages Irish people to buy Irish goods qualified as a “quantitative restriction 
on trade”, which was the resolution of the court case. Indeed, most other European Union 
member states have adopted a policy of free trade within the EU, however, thereby the EU can 
negotiate trade agreements with other nations and the EU member states cannot agree upon 
trade agreements with other nations by themselves. This can be exemplified with the 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), which was between Canada and the 
EU, and the main aim was to facilitate free trade between Canada and the EU. CETA came into 
effect on the 21st of September 2017 after a long and arduous negotiation process that ended up 
with the complex Belgian political system blocking the trade deal due to the region of 
Wallonia’s non-agreement with CETA. However, all of this is to illustrate the dominance of 
the Chicago School and the dominance of the neoliberal economics/neoclassical/mainstream 
school of economics in terms of free trade. The EU is steeped in new public management and 
neoliberal economics, and this was also the case during the Euro Crisis as well (Pisani-Ferry 
2011, 24-180). 
 
Section 2.3: The Norwegian welfare state today: An Introduction 
and Overview 
I shall give an overview and explanation of the Norwegian welfare state and how it differs from 
other welfare states. One of the most important parts of the Norwegian Nordic model is the 
welfare state. Alexander Hicks (1999, 111-169) points out that the main defining characteristic 
of the Nordic model is their universalist, generous and expansive welfare states and its societal 
structure of societal corporatism, and their system of multi-level tripartite collective bargaining 
on wages. To be sure, the literature on the Norwegian welfare state is rich, expansive and has 
been studied for decades (Hicks 1999; Caramani 2014, 349-366; Cappelen et al 2018; Vike 
2018; Hatland et al 2019; Esping-Andersen 1988). Moreover, it is very different from the 
Anglo-liberal welfare states like for example that of the U.S. which is largely means-tested 
programs rather than the universality like the Norwegian welfare state (Howard 1999, 421-440). 
Norwegian politicians abandoned the idea of the American welfare state decades ago which is 
heavily means-tested while the Norwegian one is mostly universal with some means-tested 
schemes. The American welfare state can be characterized as means-tested, while the early 
socialists of Norway abandoned the idea of means-testing benefits, and instead opted for 
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universality, and this is where the welfare state draws its legitimacy from. The Norwegian 
system was created by the earlier evolutionary socialist, who sought to achieve their goal of 
socialism through votes and democracy (Ball et al 2016, 90-160). Indeed, the Norwegian 
welfare state is Nordic welfare is a product of the class struggle (Rokkan’s labour-capital 
cleavage) that the early socialist gained power through parliament and sought to empower the 
working class and create security and stability for those who were the most vulnerable. It 
created the idea of egalitarian solidarity bur the Nordic welfare state means that it has 
comprehensive public welfare policies to secure basic needs, strong public participation (in the 
labour market and in political life), a universal system, income security based both on flat-rate 
basic security and earnings-related benefits, public transfer of income and tax financing (the 
redistributive function that was noted earlier by Hatland et al). Moreover, the Norwegian 
welfare state provides service provision by public authorities on a local level. The welfare states 
provide relatively low differences in income and a strong emphasis on gender equality and 
labour market participation (Hatland et al 2019, 245-262). Labour market participation has in 
later years become one of the main challenges to the Norwegian welfare state (Hatland et al 
2019, 245-280). There are other types of welfare states as well such as the Bismarckian welfare 
state, the Beveridge welfare state, the Latin (Medditerreanan model) like Italy, Spain and Latin 
American countries, the Anglo-Liberal welfare state, continental welfare states like Germany. 
However, I shall not cover these here, and I already mentioned the main way in which Norway 
differs from the Anglo-liberal welfare state that is the Norwegian welfare state’s universality. 
The Norwegian welfare system is based upon equality and solidarity and it requires a legitimate 
system of governance. Furthermore, the Norwegian welfare state consists of many political 
institutions which makes it strong but also weak. Why would it be weak?  The reason for this 
is because it is a political creation of the earlier socialists and Keynesians. It can be influenced 
which one can see with the influence of neoliberalism and this influence also comes through 
the EU as discussed (Hatland et al 2019, 262-288). The Norwegian welfare state is a 
comprehensive system that creates security for citizens. Although Norway is heavily dependent 
on oil income to fund the welfare state (Hatland et al 2019, 270-290). The welfare state is also 
funded by direct taxation on companies and persons. Moreover, indirect taxes like VAT and 
other special taxes on alcohol and tobacco. While pension schemes are financed by a tax paid 
by employers and employees although the oil fund is also supposed to fund the pensions of 
future generations. Indeed, Norwegians are highly taxed comparatively, although, they receive 
a lot of benefits in exchange. A brief overview. Norwegians receive parental benefits (49 weeks 
at full pay which is maxed at the 6G national insurance amount, or 59 weeks at 80% pay. Both 
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parents get at least 10 weeks each, which goes back to the strong gender equality element of 
the Norwegian welfare state). Education is free this includes at the university level as well, and 
the Norwegian state gives students grants and loans through Lånekassen. These grants and loans 
are for books and tools needed throughout the education process and other necessities such as 
housing and food. The welfare state allows for a work-life in Norway that consists of 37.5 hours 
per week of work and this includes 5 weeks of paid vacation every year, a retirement age of 67 
(with many professions having exceptions). Moreover, unemployment benefits give an 
employee approximately 63% of their income for around 2 years. This is known as a passive 
labour market policy, however, at the same time as this passive labour market policy takes effect 
other active labour market policies also take effect so that the unemployed person can regain 
meaningful employment whether that be part-time or full-time employment. Pensions are 
earnings-related but also a flat rate. What is a flat rate? Essentially, the employer multiplies an 
employee’s time working by a flat rate that was already predetermined. It is one of many 
methods of calculating a pension payout. The Norwegian welfare state faces several challenges 
such as high unemployment, oil dependency, a larger share of the population on disability 
benefits and more (Hatland et al 2019 70-95; 110-125; 135-245). And of course, Norway has a 
universal single-payer healthcare system.  
 
I have briefly explained the Norwegian welfare state, however, I would now like to discuss how 
this connects with the Enabling Theory.  
 
Section 2.4: The Enabling Theory: An Explanation  
The enabling theory as mentioned in the introductory section and as outlined is a theory that I 
have developed. It takes from classic theories, while also being innovative and a new theory. It 
takes inspiration from Aristotle (Anagnostopoulos and Santas 2018; Anagnostopoulos 2018, 
179-223) and philosophies of antiquity, while borrowing theories from economics, however, it 
is also a classic theory within political science that institutions do indeed matter and shape 
preferences. Although, the Athenians sense of justice must be considered carefully since they 
had no qualms but excluded slaves and women. Indeed, they did have as Amartya Sen notes:  
 
The Athenian intellectuals discussing inequality did not find it particularly obnoxious to leave out the slaves from 
the orbit of discourse, and one reason why they could do it was that they could get away with it. The concepts of 
equity and justice have changed remarkably over history, and as the intolerance of stratification and differentiation 
has grown, the very concept of inequality has gone through radical transformation... I should argue that the 
19 
 
historical nature of the notion of inequality is worth bearing in mind before going into an analysis of economic 
inequality as it is viewed by economists today. 
                                                                                                                                                           (Sen 1973) 
 
Indeed, Sen rightfully notes that the idea of inequality has come and a long since antiquity and 
I have argued as much that the Norwegian labour movement was built an idea of egalitarian 
solidarity. Indeed, and that this exclusionary idea was slowly torn away by the Norwegian 
labour movement that built the welfare state to be universalistic (meaning non-exclusionary) 
and the Athenian way of democracy is vastly different from what it is today. To be sure, 
democracy in Athenian society was a direct democracy, where women and slaves could not 
participate (Gottlieb 2018, 252-268; Anagnostopoulos and Gerasimos 2018, 179-222; 
Anagnostopoulos 2018). Aristotle suggests that “equality of resources is a way of avoiding 
faction”, as in us versus them mentality. Indeed, it is a way of avoiding conflict and polarization, 
therefore the Enabling Theory is very classic in political philosophy. Indeed, and is a very well-
known concept within economics and studies of the welfare state as well. Automatic stabilizers 
are a type of fiscal policy that one can find baked into the welfare state. The key and main 
takeaways are the following: automatic stabilizers are continuous government policies. These 
policies are there to automatically stabilize incomes, consumption, and business spending over 
the business cycle. Unemployment benefits and sick leave are good examples of this. It is a 
classic theory that borrows from structuralism, sociology, and economics.  This section is to 
clarify what this theory entails and what the implications of this theory are. This theory is 
relevant for crises and seeks to explain why it is Norwegians have been enabled to be concerned 
about the fundamental human rights and freedoms of asylum seekers and refugees, while there 
is a global recession and a deadly pandemic. The Enabling Theory, as I have coined it, borrows 
from Keynesian economics as well, and the welfare state alongside countercyclical deficit 
spending has prevented the deterioration of the welfare of citizens and their material well-being. 
Indeed, as I have discussed socialists have long fought in Norway to minimize the effects of the 
social domination of capital over labour. Indeed, the Nordic model of an expansive, generous, 
and universal welfare state guaranteeing citizens a minimum standard of economic well-being 
has been commended in contemporary debates after the 2008 great recession as the next 
supermodel. It was argued that it curtailed one of the worst excesses of capitalism, that being 
that capitalists are responsible for society’s economic well-being, thus if firms and their well-
being declines it will have detrimental effects upon wages, employment, and society. Meaning 
that if companies were to go through a contraction nationwide this would have detrimental 
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effects upon the entire economy. Without state intervention through active and passive labour 
market policies and the welfare state everyone’s economic well-being, which is tied to the well-
being of firms, companies and corporations would also be severely affected (Keynes 2017, 269-
323; Skidelsky 2015, 338-380; Skidelsky 2009, 131-165). Furthermore, due to the nature of the 
state, capitalism and investment heterodox economists argue that social domination will occur, 
which is even the state actively prioritizes the interests and preferences of capital over labour. 
This theory of social domination was first developed in sociology and by Marxian heterodox 
economists, while the latter theory is known as structural dependence of the state upon capital 
(Przewoski and Wallerstein 1988, 11-14).  Indeed, Norway after 2008 was remarkably resilient 
to the economic crisis and the subsequent Euro crisis of 2010. The Norwegian economy was 
resilient and recovered at a remarkable rate in comparison to other contemporaneous economies 
at the time. Indeed, we are at a time of crisis again, however, this time it is not merely an 
economic crisis, but also a global pandemic in Covid-19, and in the second quarter of 2020, the 
Norwegian GDP sunk by 6.3% according to statistics Norway (SSB).  
 
Furthermore, this is the biggest recession recorded by SSB, meaning that Norway is currently 
experiencing the worst economic crisis in its recorded history, while also dealing with a deadly 
pandemic in Covid-19 (Kjos and Helliesen 2020). The SSB in their article states (translated 
from Norwegian): 
 
“Activity in the Norwegian economy fell sharply after the introduction of infection control measures on 
12 March. Gross domestic product (GDP) for mainland Norway fell by 7.3 per cent in March and fell by 
a further 4.1 per cent in April. The decline was particularly strong in many service industries, new figures 
from the national accounts show.” 
 
Indeed, this is a sharp decline and many other countries saw similar declines and other countries 
worse declines to their national economies. There is as well rich, in-depth, and expansive 
theories and literature behind the welfare state (as I have discussed). The set of policies that 
were introduced alongside the welfare state is known as “motkunjunkturpolitkk” and is very 
well established in post-Keynesian and the neoclassical synthesis (Keynes 2017, 38-77). These 
countercyclical policies in Norway came in the form of real capital investment in schools, 
hospitals, roads and coupled with the welfare state this gave rise to a rapid recovery, and the 
financial crash of 2008 and 2009 was barely felt in comparison to nations such as the United 
States, and others who did not give these policy prescriptions and who did not have generous 
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and expansive welfare states. The same policy prescriptions have been given to curb the worst 
excess of capitalism. Although it has been debated whether the Keynesian stimulus is still 
effective in facilitating recovery, I will not enter this debate, however, I will argue that in the 
Norwegian case and mainstream Norwegian macroeconomics it is still accepted as the policy 
prescription to give due to the idea of the “investment brake” meaning even if prescriptions 
such as tax cuts are given this is not enough to facilitate real capital investment so that the 
economy will recover. It must be done in conjunction with countercyclical deficit spending so 
that capital will regain confidence in the market and once more invest (Skidelsky 2009, 20-65; 
Sherman and Meeropol 2013, 40-120; Keynes 2017). This provided Norwegian citizens with a 
stable income throughout the recession period, however, citizens could still afford to do many 
of the things that they had grown accustomed to. The welfare state is also a stability mechanism 
and citizens know that there will always be a safety net to catch them if they fall on rough times. 
This might be due to structural reasons and/or individual reasons such as wanting to attain 
another job and then quitting the old one. Structural reasons being pandemics, recessions and 
so on.  There are many preference reasons as to why someone may quit their job, and the 
Norwegian welfare state provides for healthcare, which in the U.S. is often tied to occupation 
making it harder for people to quit the job that they do not like and pursue another profession. 
Thus, the Norwegian welfare state is an enabler of freedom of choice since rights and freedoms 
are universal and tied to citizenship. A contraction in the economy according to Keynes is due 
to a collapse in effective demand, which hampers investment from firms due to the herd 
mentality and the investment brake due to low confidence in potential profit to be made in the 
economy. To be sure, the welfare state then becomes an instrumental tool against homelessness, 
poverty, starvation, while there is an economic contraction. The Norwegian system and its 
welfare state are currently being put to the stress test, however, what is most fascinating is that 
debates around asylum seekers and refugees have persisted, and the welfare state seems to have 
been an enabler of such debates. To be sure, if the economic well-being of Norwegians were to 
be put into question, then such debates would not have been possible, because they would be 
more concerned about citizens rather than asylum seekers and refugees. If such debates ceased 
and asylum seekers and refugees were put on the back burner and their human rights and 
freedoms deprioritized this would pose a great threat to them due to the Covid-19 crisis and the 
already awful conditions that many refugees live in. However, the welfare state of Norway has 
enabled these debates to continue and for their human rights not to be deprioritized and be a top 
priority for many and be on top of the policy agenda. This could be seen throughout the Covid-
19 crisis with the children of the Moria camp being highlighted often in media and debates, 
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however, the enabling theory is not merely about issues regarding refugees and asylum seekers. 
It is an enabler of debates around climate change, and other issues that are not solely about the 
pandemic and the economic recession. Indeed, the welfare state is integral, that it shapes and 
influences preferences, the welfare state distributes wealth, it secures a minimum guaranteed 
standard of living, and it is an instrument for democracy. Moreover, the Norwegian welfare 
state is a product of decades of development and preexisting rural-city cleavage, which has been 
discussed. product of the labour-capital cleavage. I have noted how instrumental the labour 
movement and the labour party were in developing the modern Norwegian welfare state. To be 
sure, I have also discussed Norway’s longest-serving prime minister, Einar Gerhardsen, the 
father of the Norwegian nation (Landsfaderen). Indeed, I have discussed how his service as 
prime minister for 17 years reemphasizes how crucial the socialist movement was in the 
development of justice and the welfare state. He was one of the main architects behind 
rebuilding Norway after the second world war. Indeed, I explained the ideological movements, 
and how they shaped Norway. In this chapter, I have created a historical narrative based upon 
ideologies and how they influenced the welfare state and the Nordic model. Hopefully, with 
this chapter we embark on a common understanding how of the Norwegian welfare state was 
developed, the cleavages that affected not only the welfare state but Norwegian democracy as 
well. And how these ideas of egalitarian solidarity and how Rokkan’s conflict theory created 
systems for resolving those conflicts in the most peaceful manner such as tripartite cooperation 
on wages for example. The egalitarian solidarity, the cooperation, the trust, and the 
communication between different socio-economic classes in a society where power is shared 
and pluralistic was ultimately defined and became crystallized in the Norwegian socialist era 
with the welfare state. The welfare state, therefore, is a positive feedback loop, where it 
reinforces these ideas. However, I would like to move on to the dependent variable.  
 
Chapter 3: Theory: From Communitarianism to Cosmopolitanism 
to Welfare Chauvinism   
In this chapter, I discuss theories. The structure of this chapter is that I start with the French 
Revolutionary ideals of what citizenship is, while thereafter contrasting the French 
Revolutionary ideals with Carens’ conception of cosmopolitanism. Thereafter, discuss Miller’s 
communitarianism, while finally contrasting this with Andersen and Bjørklund’s theory of 
welfare chauvinism, which is a form of nationalism that rejects the universality of the welfare 
state, and argues that the welfare state should just belong to citizens, us versus them mentality. 
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Us vs them mentality is indeed as well indicative and characterizes populist radical right-wing 
parties in Europe. Indeed, this chapter is designed to be a literature review as well it is my 
dependent variable (attitudes towards refugees). While cosmopolitanism is the most favourable 
towards refugees, communitarianism is more sceptical, while welfare chauvinism/welfare 
nationalism is the least favourable. It can be viewed as a continuum and citizens can move up 
and down this continuum, however, the expectation as discussed earlier is that Norwegians are 
communitarians. They view refugees favourably, although they are not cosmopolitans. 
However, first and foremost a discussion of citizenship, and thereafter a discussion, 
explanation, and literature review of these. Although, I focus on key authors like David Miller 
(2016), Joseph Carens (2013; 1988; 1987) Andersen and Bjørklund (1990) authors are included 
as well. However, let us begin with Cosmopolitanism.  
 
Section 3.1: Citizenship   
In this section, I would like to discuss why citizenship matters. Indeed, I argue that citizenship 
is a fundamental human right. Bellamy, one of the leading contemporary scholars on citizenship 
heavily emphasize political citizenship as representation, democracy, and suffrage, however, I 
would like to start in simpler terms. This is not to say that Richard Bellamy is wrong in including 
democracy into citizenship since democracies can best safeguard against human rights abuses 
since the source of the laws that bind citizens are the citizens themselves. The keyword is 
“universality” and this is equality of rights. The main thread here is that the Norwegian welfare 
state is universal, it draws its legitimacy from its universality and this is also the case for 
citizenship (Bellamy 2008, 1-27; 89-97). For example, the suffrage movement and the civil 
rights movement in the U.S. was about the illegitimacy of making distinctions between groups 
in society where one group has full rights and others do not. Citizenship can be a broad term, 
but if one boils it down to its simplicity it simply means belonging in a community. In this 
community citizens and those who seek to become citizens must participate in society. 
Although, this debate about citizenship and whether states have the right to exclude is extensive 
(Bertram 2018, 23-120; Bellamy 2008; Kymlicka 2002, 208-284; 284-327; Carens 1988, 207-
230; Carens 1987, 251-270; Carens 2013; Miller 2016). Carens argues that citizenship matters 
but that we should not exclude migrants from moving to another country and settling down. 
However, Miller and Kymlicka outlines that those states do have a right to exclude migrants 
and that this is just. They argue from a point of the popular sovereignty principle, that 
democratically a society or a community should be allowed to exclude migrants and refugees 
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if they deem it necessary. It can be for reasons such as excluding refugees because the given 
country cannot grant refuge to more refugees due to reasons such as capacity and resources. 
However, Carens argues that this is unjust to individuals and their rights. Cosmopolitanism 
focus is on the individual and their rights, on the other hand, communitarianism focus on groups 
and their rights. However, welfare chauvinists may be fine with granting refuge to more 
refugees however exclude them from full citizenship rights. Communitarians are to the 
contrary, they argue that any such separation of citizenship would be unfair and unjust, 
therefore, communitarians may argue that a certain number of refugees should be granted refuge 
to thereafter be integrated into society efficiently and this cannot succeed without refugees 
being granted full rights.  Of course, cosmopolitanism agrees that any separation of citizenship 
would be highly problematic and unjust. Moreover,  citizenship is a very direct source of rights, 
and once one has attained citizenship taking this citizenship away from someone if they do not 
hold another citizenship (effectively making that person stateless) is problematic for 
cosmopolitanism and communitarianism. Furthermore, it is also illegal according to 
international law (Bellamy 5-30). Although welfare chauvinism argues that this is not as 
problematic since the citizen in question did not truly hold citizenship (since they did not have 
full rights with their citizenship).  
 
To summarize, the three theories of justice are tied together through the idea of citizenship. 
Citizenship is fundamentally about who belongs. It is a direct legal source to your rights that 
you can claim although that obligates you to fulfil the rights of others as well. Citizenship is a 
bundle of rights and a bundle of duties and obligations. Moving on to cosmopolitanism.  
 
Section 3.2: Joseph Carens: Cosmopolitanism  
Cosmopolitanism differentiates itself from communitarianism in that it argues that 
communitarians like Miller and that communitarianism do not go far enough and it does not 
solve the inherent injustices that borders impose. While communitarians argue that countries 
have a right to decide who is allowed to settle inside their borders and that allowing a nation-
state this kind of self-determination whether it be democratic or not is just. Although,  
cosmopolitans like Carens disagrees. I hypothesize at the end of this chapter that Norwegians 
are much more in line with communitarians like David Miller since Carens’ cosmopolitan 
justice goes further and it is more radical than what mainstream Norwegians can accept. 
However, herein lies the main theme again, what if: the welfare state was to be theoretically 
threatened? Would Norwegians’ attitudes towards asylum seekers and refugees change from a 
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cosmopolitan outlook to a more welfare chauvinistic/welfare protectionist outlook? The welfare 
chauvinism could express itself as giving refugees and asylum seekers less welfare and make it 
different from native citizens, but still be positive of free movement and allowing them to 
resettle in Norway. However, they could also potentially say that they should not be allowed to 
resettle in Norway, and they should instead receive some resources to able to live and get their 
human rights at these camps. This is a frequent talking point of the Progress Party, where they 
argue that instead of resettlement Norway should give them money and resources and “help 
them where they are”. However, they could also say; “Well, if our welfare state is threatened 
and you know, my economic well-being is demolished, then we must look out for ourselves 
first, and you know we can’t take in refugees and we have to reject asylum seekers or put them 
on hold.” To reemphasize, the central hypothesis is that the welfare state has allowed people to 
have a cosmopolitan attitude toward asylum seekers and refugees. Anything else is a deviation 
from the expectation, and I expect that if Norwegian citizens’ feel their welfare is threatened 
that this communitarian outlook will be undermined. Nevertheless, there are some underlying 
and fundamental principles of justice and morality in cosmopolitanism and communitarianism 
that cannot be overlooked. Firstly, is that citizenship is not based on race, ethnicity, or religion. 
Indeed, to elaborate further: 
 
“What matters most morally with respect to a person’s legal status and legal rights in a democratic political 
community is not ancestry or birthplace or culture or identity or values or actions or even the choices that 
individuals and political communities make but simply the social membership that comes from residence over 
time…. [Most people] develop deep and rich networks of relationships in the place where they live, and this normal 
pattern of human life is what makes sense of the idea of social membership.” 
                                                                                                                                                     (Carens 2013, 160) 
 
Human beings tend to judge and discriminate based on actions, and identity. For example, if I 
feed homeless children in Africa and give them lifesaving medicine, while my brother does not, 
then from an outsider’s perspective they would judge me to be of a higher moral worth because 
I aided starving and needy children in Africa. Although, I shall argue, and the question asked 
of the participants are about “human dignity”. Indeed, this human dignity is that people have 
an innate moral worth due to being human and that no one is worth more than another based 
upon characteristics such as race, ethnicity, or religion. This is not inconsistent with the view I 
just put forth, while we as humans do, indeed, judge people for their actions and thereafter 
might add that person A is of a higher moral worth than person B, because person B is a terrorist, 
while person A is involved in charities for children for example. Indeed, more unfairly though, 
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individuals may discriminate on identity by having a preconceived notion and idea about that 
identity. Say a person who identifies are gay or lesbian may get unfairly judged and 
discriminated against due to those preconceived notions and ideas about them (Gutman 1988, 
190-220). Most people would agree that discrimination based on race and ethnicity is unjust, 
however, it must be mentioned that in the context of citizenship then none of these matters. The 
Norwegian bureaucracy is a professional Weberian one, and the Norwegian Directorate of 
Immigration (UDI or Utlendingsdirektoratet in Norwegian) cannot let their personal biases get 
in the way, and they have to judge each case on a very strict framework of rules guidelines on 
who to grant citizenship and/or asylum in Norway (Aarebrot and Evjen 2014, 24-45). Of course, 
asylum seekers and refugees that need the most help, and the most urgent help will get it first, 
and in a way, this is a form of discrimination in favour of one person. Indeed, this expands to 
the welfare state as well. Legal rights to welfare and these rights not being tied to ancestry, 
birthplace, culture, or identity. Put in simpler terms, it is not tied to ethnicity. Carens argues in 
favour of social membership theory as well. Carens writes:  
 
“The moral right of states to apprehend and deport irregular migrants erodes with the passage of time.  As irregular 
migrants become more and more settled, their membership in society grows in moral importance, and the fact that 
they have settled without authorization becomes correspondingly less relevant…. The implication of this analysis 
is that states … should establish an individual right for migrants to transform their status from irregular to legal 
after a fixed period of time of residence, such as five to seven years.”    
                                                                                                                                               (Carens 2013, 150-151) 
 
Carens’ theory deals with citizenship, identity and who belongs. Such debates about nationality 
and belonging have been highly discussed and debated within comparative politics. Indeed, not 
to mention nationalist struggles over identity, ethnicity, and self-determination such as 
Yugoslavia and Ireland (Gibney 2017, 187-213). However, Carens argues that it is not ethnicity 
that determines citizenship, but rather his social membership theory and forming rich, deep, and 
meaningful connections. Cosmopolitan morality ascribes equality of citizenship, where one can 
achieve citizenship regardless of ethnicity, religion, race gender, and social status. It is then 
morally illegitimate to exclude people from citizenship based on ethnicity, race, and religion. 
Moreover, it is a departure from previously established titular nation-states of Europe, which 
defined their structures of citizenship (Aarebrot and Evjen 2014, 150-220). Historically there 
have been exceptions to this such as Switzerland and the Netherlands. However, Carens seems 
to contradict himself later that it is not rich social connections and networks that entitles 
someone to citizenship. Consider the recluse, a person who moves to the mountains of Italy to 
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avoid making such connections and networks altogether. Carens furthermore argues that it does 
entitle the person to citizenship. Carens argues:  
 
“The recluse who is the descendent of several generations of citizens is still a member of society, not because of 
her ancestry but because of where she lives.  The immigrant recluse has the same claims to social membership.” 
                                                                                                                           (Carens 2013, 168) 
 
In the case of refugees, the same principle holds although refugees are often granted citizenship 
very early. Indeed, irregular migrants that turn out to be refugees have a stronger claim, where 
returning to their country of origin can have detrimental consequences. Carens argues firstly 
that is the rich and deep connections that one creates that entitles one to citizenship. However, 
Carens’ goes on to argue that the recluse scenario which is inconsistent with what he already 
established. He makes a point of through living on the land, people make connections with the 
land itself, as in building/buying a home in the mountains (the recluse scenario) and leaving 
one’s mark on it. You become a part of the land, and while this does not entirely solve the 
contradiction that Carens put forth with the recluse scenario what I added would explain it.  
Indeed, and this does not contradict the principle that every single individual has the same rights 
to the lands of the earth (Miller 2016; Carens 2014; Carens 1988, 207-220; Benhabib 2004, 71-
100). However, it must be mentioned that the recluse scenario is unlikely. What is more likely 
is another scenario known as parallel society, and a great amount of emphasis in recent years 
has been to combat this phenomenon. It is not viewed as acceptable by the Norwegian 
government, successive Labour and Conservative governments, for refugees to close 
themselves off to greater society (Ottosen 2016).  Indeed, one might form rich, deep, and 
meaningful connections with the refugees that live in the same area. However, this might result 
in ghettoization and gentrification, where an area becomes completely dominated by people of 
the same ethnic group. This might occur for multiple reasons in Norway, firstly, Kommune 
housing policy to house refugees in certain areas and secondly, refugees and minorities wanting 
to feel safe and at home and therefore through their own volition choose to live in areas with 
people who are like them. Likewise, this gentrification of ethnic Norwegians occurs for the 
same reasons. Those two reasons summed up are 1) state and local policy and 2) personal 
preferences. Due to the recluse example being unlikely I put forth a more realistic dilemma that 
has occurred in many countries (Miller 2016, 170-200) It questions what one means by those 
words that Carens use. Carens argues that it is the deep, rich, and meaningful relations, but what 
if they do not form them and instead choose to live with people that are also refugees and chose 
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to not interact with greater society? Theoretically speaking, this can potentially cause racism 
and xenophobia against such minorities. This can cause between natives and refugees. This is 
because those groups live completely different cultural lifestyles, different languages, different 
religions that the other groups do not understand. After all, to create a healthy multicultural 
society those deep and meaningful connections across groups and it is not merely enough to 
create them with the refugees living in the same area (Carens 2013; Miller 2016). David Miller 
argues that gentrification and ghettoization occur and therefore integration through culture, 
language and education is needed.  Communitarian and cosmopolitan conceptions of 
citizenship are inclusive and universalistic. A refugee through legal frameworks is granted 
citizenship or residence permit. The latter and the former who has been living on the land over 
time will generate and accumulate claims to citizenship and to the same legal rights that come 
with citizenship. This will also occur in the eyes of natives as well. Communitarians, therefore, 
disagree with Carens since they value the community highly and it is important they become a 
part of it.  
 
Section 3.3: David Miller: Communitarianism   
In this section, I would like to discuss liberal nationalism, which is also known as 
communitarianism or soft cosmopolitanism. This is also known as the institutional and 
mainstream view of society. Earlier, I explained Carens’ cosmopolitanism as he is one of the 
main proponents of this view, however, David Miller is perhaps the most well-known advocate 
of the communitarian view. Communitarianism stands in contrast to cosmopolitanism and 
welfare chauvinism, while welfare chauvinism or welfare nationalism is about ethnicity, 
however, cosmopolitanism and communitarianism do not consider ethnicity to be a qualifying 
factor for citizenship and equal welfare rights. Communitarians like Miller are greatly 
concerned with issues of reciprocity between natives and refugees, as refugees have human 
rights and welfare rights, but they, moreover, have duties and obligations to fulfil as well (Miller 
2016, 65-180). What such duties encompass has been hotly and largely debated in 
communitarian and soft cosmopolitan philosophy (Miller 2016; Miller and Straehle 2019). 
Communitarianism is about the community, and it is necessarily about reciprocity. To have 
rights, others must have duties to fulfil your rights. Communitarians value democracy, they 
value freedom of movement, and they think that all people are morally equal like cosmopolitans 
do (Miller 2016, 23-40). Communitarianism differs in the two following ways from 
cosmopolitanism. Firstly, they emphasize integration and obligations on refugees to become a 
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part of society and to gain citizenship. The moral right to deport refugees and migrants 
deteriorate further if they are members of society in sense of having a job, knowing the 
language, partaking in the culture and intermingling with the local native community. It is not 
merely the passage that erodes the right to deport refugees or migrants. It is morally right to 
deport refugees back to their country of origin regardless of the passage of time and regardless 
of time and if they have become a part of the community as this is the moral right of the popular 
sovereignty principle. However, this right erodes when citizenship is granted and according to 
communitarianism, it is not the passage of time but the contributions that they have made to 
society and become a part of the community (Miller 2016, 40-120).  The second way the two 
theories of justice differ is that communitarianism argues that it is right for the state to exclude, 
and as discussed that refugees and migrants have obligations that they need to fulfil to become 
part of the community. Indeed, Christopher Bertram tackles the question if states are morally 
within their right to exclude migrants (2018). In communitarianism, they argue that the right of 
the community to self-determination and popular sovereignty triumph over the right of migrants 
and refugees to move to another country. Indeed, not everyone can be a part of the same 
community and live in Norway for example, therefore, excluding some people is morally 
justifiable. Cosmopolitanism argues that contrary and that the rights of refugees and migrants 
triumph over the right of the community to exclude and would argue that community should 
not exclude. In the case of refugees, communitarianism will argue that it has a moral duty to 
help those in need but only to a certain extent that they will decide themselves through the 
principle of popular sovereignty. There are, of course, degrees of legitimacy to the popular 
sovereignty principle, for example, an authoritarian regime exercising such discretion would be 
less moral than if a democratic regime does so in communitarian justice. This is because 
communitarianism is a democratic theory of justice like cosmopolitanism. Indeed, welfare 
chauvinist justice and ideology is murkier. We shall come back to this point later but this is 
because welfare chauvinism is often linked to populist radical right-wing parties such as the 
Norwegian Progress Party. Those who support PRR parties tend to favour majoritarian 
democracy (Peters and Tatham 2016, 33-51). Although the contemporary Progress Party that 
has been part of three Conservative coalition governments cannot be characterised as a welfare 
chauvinist party Welfare chauvinism unlike cosmopolitanism and communitarianism is not a 
well-defined theory of justice and ideology – it very simply just means having two separate 
welfare states but that also implies to separate forms of citizenship. I have now discussed how 
Communitarianism differs from Cosmopolitanism. However, welfare chauvinism is different 




Section 3.4: Welfare Chauvinism in Norway: Andersen and 
Bjørklund 
The previous literature on welfare chauvinism is extensive, and as structuralism stated, it shows 
theoretically and empirically that institutions matter in preference formation (Cappelen and 
Peters 2017b). It cuts against the liberal grain of universalism in the welfare state, and it can 
also be aptly called welfare state nationalism. The idea behind it is that welfare benefits should 
be restricted to certain groups. These benefits should only be given to natives instead of 
immigrants, and it could also be called welfare state nativism. Often this ideology cuts certain 
groups off from welfare state benefits based on ethnicity and race (Cappelen and Peters 2017b). 
Although, the literature and the term welfare chauvinism came from a study on the Danish and 
Norwegian populist radical right parties (PRR party). The Norwegian Progress Party was not 
founded as a PRR party. Before the contemporary Progress Party, it was known as “Anders 
Lange’s Party against taxation and fees”. The Progress party later reformed itself into a 
neoliberal anti-immigration and Eurosceptic party (Tatham and Peters 2016, 30-45; Heidar et 
al 2013). Although, as Jørgen Andersen and Tor Bjørklund point out in the 1990s the Progress 
Parties of Denmark and Norway were littered with paradoxes and hard to define (1990, 195). 
Indeed, it is easier to define what the Norwegian Progress Party is not rather than what it is 
(Ibid 1990, 212). Andersen and Bjørklund originally coined the term welfare chauvinism in 
their seminal piece. Indeed, and this coincided with the rise of neoliberalism in western 
democracies, one should note as I note that Norway was lagging in the implementation of 
neoliberal policies and the ideological paradigm to longer to shift and has not shifted completely 
to this day (Peters and Tatham 2016; Heidar et al 2013). However, to understand what welfare 
chauvinism is first we must understand what populist radical right parties are. Populist radical 
right parties are different from regionalist and separatist parties. Examples of such parties is the 
Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) and the Spanish “Partido Andalucista” (PA) known in English 
as the Andalusian Party (AP). PRR parties in Europe tend Euroscepticism. This is not the case 
for regionalist parties. Regionalist parties tend towards being more Europhile. Regionalist 
parties have been dubbed the “Europhile fringe” by scholars and the conclusion is that such 
parties show higher support for the European project (Peters and Tatham 2016, 35-49; Jolly 
2007, 14-16). Regionalist political parties are in favour of the EU, and this is the case across 
time and space. However, Seth Kincaid Jolly also finds regionalist parties have a Europhile 
tendency on matters of public policy that cannot be found in PRR parties. Indeed, the Progress 
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Party to this day has retained its Euroscepticism. Regionalist parties contrast their populist 
radical right counterpart (Jolly 2007). Cas Mudde’s definition distinguishes and necessitates 
that populist radical right parties are on the national level rather than on the regional level 
(Mudde 2007). How I define populist radical right parties is that populist radical right parties 
are radical. Radical in this context simply means that they are going to the “root of the problem”. 
The perceived root of the problem for these parties is the diffusion of the nation-state, its powers 
and competencies being transferred to the subnational level, to the regions (Hooghe et al 2010, 
109-120). However, it is hard to pin down a definition of PRR parties, however, the term 
welfare chauvinism came from Andersen and Bjørklund’s analysis of the Progress Parties of 
Denmark and Norway. Welfare chauvinism and the nationalism espoused by the Progress 
Parties is based upon a mentality of the other versus us. Therefore, there should be a welfare 
state for us, and not for the other. Indeed, welfare chauvinism and nationalism go hand in glove. 
I have now expounded upon cosmopolitanism, communitarianism and welfare chauvinism. All 
these theories have implications for citizenship. Indeed, cosmopolitanism and 
communitarianism both argue that one should be able to attain full legal citizenship regardless 
of the race though as mentioned, while the main difference between the two is the following: 
Carens believes that living in a certain area for a long time grants you stronger and stronger 
rights to citizenship, while communitarians disagree because to communitarians citizenship is 
about community and contributing and partaking. You have obligations as well as rights. I have 
discussed citizenship as well and why it should matter and how all these three theories of justice 
are connected through citizenship. I would now like to deal with the implications of conducting 
interviews and take into account research ethics and data protection.  
 
 
Chapter 4: Research Ethics and Data Protection  
 
Since my data as discussed in the data section is sensitive information, I must take precautionary 
steps and I am legally bound to EU and Norwegian law to uphold the duties and obligations 
listed in the GDPR guidelines. I take data protection very seriously and all personal data is 
processed lawfully, fairly, and transparently (here transparency simply means that if someone 
were to access the data later the experiment could be replicated and that authorities could 
investigate it later if needed). This is discussed more in the FAIR principles below. The personal 
data was only collected for the specified, explicit purposes that the respondent in the interview 
was made aware of. The data will be kept for a limited time, one year after the research was 
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completed. This conforms with the respondents’ rights to be forgotten. Simply put, I must 
remove and delete all their personal information that could be used in identifying them. 
Moreover, I follow the University of Bergen’s guidelines and use their guidelines that are 
consistent with EU and Norwegian regulations. I shall use the University of Bergen’s SAFE 
software when I deal with data, and I store the data there. Moreover, I shall conform to UiB’s 
written formal guidelines on interviews (UIB 2020). UiB’s SAFE system conforms to the 
ALLEA guidelines and it follows the FAIR principles, which are: Findable, Accessible, 
Interoperable, and Re-Usable. These principles ensure that the data is as transparent as possible, 
while also keeping the data as close as possible (ALLEA 2017, 7). To be sure, my project 
follows these principles, however, the data itself cannot be accessed by others due to the 
sensitive nature of the data being interviews, and that information violates their right to privacy. 
The project does not fall within the DPIA, and it does not pose a high risk of the rights and 
freedoms of any of the potential participants (Tamburri 2019). Indeed, my project is a low-risk 
one, and every single participant involved did so of their own volition and all the participants 
are required to be of legal age of 18 years or older. However, it is not that simple. The Data 
Protection Commission in their section on sensitive personal data outlines as follows:  
 
“Sensitive data, this includes special categories of data as defined in Article 9 GDPR (for example information 
about individuals’ political opinions), as well as personal data relating to criminal convictions or offenses. An 
example would be a general hospital keeping patients’ medical records or a private investigator keeping offenders’ 
details.” 
                                                                                                                       (Data Protection Commission 2019, 6) 
 
Although collect sensitive information, as in political opinions, the data itself (recordings of the 
interviews) do not contain their real name, but instead a pseudonym. The participants gave me 
an age range, their gender, their general occupation i.e student, retail worker, barista and so on, 
their region of residence and finally whether they live rurally or in a city. Thus, the recordings 
themselves become less sensitive, and I am the only person who has access to the information 
since no other researcher will be involved. The recordings were not kept on any of my devices 
but rather stored in the UiB’s safe system, where only I can access it and will be deleted from 
the system thereafter following UiB’s regulations and rules. Therefore, I concluded that DPIA 
is not necessary and that is due to the low risk this poses to the participants' freedom, rights, 
and personhood. It was made clear to each of the participants what the data was being used for, 
how their data was stored and what rights they have under the GDPR. I made sure that their 
rights were fully protected. Indeed, I moreover consulted another researcher at the University 
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of Bergen (Cornelius W. Cappelen), who was also of the opinion that a DPIA is not needed due 
to how the data is collected and stored (Data Protection Commission 2019, 5-8). Without a 
proper understanding of the GDPR guidelines and the DPIA guidelines one might be misled 
into thinking that DPIA is necessary when it is not, of course, there is nothing wrong with taking 
precautions and conducting a DPIA, but for a research paper like this with such low-risk data, 
it is not needed. The paper adheres to the fundamental principles of research integrity. To be 
sure, all good research and researchers must follow these principles. Which is the following: 
Reliability, honesty, respect, and accountability. Reliability is about ensuring the quality of 
research, reflected in the design, the methodology, the analysis, and the use of resources. 
Honesty when developing, undertaking, reviewing, reporting, communicating research in a 
transparent, fair, full, and unbiased way. The second principle of honesty is very important in 
social science, although, the researcher can never be fully removed from his biases, and thus in 
my view it is better to make it transparent to other researchers and the potential readers of the 
research what your biases are. This is consistent with the principle of honesty, and to declare 
that researcher has no biases and that they are completely removed from them while conducting 
the research would be a mistake. Moreover, it is better to declare what the biases are and remain 
true to the principle of honesty and transparency while trying to keep such biases at bay, while 
one conducts the research. To be sure, this sentiment is also echoed by other researchers such 
as Gerring (Gerring 2012, 68-74). Respect for colleagues, respect for research participants, 
society, ecosystems, cultural heritage, and the environment. Indeed, it is important to show 
respect to the research community, and properly cite work used in one’s research, while also 
showing respect for the people that participate in one’s research, because they are invaluable to 
your research and their contribution allowed your research to continue to completion. 
Accountability for the research from the idea to publication, for its management and 
organization, for training, supervision and mentoring and its wider impacts. These four 
principles of research integrity are outlined in “The European Code of Conduct for Research 
Integrity” published by All European Academies shortened to ALLEA (All European 
Academies 2017, 3-4). Indeed, the paper and research do not engage in any violations of the 
ALLEA guidelines such as falsification, fabrication, or plagiarism. All work that is included in 
this research is cited, and none of the data found was fabricated, and the paper does not 
manipulate research materials, equipment or processes or changing, omitting, or suppressing 
data or results without justification. If data is left out of the research is done so with proper 
justifications such for example a participant opting out of the research and invoking their right 
to be forgotten (2017, 7). Moreover, I acknowledge that any violation of these principles will 
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result in an investigation of the wrongdoings, and I am aware of the consequences thereafter. 
Although, I must not only consider legal requirements but also consider ethical guidelines and 
conduct. I must also consider the boundaries of the participant and respect their wishes as if 
they no longer want to participate, then the interview stops, and all data deleted. I must also 
make sure the participant is comfortable throughout the interview otherwise I will not get the 
best possible data. If the participant feels uncomfortable throughout the interview the likelier it 
is that they regret their participation. To be sure, it is my job as a social science researcher to 
make sure that the person feels comfortable throughout the interview. The ethical guidelines 
are intuitive, they protect and ensure the safety of participants, but furthermore, it ensures that 
you get the best possible data in the case of interviews. Although, conflicts of interest do occur, 
where the safety of the participant and obtaining the best possible data clash, however, in the 
case of this paper, the safety and comfort of the participant and the best possible data go hand 
in glove. Furthermore, to ensure the privacy of participants, the participants will be given new 
names, also known as pseudonymization, and their exact age will not be given, but rather their 
age group will be given. For example: “18-25”. The participants’’ occupations will be stated, 
but their specification position and which company they work for will not be given. 
Furthermore, their gender will be stated, and whether they live in a cosmopolitan area or if they 
live in a rural area. So, to give an example: “I think the Norwegian welfare state does a lot of 
good for people…” said Helene, 18-25, female, student, and barista from Vestland, Norway, 
who lives in a big city cosmopolitan area. This gives enough context and background about the 
participant without the information breaching their right to privacy, and the information given 
cannot be used to identify the person. However, considering the topic that I am researching, 
then extra considerations must be taken. I am taking into consideration the International 
Association for the Study of Forced Migration’s or IASFM’s 2018 code of ethics (2018). 
Although I am not working directly with people in situations of forced migration, I am asking 
about attitudes and views on such people. It is therefore pertinent for me to realize that I am in 
a position of power and that I could potentially influence Norwegians views and attitudes on 
such people. Therefore, extra precaution and care must be taken to ensure that the quality of the 
questionnaire is good and not harmful.  
In particular, the main takeaway from the IASFM code of ethics is the following:  
 
““Doing no harm” in forced migration research means proactively prioritizing the dignity, safety and wellbeing of 
participants, partners, research assistants, interpreters and researchers. Particular attention should be paid to the 
ways in which research – directly or indirectly – can (re)traumatize, as well as contribute to racism, xenophobia 
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and the criminalization of migration. Researchers should think carefully about the messaging that will be 
disseminated through interactions with media and policymakers.  
 
                                                                      (International Association for the Study of Forced Migration 2018, 2) 
 
To be sure, my research topic about whether the welfare state enables Norwegians to still 
consider the human rights of refugees and asylum seekers during a global recession and 
pandemic becomes crucial. Indeed, my research then becomes topical for the IASFM because 
I am researching whether the welfare state can help refugees and asylum seekers and people in 
a situation of forced migration. The welfare state then becomes a crucial instrument against the 
criminalization of migration because such attitudes and views will not be present in the 
Norwegian population despite the Covid-19 crisis and an economic recession. 
However, the main part about considering whether the research I am conducting can contribute 
to racism, xenophobia, discrimination and the criminalization of migration is important. 
Though they do not specify what those words mean, and the document is not legally binding 
the contents are worth considering. However, my research does not have those issues as I am 
merely asking Norwegians about a hypothetical where the Norwegian government has to make 
cuts in welfare for Norwegians because of the pandemic and the recession, but more on this 
later.  Furthermore, one must consider one’s position of power. Indeed, merely being a professor 
or a researcher carries significant responsibilities, it comes to the power of influencing citizens, 
policymakers and one carries authoritative power. Authoritative power in the sense that citizens 
do not weigh all opinions equally and will listen to those with authoritative power, and 
sometimes take what researchers say as an axiom. To be sure they explain this with a section 
on equity.  
 
“Equity: We acknowledge intersecting, unequal power relations, which are exacerbated in forced migration 
contexts, and will take steps to mitigate their effect on research relationships and results. We are mindful that 
power relations can never be fully resolved, but commit ourselves to actively challenging repressive social 
structures.” 
                                                      (International Association for the Study of Forced Migration 2018, 2 -3) 
 
Indeed, though this deals with once again peoples in a situation of forced migration and 
handling situations whereby the data subjects are categorized as vulnerable peoples, this is 
nonetheless relevant for this thesis. That is because people consider researchers, professors and 
academics to be authoritative figures, and therefore, we influence people and influence 
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politicians, and we must therefore be careful and try to break down challenging and repressive 
social structures that may impede our research. We must also understand that our authoritative 
status grants us an influential form of soft power. Indeed, this form of soft power has been 
outlined in the seminal piece of Bachrach and Baratz (1962, 947-952). However, there are also 
other ethical guidelines that this thesis follows. I follow national guidelines of ethical conduct 
such as the NESH guidelines. The NESH guidelines are the Norwegian National Research 
Ethics Committees’ “Guidelines for Research Ethics in the Social Sciences, Humanities, Law 
and Theology” are also considered in this research (NESH 2016, 10-40). Moreover, the 
European Commissions’ guidelines known as “Ethics and data protection” were instrumental 
in the decision to exclude children from the interviews, because all research involving children 
become more sensitive. To be sure, the justification for the exclusion of children was two-
pronged. Firstly, data protection considerations, and secondly, the theoretical justification is 
that children and young teenagers are often not familiar with the welfare state and they have 
often not spent time thinking out their own political and philosophical opinions and thoughts, 
which would not give the research the best data possible. Moreover, I use the European 
Commissions’ Ethics and Data Protection guidelines. The document has been drafted by a panel 
of experts at the request of the European Commission (DG Research and Innovation). Its aims 
are at raising awareness in the scientific community, and with beneficiaries of EU research and 
innovation projects. They note that particular care should be taken when dealing with minors, 
and children. Thus, my argument for the exclusion of legal minors is two-pronged: theoretical 
and data protection reasons.  
 
“All research involving children and young people raises significant ethics issues, as they may be less aware of 
the risks and consequences of their participation.”  
                                                                                                    (The European Commission 2018, 12) 
 
Indeed, one must also consult the legal guardian of the child to be able to interview them. 
Although, I would not interview children rather teenagers. However, the same holds for 
teenagers as they are under the legal age of 18. I would have to gain permission from the 
parent(s) or legal guardian(s) to be able to conduct the interview, and I must take further steps 
in ensuring their data protection. In other words, it is too much work for very little gain to my 
research. Nevertheless, to further ensure the protection of the participants involved in the 




“One of the best ways to mitigate the ethical concerns arising from the use of personal data is to anonymise them 
so that they no longer relate to identifiable persons. Data that no longer relate to identifiable persons, such as 
aggregate and statistical data, or data that have otherwise been rendered anonymous so that the data subject cannot 
be re-identified, are not personal data and are therefore outside the scope of data protection law. However, even if 
you plan to use only anonymised datasets, your proposal may still raise significant ethics issues. These could relate 
to the origins of the data or the manner in which they were obtained. You must therefore specify the source of the 
datasets you intend to use in your proposal and address any ethics issues that arise. You must also consider the 
potential for misuse of the research methodology or findings, and the risk of harm to the group or community that 
the data concern. Where it is necessary to retain a link between the research subjects and their personal data, you 
should, wherever possible, pseudonymise the data in order to protect the data subject’s privacy and minimise the 
risk to their fundamental rights in the event of unauthorised access. Pseudonymisation and anonymisation are not 
the same thing and it is important that you are aware of the difference between them, as the GDPR requires you to 
use them wherever possible or feasible (Article 89 GDPR).” 
                                                                                                                           (The European Commission 2018, 7) 
 
Indeed, this is the best way to mitigate such concerns, and my research employs 
pseudonymization in the recording themselves. However, moving on to chapter 7, the 
Questionnaire used to uncover the central question.  
 
Chapter 5: Methodology: Interviews and Quasi-Experiments  
 
Why interviews and quasi-experiments? This methodology will provide the most in-depth 
empirical data of my dependent variable. Moreover, it will help to discern whether the welfare 
state has an impact on the dependent variable. See section 3.0 for a discussion and explanation 
of the dependent variable (Grønmo 2004, 153-160; 167-172; Gerring 2012, 197-215; Ritchie et 
al 214-207; Swanborn 2010, 10-53; Landman and Carvalho 2017, 90-140). Indeed, I shall have 
2 groups of 10 interviewees, while 10 participants are in the treatment group and the other 10 
are in the control group (C group). This aids the research to determine if the added information 
in the treatment group (T group) changes their answers significantly. This allows me to tease 
out the causality, as in whether the welfare state influences citizen’s attitudes, and how it 
influences their attitudes. However, it is better to explain quickly explain what quasi-
experimental research is and why I am using it. A quasi-experimental research design resembles 
experimental research. However, due to the nature of social science, it is not true experimental 
research. The independent variable is manipulated; in my case, I give the respondents more 
information and facts about the independent variable. However, it must be mentioned that the 
participants are not randomly assigned to conditions or orders of conditions (Cook and 
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Campbell 1979). How this paper manipulates the independent variable is through having the T 
and C group, and in the T-group, I give additional information about the independent variable 
to see whether that causes a change in the dependent variable, meaning cosmopolitan to welfare 
chauvinistic attitudes. There is the directionality issue, as in does x influence y or does y 
influence x. Due to this problem, I have chosen this design. Quasi-experimental research 
eliminates the directionality problem. Participants are not randomly assigned which makes it 
likely that there are other differences between conditions. It is important to note also, that quasi-
experimental research does not eliminate the problem of confounding variables. Indeed, I 
cannot remove confounding variables, however, I can determine the direction of the causality 
and extract the causality. One of the problems with quantitative data is time, as in how much of 
a lag must be applied to a variable in a regression. Quasi-experimental designs eliminate this 
problem since the researcher is in control and can manipulate the dependent variable in the 
treatment group (Pierson 2004, 24-70; Kellestedt and Whitten 2018, 30-50). To be sure,  I can 
then more confidently say that the welfare state does indeed influence and enable positive 
attitudes towards refugees. However, of course, due to limitations on the number of participants 
I cannot say that it holds high external validity, while quasi-experimental designs have high 
internal validity. While moreover, it could also hold external validity to Norway and other 
Scandinavian countries (Gerring 2012, 12-45). External validity simply means that the 
relationship holds with a large number of cases, which is the case with large N quantitative 
studies, while small N qualitative may not be relevant to a large number of cases because of the 
specificity of the study and how it is rooted in the national and/or local contexts. Indeed, I can 
establish a trustworthy cause and effect relationship between treatment and outcome, while also 
eliminating alternative explanations. I put the idea of welfare chauvinism into context, and I 
discuss them alongside populist radical right-wing parties such as the Progress Party in Norway. 
Indeed, I want to see if the welfare state has enabled citizens to be concerned about the welfare 
and human rights of refugees. Furthermore, in this paper, I shall be testing this with a 
hypothetical wherein due to the pandemic and due to the recession, the government finds itself 
in a position where finances are tight and must cut in expenditure such as the welfare state to 
avoid massive budget deficits. Moreover, this hypothetical is very likely due to the 
Conservative government siding more with capital interest organizations such as NHO which 
has proposed cuts to the welfare state and privatizing parts of the welfare state, and indeed, this 
was proposed in the middle of the pandemic and the recession. Moreover, they proposed a 
weakening and slackening of labour protection, proposed tax cuts, and allowing for more 
temporary workers making it easier to hire and fire workers. Indeed, they proposed a “diet” for 
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the public sector and the welfare state, trimming it down, and this is also ideological. While 
Norway over time has had its social democracy become more impregnated with neoliberalism 
and with new public management. The Conservative and Labor Party becoming more neoliberal 
over time. This coincides with the rise of Neoliberalism elsewhere. Since the 1980s the 
Norwegian labour party and the Conservative party has become increasingly more neoliberal.  
 
Section 5.1: Theoretical Conceptions: Religious affiliation, Rural, 
Gender Variable and Political Affiliation  
First and foremost, in this research, I control for variables that may and can affect the answers 
given by participants. Those variables are gender, as women are more positive towards refugees 
and migrants as pointed out in chapter 1. I control for religious affiliation, as this may affect 
their answers. I think that whether someone is right-wing or left-Christian in Norway this will 
make them have a positive outlook towards refugees, although this will be tested of course in 
chapter 8. I would like to touch upon some theoretical conceptions and give justification as to 
why I have included religious affiliation in the questionnaire. Someone’s religious affiliation 
may favour cosmopolitan attitudes, although it may also not. However, it must be understood 
that religion does often influence politics. Just like any other political ideology, the different 
branches of Christian affiliations in Norway have a lot of nuances and variance. Thus, religious 
affiliation as a confounding variable cannot be dismissed completely, however, and that is why 
I included it in the questionnaire. Someone may mention and argue: “We are all equal in front 
of God and refugees are also children of God so we should show them solidarity and grant them 
their basic human rights here in Norway and they should be allowed to settle here.” Some may 
say, “No, this is a nation-state that we are living in, it is the God-given order and we should not 
tamper with it by letting other ethnicities in because it could disrupt the God-given order. 
Moreover, it may influence their views on politics and human rights. so political identity is also 
important, and I will ask which parties the participants sympathize the most with, how they 
would describe themselves politically and where they think they lie on the political spectrum. 
This way one gets a clear idea about what kind of person I am interviewing without breaching 
their anonymity. However, just as religious sentiments may affect cosmopolitan values, so may 
political affiliations as well. I suspect that those that situate themselves on the leftward side of 
the left-right wing spectrum will be closer to Joseph Carens’ cosmopolitanism, and I suggest 
this is because those on the left-wing have a stronger sense of solidarity and tend towards 
idealistic thinking, while those on the centre or those to the right of centre will be more 
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conservative and therefore be more pragmatic and favour order. I hypothesize from this that 
those on the conservative side of politics or the right-wing side will be more in line with the 
mainstream and institutional view of David Miller. Of course, I shall explain in detail what I 
mean by cosmopolitanism and what I mean by communitarianism. Those who are conservative 
want to conserve elements of the status quo, and I hypothesize here that those that situate 
themselves on the far-right of politics will take a non-universalist approach to citizenship. 
Essentially, what I suggest is that when I inject the information into the treatment group, they 
will shift towards the rightward side of politics. Essentially, that the treatment group will start 
valuing the principle of popular sovereignty higher, and some will become welfare chauvinists. 
I also suspect that cleavages, informed by Stein Rokkan’s cleavage theory, which shall be 
discussed in chapter 5, will have an impact. For example, those who live rurally may be affected 
by this. Those, who live rurally might value Norwegian culture more highly and emphasize the 
maintaining of Norwegian culture and put emphasis on the integration of refugees. While those 
who live in cities, who experience multiculturalism may not emphasize integration as highly 
since they think there is a lot of value in other cultures. To be sure, hence why 50 per cent of 
all my participants be from rural areas to control for this. It is also informed by the theory 
developed by Rokkan and the cleavages of city and rural can also be seen in the welfare state 
(Vike 2018, 40-130). The welfare state is multi-level and often faced pressures from “below” 
(Vike 2018, 133-150). Meaning different contexts shaped the welfare state and the rural-city 
cleavage was crucial in this way. Farm subsidies are crucial for small farm holdings within the 
city-rural cleavage, one can find a labour-capital cleavage as well. Where those with family 
farms and those with big industrial farms stand in conflict with each other. One of those issues 
being farm subsidies. (Tellefsen 2020) For example, one can look at the farm subsidies that 
come from the welfare state to facilitate small family farms where the land is owned. This is 
steeped in Dahl’s theories of pluralism as well, where he argues that free farmer societies 
develop pluralistic democracies such as Norway (Dahl 1973, 33-55).  
 
Section 5.2: Hypotheses  
In this section, I would like to present and discuss the hypotheses of this research. I have 
developed two sets of hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: The control group will appreciate the welfare state and have a communitarian 
attitude towards refugees.  
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Hypothesis 2: Participants in rural areas will be more concerned with culture and integration 
and will be less affected by the theoretical cut to the welfare state. 
Hypothesis 3: The treatment group will appreciate the welfare state, and therefore with the 
injection of the welfare chauvinist and the neoliberal argument their outlook will become more 
welfare chauvinistic. 
However, moving on to the data.  
 
Chapter 6: Data  
The data of my essay was 20 interviews of around 20 to 25 minutes focused on 14 main 
questions and possible follow-up questions, and 4 identity questions. Although one interview 
went on for more than 40 minutes, and some went to 30 minutes, the majority of the interviews 
lasted 20 to 25 minutes, and the research aimed to have interviews at 20 to 25 minutes 
considering the number of participants. The identity questions were to give more context about 
the participant without any breaches to their anonymity. Chapter 7 goes in-depth on those 14 
questions and discusses why they are relevant and why they should be asked. As mentioned, 
this thesis applied a quasi-experimental design, therefore 10 of the interviewees were assigned 
to the T group, and 10 were assigned to the control group. Thus, my thesis has hours’ worth of 
empirical data, that is split into two separate groups, where one is given the treatment and the 
control group is there to see whether the treatment has any effect upon the participants. This 
data is presented and analyzed in chapters 8 and 9. There I uncover whether there is a substantial 
difference between the two groups and if it has any effect. The selection of participants will not 
be random, but rather selective. I shall select a representative sample of the Norwegian 
population. One of the aims is to have gender representation, and rural representation, as at least 
8 of the 20 participants will be women, and 10 out of the 20 participants will be from rural 
areas. That is to control for confounding variables such as gender and to control for confounding 
variables such as rural. These will then be divided into two groups, the treatment, and control 
groups. Indeed, as one can see in chapter 7, I asked whether they came from a migrant 
background or not, and the thesis had planned for 24 interviews, where 4 of the interviews were 
from a migrant background, although, this was decided against due time constraints and 
concerns of feasibility.  To be sure, in the questionnaire in chapter 7 I included an identity 
question as to whether they are ethnic Norwegian or a migrant as it would be interesting to see 
how the theoretical cut to the welfare state affects those of migrant background compared to 
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ethnic Norwegians. However, due to time and feasibility constraints, this was not conducted in 
this research. 
  
Section 6.1: Recruitment Technique  
The recruitment technique used in this research was selective, and a combination of snowballing 
and social networking through social media. Snowballing is a technique that was applied in 
similar research as mine, however, about Polish labour migrants in Norway by and Ragnhild 
Muriaas and Cornelius Cappelen (2018, 172). Indeed, through social media and friend circles, 
I asked people to introduce me to people that would be willing to participate. Indeed, in Norway, 
it proved to be challenged to find participants from the periphery/rural areas to participate. Thus, 
when I got into contact with one such participant, I asked them to introduce me to their family 
and friends that could be willing to participate in the research, though some were recruited from 
social media pages that dealt with politics, and other social media pages on Facebook. 
Moreover, a goal of the research was to have gender representation as mentioned. This is in line 
with the theory on women being more impressionable to structures such as the welfare state.  
While indeed it was selective it had an element of randomness as well. For example, the Red 
Party and the Socialist left party was very well represented in the T group overall, while across 
the two groups the Progress Party was ill-represented and only one participant said they 
sympathized with the party. The Agrarian Center Party (Senterpartiet) was overall well 
represented in the C group and the T group. Moreover, many participants sympathized with the 
Labour Party. However, this might also be an indication of the trend towards a Labour, Agrarian 
and Socialist Left coalition government, which can be found in polling data, while the 
Conservative Party has maintained its popularity its supporting parties such as KrF (Christian 
Peoples’ Party) and Venstre (the Liberals) have all fallen below the election threshold and are 
at risk of not being represented in the Storting (Parliament). Moreover, the Progress Party has 
yet to regain what it lost after its exit from the coalition government. Indeed, the current 
electoral trends suggest that the current minority coalition government will fall in the next 
election. Indeed, though my research does not completely mirror the Norwegian ideological 
landscape it does capture the leftward swing of the Norwegian electorate. To conclude this 
chapter, the data I use is audio recordings of interviews and quasi-experiments. The recruitment 
technique was a combination of random selection, snowballing and selecting for certain 
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characteristics. It was a goal to represent the ideological landscape of Norway, and this was 
successful, although, left-wing voters were overrepresented in the treatment group. 
 
Chapter 7: Questionnaire  
 
In this section, I present and discuss the questionnaire that was used.  I give a brief justification 
for each question, and. These are the key and main questions that I want to ask the participants, 
and these questions will be outlined in the thesis as such to provide the greatest amount of 
clarity, and to give each of the main questions a justification and explanation as to why I am 
asking a certain question. It is therefore an interview structure that is semi-open. Simply put, 
due to the methodology being quasi-experimental, as in I introduce information to the treatment 
group and not to the control group, it becomes structured. However, I leave room to ask follow-
up questions for the sake of clarity, or the respondent might have said something interesting 
that I want him or her to elaborate upon. The questions can be stated in either English or 
Norwegian. The questionnaire is structured in a manner where it starts with simple questions 
and ends with simple questions. The more difficult questions are in the middle of the 
questionnaire. The reason for this is to warm up the respondent and make them think and talk. 
For an analogy, it is the same principle and idea behind doing warm-up exercises at the gym, 
where one must do warm-up exercises to get the best result of the main workout session and 
finally one ends the workout session with cool-down exercises. We as social science researchers 
must help the participants to give us the best answers. The world-famous world chess champion 
of 1972-1975 Bobby Fischer said, “Help your pieces so they can help you”. The same principle 
holds for social scientists we must help the participants warm up their minds by asking them 
questions. If we do help them, they in return will help us. We ask first and foremost the simpler 
questions before moving onto the harder questions and finally concluding it with more simple 
questions.  In addition, the questionnaire has two overarching parts: The first part is about the 
Norwegian welfare state and their attitudes to it, while the second part is about commitments to 
cosmopolitan values or lack thereof. In between these two overarching parts I introduce new 
information to see whether this affects their cosmopolitan values. I have a T-group and C-group, 
so I can see whether these pieces of information change their answers. Some pre-questions and 
information that I need from the participants are the following:  name (pseudonym), age 
(parameter not specific age), occupation (general occupation such as barista or store cleric), and 
place of residence (the region is enough). However, I do add some identity questions that add 
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context, however, are added as control variables due to their confounding natures according to 
theory. However, before this, I read out a statement to the respondents explaining their rights 
and my obligations to them as a researcher. Firstly, the English statement:  
 
“Following GDPR rules I must clarify that you understand what your rights are. In addition, as 
a participant in this project, you receive a reimbursement for your time spent in this project. 
The statements are needed in English and Norwegian due to some citizens not having the 
appropriate language skill, but also to explain and add clarity to the readers of this paper as to 
what I am doing.  
You have the right in the GDPR to stop the interview at any moment if you should feel 
uncomfortable. You have the right to contact me at a later date if you regret your participation 
in the interview. The questions can be given to you beforehand so that you know what I will 
ask you to answer. However, you still have the “right to be forgotten” and if you regret your 
participation in the project your data recording will be deleted. If you should request your data 
to be deleted, you will receive a response no later than one month and the data you requested 
to be deleted shall be deleted. All recordings will be deleted after one year per the GDPR. Your 
data will be stored in a safe location in the University of Bergen’s SAFE system also known as 
“secure access to research data and e-infrastructure” and none of your data will be saved to any 
of my devices such as phones, computers, but will be kept safe in University of Bergen’s SAFE 
system. If you would like to know more about how your data is stored and treated, you are free 
to ask. If you have no other questions, please repeat the following slowly and clearly into your 
microphone: “I fully understand what my rights are under the GDPR. I acknowledge that I 
received reimbursement for partaking. I consent to be interviewed for the researcher’s project.”  
 
 
Although, I do ask some pre-questions that give context to the participant without breaking their 
anonymity. Age, pseudonym, region, occupation, gender, cosmopolitan (city) or “distriktet” 
(rural/periphery).  
 
However, onto the main questions.  
Question 1: How would you describe the Norwegian Welfare State?  
This will give me insight into how Norwegian citizens themselves would describe the welfare 
state. It gives the laypeople's perspective on the Norwegian welfare state. It is all well and grand 
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to have sophisticated theories of the welfare state with apt descriptions of the welfare state, 
however, what also matters is how citizens perceive and describe the welfare state.  
 
Question 2: What is the most important part of the welfare state to you, and why?  
 
Question 3: It has been 1 year since the pandemic came to Norway and affected the lives of 
many Norwegians, moreover, Statistics Norway showed that Norway experienced its worst 
economic recession due to the pandemic. Many lost their jobs and had to take temporary layoffs, 
and especially people in the service sectors, who had no option of working from home. How 
much do you appreciate the Norwegian welfare state, with 0 being ‘not appreciating it at all 
/believing it should change or is not functioning, and 10 being: ‘I fully appreciate and endorse 
it’?  
Question 3 will give me insight into how much people appreciate the welfare state during the 
pandemic and seeing how the pandemic influences their appreciation for the welfare state, of 
course, as discussed earlier a libertarian participant may completely disregard the welfare state.  
 
Here is where I inject the information (the two arguments from NHO and Helgheim):  
NHO, an organization for the advocacy of capital interests, has said that the Covid-19 situation 
has created a situation whereby they argue that the welfare state is unsustainable. Furthermore, 
they proposed that the public sector needs to go on diet and trim down. Further, they argued for 
cutting taxes, cutting in pensions and pensions are already under adjusted meaning that 
pensioners are already struggling financially especially those on minimum pensions. They also 
proposed weakening labour laws making it easier to hire and fire employees, and they also 
proposed privatizing parts of the welfare state and this is part of a larger effort to privatize state-
owned assets such as railways. They also proposed cuts to unemployment benefits and cuts to 
sick pay. After two “Brochmannutvalg” they concluded that non-western migration, meaning 
from South America, Asia, the middle east and Africa, is very costly. One female refugee cost 
the Norwegian welfare state 14.3 million NOK, while a man cost 8.3 million over their lifetime. 
Those 203 thousand migrants from the period 2010 till 2019 have provoked integration debt of 
230 billion NOK a year. Furthermore, 85 per cent of the estimated migration to the year 2060 
will be from non-western countries according to Statistics Norway. Thus, cuts to the welfare 
state will affect the welfare of the poorest in society such as citizens, but also refugees and 
asylum seekers. With this new information and two arguments please answer the following 
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questions as honestly as possible with these arguments in mind. Keep in the back of your head 
that there could be theoretical cuts made to the welfare state (Birkelund 2020; Helgheim 2021).  
 
The idea behind the injection of the new information is for the participants in the T group to 
envision a world in which the welfare state could be cut and their economic well-being under 
threat and thereby affect their answers in the next section.  
 
Moving on.  
Question 4: What do you think about the following statement: Refugees who have come to 
Norway and lived in Norway for a substantial amount of time has over time earned a right to 
citizenship and the same welfare benefits as natives, this claim grows and becomes stronger 
over time?  
 
Question 4 sees whether they agree with Carens’ Social membership theory, and this is crucial 
to know. If the participants reject this and argue for ethnocentric citizenship, then this is a good 
indication of someone who is a non-cosmopolitan and who is an ethnic chauvinist. If they reject 
social membership theory, they move along the scale of the dependent variable to a national 
chauvinist and a welfare chauvinist.   
 
Question 5: What do you think about the following statement: “We as human beings have an 
individual right to migrate and live wherever we want on this planet.” On a scale from 0 to 10, 
how much do you agree, 10 is complete agreement, while 0 is complete disagreement. 
This tests how much the participants value free movement, and this will give me a clear answer. 
Carens values free movement to be one of the highest and the most valuable freedoms. 
Moreover, in Cosmopolitanism one of the highest and most valued forms of freedom is free 
movement.  
 
Question 6: What do you think about the following statement: “We, the citizens of Norway, 
have an inherent right to control our borders and decide upon who is granted access to live in 
Norway”? On a scale from 0 to 10, how much do you agree or disagree?  
 
This question asks Norwegians if they have the right to control their borders, and the reason I 
ask this question is for the following reason: A communitarian will agree with the statement, 
and considering the information, I injected the treatment group might value this a lot more to 
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protect the welfare state, therefore, it shows that a communitarian may adapt a more welfare 
chauvinistic attitude if they feel their security and welfare is being threatened.  
 
Question 7: Do you think that the impact of COVID should lead us to reconsider and perhaps 
alter the support we offer refugees/the role of migrants, and if so, why?  
 
This is a good question, especially if viewed in conjunction with the injection of information, 
and this will also reveal deviations from the C group to the treatment group. It asks in a time of 
the Covid crisis whether we should rethink and alter the support given to migrants, and if they 
have the injection of the new information, they might think that immigrants should receive less 
support since if there is a dire financial situation, although some may outright say that we should 
not support them whatsoever due to the new information and say that we need to worry about 
ourselves more. Indeed, this question answers the Covid part of my thesis, Norway is in the 
middle of a pandemic and a recession, which can and will affect their attitudes, while the 
welfare state enables Norwegians to have a positive attitude to refugees.  
 
Question 8: What do you think about the following statement: “We are all humans of the earth, 
so we all the same right to the lands of the earth?”  On a scale from 0-10 how much do agree 
with this and why?  
This is a cosmopolitan idea that no land belongs exclusively to one group of people, but the 
land belongs to everyone on earth. This is contrasted with nationalism, civic nationalism or the 
more radical forms of nationalism that argue for blood and soil type nationalism and 
ethnocentric nationalism. Carens’ cosmopolitanism is the idea that the land of the earth belongs 
to everyone on earth because we all have the same moral worth and value. These beliefs are 
outlined in Miller as well as Carens (Carens 2012; Miller 2016). This will help me gauge who 
is a cosmopolitan and how committed they are to those values.  
 
Question 9:  
Should refugees and asylum seekers that live in Norway have access to the same level of welfare 
as Norwegians?  
 
This question will help me find out whether someone is a welfare chauvinist and I just ask if 
asylum seekers and refugees should get the same welfare as citizens or if they should be treated 




Question 10: What course of action should be taken regarding child refugees and asylum 
seekers without parents?  
 
Here I make the distinction between adult and child refugees to see whether this makes a 
difference to the participant, and this will help me see what kind of attitudes they have towards 
refugees and child refugees. It is important to make that distinction since numbers from the high 
commissioner of the UN show that around half of the 80 million refugees currently half of those 
are children (Holte 2021).  
 
Question 11:  
What do you think about the following statement: “All human beings have the same moral 
worth”? On a scale from 0 to 10, how much do you agree or disagree? 1 being complete 
disagreement, while 10 is complete agreement.  
 
 
Question 12:  
What do you think about the following statement: “Restrictions open human freedom requires 
a moral justification to citizens as to why we are restricting them”?  On a scale from 0 to 10, 
how much do you agree or disagree.  
 
Question 13: What do you think about Norwegian democratic values, as in Norwegian 
democracy currently irrespective of what you think about the current coalition government? To 
give examples: such as rule of law, referendums, that the government can rule through the 
consent of parliament who were elected by the people, one person one vote. On a scale of 0-10, 
how much do you agree with these values and these institutions, and why?  
 
These three (question 11, 12 and 13) questions are crucial in identifying who has the 
cosmopolitan beliefs and seeing whether they agree with the starting axioms of cosmopolitan 
theory (Carens 2012). As mentioned, Carens’ three axioms that allow for the argument of open 
borders are important in identifying who is a cosmopolitan, while the next question just asks if 




Question 14: Do you believe that a world without any borders would be a more just and fairer 
world or unfair?   
The expectation is that very few will agree to this, and that most people will reject this 
cosmopolitan conception of justice. Indeed, Carens argues that the fairest and just world is a 
world where borders do not exist, and where everyone has the right to free movement and can 
settle wherever they wish to. This question tests whether the participants will agree with Carens.  
 
Identity questions:  
ID question 1: Do you have any religious beliefs or are you affiliated with any organised faith 
or religion?  
 
ID question 2:  
Monday 13 September 2021 is the Storting election in Norway. With this in mind, how would 
you describe yourself politically? Possibly which parties you sympathize with. In addition, 
where would you place yourself on the political spectrum from 0 to 10, where 0 is far left while 
10 is far right.  
 
ID question 3: Do your religious beliefs and your connection to your organized religion and 
faith influence your views on migration and refuge, and how so? On a scale from 0 to 10, where 
0 is no influence, and 1. 
 
ID Question 4: Are you of a migrant background or are you ethnically Norwegian? /  
 
One might ask; Why are you asking these questions? As discussed previously, I cannot 
completely dismiss religious affiliation and beliefs as a confounder, moreover, religious beliefs 
often influence political beliefs and ideology. Hence, I ask the second question regarding their 
political affiliation, and which political parties they sympathize with. Of course, if a respondent 
says that they are going to vote for the Agrarian Center Party this is a good indication of 
someone not being a cosmopolitan, and I thereafter expect these respondents to be more 
negative about asylum seekers and refugees’ rights and welfare. I expect those respondents to 
be more socially conservative, thus political affiliation and religious affiliation are confounding 
variables that can affect the dependent variable and must be controlled for. Indeed, if a 
respondent comes from a rural area and sympathizes the most with SP (Agrarian Party) those 
two variables overlap, but someone from a rural district is more likely to support the Agrarian 
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Party and therefore have views that are socially conservative, non-Cosmopolitan and much 
more sceptical to refugees’ and asylum seekers rights. In addition to these variables being 
rooted in theory, they serve a second purpose which is contextual. They provide context about 
the individual that I am interviewing, and theoretically they explain why a respondent might 
heavily deviate from the norm of what the thesis expects. To give an example: if the respondent 
says that they are politically a right-wing libertarian, this will explain why they might not care 
about theoretically proposed cuts to the welfare state and still insist upon free movement for 
asylum seekers and refugees. Hence why twenty interviews, divided into a T and C group, 
outliers can be ignored. One’s ethics and morality do influence their political beliefs. If 
participant A thinks that poverty is immoral, then they would take steps to minimize if not 
eliminate poverty. Indeed, thus personal ethics and morals matter because I want to see how the 
welfare state has allowed people to maintain their cosmopolitan morality regarding asylum 
seekers and refugees. Indeed, religion can play a massive role in one’s personal life, it affects 
ethics and morality, moreover, since politics is about ethics and morality (what people find to 
be just and unjust) it makes sense to control religion and how it affects their politics. Indeed, a 
religious person might want to preserve the welfare state no matter what the costs are because 
they believe that the welfare state is instrumental to their ideology of curbing homelessness, 
helping the sick, and preventing mass poverty due to Covid-19 and the economic recession. 
Moreover, data from the United States show that Christian and religious affiliation matters in 
how they perceive whether migrants are a net economic benefit or not. White Christians in the 
United States for example have the most negative attitudes towards migrants (Rosenthil and 
Smith 2006). Let us then move on to chapter 8.  
 
Chapter 8: Findings   
 
In this chapter, we get to the meat and potatoes of the research, I will present the findings of the 
interviews and whether the quasi-experiments yielded a tangible result. This chapter is broken 
into three sub-chapters being; the findings of the control group, thereafter the findings of the 
treatment group and thereafter I compare them in the third sub-chapter. All the interviews were 
conducted in Norwegian, and the quotes are translated from Norwegian to English, therefore it 
became more useful to paraphrase the participants so that the meaning is not lost in translation 
as well. Therefore, the quotes from each participant are paraphrased, although some idioms are 
directly translated and explained so that it makes sense in English as well. Moreover, how this 
research systematically distinguishes between each participant is through coding of C01, where 
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the C is “control” and the number 01 means participant 1 from the control group. The coding 
of T01 means treatment and participant 1 from treatment group 1. This code is to create clarity 
for the reader and the researcher. Firstly, I would like to introduce the findings from each 
participant, and thereafter I give visual representations and normal distributions of key attitudes 
that were found in each group. Moreover, some have been coded as 99 which simply means 
that no answer or no grade was given, therefore such data is left out. One can think of it as 
missing data, however, as mentioned context will be given, and this reflected their personal 
beliefs better than the score they gave.  However, some missing data will be provided with 
context, and where they gave verbal answers instead of a grade those verbal answers explained 
moire. Some of the key attributes and qualities that I look for is important in distinguishing 
whether they are welfare chauvinist/nationalist or communitarian or cosmopolitan. However, 
some of the key attributes and characteristics are there to give a better and broader explanation. 
Those key attributes are appreciation of the welfare state, whether they agree with social 
membership theory, appreciation of freedom of movement, popular sovereignty principle, 
commitment to democracy and how they situate themselves on the left-right spectrum. To be 
sure, some participants gave fuller answers, therefore are some of the participants more fleshed 
out than others due to this. Moreover, some participants were more interesting to explore than 
others, and therefore more attention was put on those participants. However, moving on to the 
control group.  
 
Section 8.1: Findings of the Control Group  
 
Participant C01 Magnus Magnussen, 20-25 years, Viken fylke, Student, city 
  
Firstly, I would like to give some background context about participant CO1. Magnus is non-
religious, he is left-wing and sympathizes with the labour party and the socialist left party. 
Moreover, he is affiliated with the labour youth party known as AUF. He is ethnically 
Norwegian who is a young student living in Viken fylke and grew up in a cosmopolitan setting. 
He moreover self-identified himself as a social democrat and said he placed himself at 3 on the 
left-right spectrum meaning he leans significantly towards left-wing politics.  Firstly, he 
described the welfare state as the following: “My relationship to the welfare state is very good… 
I appreciate the system we have compared to other welfare systems in the world. I consider the 
Norwegian welfare state to be the most well-designed and if it is the best, then that is not a bad 
standard.” He continued and followed up with: “I would say that to a very high degree the 
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Norwegian welfare state is universal. It [welfare state] works with granting everyone the same 
rights and benefits regardless of whether you make a million or two-hundred thousand [NOK]”. 
For him, the most important part of the welfare state was: “Health or education. It is difficult to 
say, but this with health is very important because it is so closely connected with the right to 
life and if you do not have a universal health program [universal single-payer healthcare] you 
will get a system whereby wealth decides. In my opinion, that is crazy. Although that is not to 
say that education is not as important since it helps ethnic Norwegians as well as our new 
countrymen to give us a common understanding of what Norway is and teaches us how to be 
good citizens.” Although, he also recognized the central and key important position that NAV 
has in society, and the job it does in providing people with a safety net if “people fall out of 
society”. Magnus favoured Carens’ social membership theory at 10, and he favoured and 
regarded democracy highly, though he did not specify from a scale of 0 to 10. Moreover, 
appreciated the welfare state at 8 throughout the Covid-19 crisis and he slightly favoured the 
principle of popular sovereignty over borders at 5, and he favoured free movement 8 in 
principle, and he thought that a world without borders would be more just, although adding the 
caveat that this would be an impossible achievement. Magnus, overall, can be characterized as 
communitarian, although he is very close to cosmopolitanism, however, due to his slight 
favouring of borders and the principle of popular sovereignty he can be characterized as such.  
On the social membership theory, while he answers a 10, it is slightly misleading since he 
presupposes refugees uphold their duties and obligations, which is more in line with 
communitarianism. Overall, there is no indication here of welfare chauvinism and he was 
overall very positive towards refugees and their human rights. To conclude, Magnus is therefore 
a communitarian, and his idea of citizenship closely mirrors that of the French revolutionary 
ideals of citizenship, but as well the communitarian ideals. Magnus thinks that is not merely 
enough to develop deep and rich meaningful relationships, but that you contribute and give 
back to society as well.  
Participant C02 Erik Andre Pettersen: 20-29 years, Vestland fylke, Unemployed, city 
Participant C02, Erik Andre is ethnically Norwegian, and he is religious of the Christian faith, 
and his denomination is evangelical. He is a member of the Norwegian Evangelical Free Church 
of Norway. He described himself politically as right-wing, and he sympathizes with PDK, also 
known as “Partiet De Kristne” or in the English “The Christians”. On a scale from 0 to 10, 
where 10 is the furthest right-wing, one could get in Norwegian party politics he considered 
himself to be a 10, but he emphasized that he is not extreme. He admitted that his Christian 
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faith does indeed influence his views regarding migration and refugees, and he explained: 
“When I am Christian, I am more preoccupied with a fair distribution among the Christian 
refugees, and I would not be if I were an atheist.” The Christian Party is a Christian conservative 
party led by Erik Selle. This party can be characterized by its social conservatism, its 
Euroscepticism, their economic liberalism and that they were a countermovement to the 
Christian Peoples’ Party’s decision to no longer require its representatives to be of the Christian 
faith. To be sure, he also hinted towards him being Christian affecting his views towards the 
welfare state in a positive way such as redistribution of wealth and helping those who need it 
the most. He described the welfare state as well-functioning during times of Corona and that he 
supported it because helps those “who fall out of society”. The most important part of the 
welfare state for him personally, which must be viewed in conjunction with the fact that he is 
unemployed, he said that it helps those “who fall out of society” and said he agreed with AAP, 
dagpenger, arbeidstrygd and sosialtrygd. These can be roughly translated to “work assessment 
allowance, unemployment benefits, and social welfare benefits”. Indeed, he valued social 
security and the safety net of the welfare state. Moreover, to question 3, he responded with: 
“10. Because without it [the welfare state] many would have fallen outside of the system now, 
made homeless and poor. They could have lost their home, but I think there are very few who 
lost their home.” Once more, while the former question of “What part of the welfare state do 
you appreciate the most?” did bring out the more egoistical side, however, in the latter question 
it showed that he also applied to all citizens, and the motives were altruistic. This proves that 
the framing of the question can have issues of reflexivity, although asking the next question 
helped uncover that his motives, while had an egotistical side, it as well had an altruistic side 
and compassion for others. This participant was the only person that admitted to his religious 
beliefs affecting his views towards migrants and the welfare state. In addition, this person could 
overall be described to have cosmopolitan attitudes, and he was closer to that of 
communitarianism. He was very concerned about the well-being of Christian refugees in the 
middle east. He thought Norway should take in more child refugees, although he as well thought 
that open borders would make the world more unfair. He did not espouse any welfare 
chauvinistic attitudes. Indeed, he even argued that any sort of non-universalist arrangement of 
the welfare state would be unfair, and he gave the example of refugees having a separate pension 
scheme from natives and other migrants. He pointed to this as being unfair. He also in favour 
of border control and favoured the idea of national popular sovereignty over borders, which is 
the main defining characteristic of communitarianism He answered a 10 on border control and 
said, “It allows us to help the most vulnerable and those who are persecuted.”  He favoured 
54 
 
democracy at 10 while being Eurosceptic (due to it being not democratic enough in his view). 
Erik Andre can be characterized as a communitarian, and he thinks that groups that are 
persecuted such as Christians should be helped because he views them as more vulnerable and 
too little focused upon in the public debate. He is a cultural conservative as well. However, 
moving on.  
Participant C03 Oline Johansen: 19-29 years, Trøndelag fylke, folk high school student, city 
Oline Johansen describes herself as non-religious, and said, “I stand strongly on the left-wing 
and in the coming election I will probably vote for the Socialist Left party or Red.” To a certain 
degree, she describes herself as a social democrat but considers herself first and foremost a 
socialist. She placed herself as a 1 on the left-right spectrum within Norwegian party politics, 
and she clarified that she is not a communist, however. She is also ethnically Norwegian and 
described the welfare state as well-functioning and universal. Throughout the Covid-19 crisis, 
she appreciated the welfare state at an 8. Her reasoning for this was simply: “In principle, I 
support the welfare state highly, however, the Covid-19 crisis has shown a skewed distribution 
in welfare like for example students who received nothing, while we have poured a lot of 
resources into saving airline companies, so in that sense, during the last year I think the welfare 
state has not done the best it could have done.” However, she was very uncertain about Carens’ 
social membership theory and gave no concrete answer as to how much she agreed with it. 
However, she seemed to agree that time mattered, but also not. She was just as supportive of 
new refugees and old ones. Though she was inconclusive about the rank the answer was in line 
with cosmopolitan. When asked question 4 she came out hard against any sort of welfare 
chauvinist argument, and said: “No matter our economic situation we should not abandon the 
rights and welfare of refugees.” She also valued freedom of movement at a 7. Although, it is 
once more highly revealing that she answered a 10 to the principle of popular sovereignty, 
which further questions her commitment to cosmopolitan values. Remember, Miller, outlines 
that the key difference between communitarianism and cosmopolitanism is this principle. 
Overall, while she was very close to a cosmopolitan the main defining factor that distinguishes 
communitarians and cosmopolitans is the border control and popular sovereignty principle. 
Although she did say that a world without borders would be fairer she was very uncertain about 
this and it spoke more to her ideals and it somewhat contradicts the earlier statement, however, 
she emphasized that it could never be achieved, and that borders and nation-states would have 
to fundamentally change, so while she is close to cosmopolitanism what distinguishes her is 
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that she believes that nation-states and peoples have a right to exclude people. Moreover, she 
said that the institution of borders cannot be changed which goes against what cosmopolitans 
believe.  
Participant C04 Lars Larsen: 61-65 years, Vestfold fylke, business owner, rural  
 Lars Larsen describes himself as non-religious and as a political moderate but favours the 
current Conservative Party. He situates himself on the political spectrum as a centrist and 
ranked himself as a 7, and he said he agreed more with the Conservative Party, which makes 
sense considering his occupation as a business owner. Overall, Lars Larsen could be aptly 
described as a communitarian, and he is very concerned about matters of integration, and setting 
criteria for refugees, and that if they can work, they should work to pay back society and receive 
the same welfare benefits. He did not espouse any welfare chauvinist point of view, although, 
he was concerned about integration in terms of language and culture. Furthermore, one could 
suppose that he could be favourable to labour migrants, although, I did not ask about this subject 
and it was outside of the scope of this research. Lars said, “It [the Norwegian welfare state] 
covers reasonably well, but of course, there are differences in coverage, but it covers everyone 
reasonably well.” Lars describes the Norwegian welfare state as universal but has problems in 
terms of universality. This point was brought up by other participants as well. The most 
important part of the welfare state for Lars he said “Hmm… I think it is the fact that there is a 
security net in our society that brings up those that have it very bad, but if you compare it with 
many other countries then you can see that they don’t have the model that we have and if  people 
don’t want to live on the street then they don’t need to to put it like that.” Further, I asked Lars: 
So it is the safety net that is the most important for you, but what about for example health?” 
He answered with “Well, yes, that is a very important part, but you do pay for that over taxes. 
Norway does have reasonably high taxes so we do pay for that.” Lars throughout the interview 
straddled closely the centre. For example, he ranked his appreciation for the welfare state at 6 
and the reasoning for this was “There is always something that could be better.” When asked 
to specify he said, “I think it is a tragedy that so many are on disability benefits, and that is a 
tragedy for the youth because many go directly from school to disability benefits, where they 
then become recipients of “service” from the state, and that is very sad and it is a shame. It is 
especially so when you see that the group of people that receive disability benefits just increases 
and increases, so there I think there something wrong in our model.” Indeed, considering Lars 
Larsen is sympathetic to the Conservative Party, he was somewhat sceptical to the welfare state 
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but he did not think that the welfare state was outright bad but had issues it needed to overcome. 
Lars was somewhat sceptical to social membership theory, and he said, “I think I would say a 
6. It has to do with that many would consider it unfair when some systems are misused, and 
there we have seen that a good amount of people lie their way to things. Now, the government 
has started to become a lot more strict about this, but if for example, you have come to Norway 
on a lie then you must consider that the state could reverse this when if this was for 10, 15 or 
20 years ago I think.” This is interesting. Lars did not agree with social membership theory 
altogether and pointed out that if someone was granted refuge on the false premises then this 
should be punished and their citizenship revoked. Essentially, Lars was not against this being 
the case for refugees but he was really against it if they had lied about their need for refuge. 
Indeed, Lars then can be characterized as a communitarian rather than a cosmopolitan since 
Carens argues that this would be unjust considering the amount of time they had lived there, 
and they now have a right to citizenship even if the citizenship was granted on the false 
premises, to begin with, or never granted in the first place. On free movement, he said he agreed 
at 6 and he justified this with “Yes because it is like that that we are a member of EU or we 
have a connection agreement and there we accept of that agreement that there is a free flow of 
labour over borders but also it is like that that different continents have different interests, and 
I think that Europe has a lot against millions upon millions of Africans migrating to Europe 
from Africa. The politicians can sense the feelings of the people on such things, right. So, then 
we cannot talk about people having a right to live wherever they want.” He also brings up 
globalization and asks “Well, in the last decade globalization has become a topic where people 
are asking how healthy that has been.” Lars was sceptical to free movement, globalization and 
social membership theory.” On the popular sovereignty principle over borders, he said “I would 
say 6 here as well because there are always two sides. The Norwegian government has become 
so strict over the years on this due to the amount of labour migration, so the government 
increasingly asks migrants to meet more and more requirements, and we have seen this 
especially during the Corona pandemic.” Lars thought that “I think that it has been a wake-up 
call for many to see the number of infection rates in migrant communities and then you must 
think “What could the reason for this be?” Lars thought that the support for refugees should 
change in significant ways: offer better housing support to refugees and secondly give refugees 
and migrants more information about Corona so that they become less vulnerable to Corona 
and so that Norwegians also become less vulnerable to large refugee and migrant communities 
in Norway carrying Covid-19. He did not think that Norway should offer less welfare or give 
refugees a worse welfare state than natives. It was actually to the contrary. He said, “Well, there 
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is a lot more risk for infection from Covid-19 if mom, dad, children and also grandparents live 
together in a tight space.” Furthermore, he was very supportive of child refugees and said 
“There Norway should stretch itself as far as it can to help those children. I’m very sympathetic 
to children.” However, he was also very concerned about parallel societies and said “It is not 
good that cities exist where 70 to 80 per cent of the population is immigrants and that has shown 
that this is not good in any country.” Lars thought that Norway should take in more refugees 
and that Norway should do more, but he was uneasy about parallel societies and thought 
Norway should do more to integrate migrants and refugees into Norwegian society. Moreover, 
he was committed to democracy at 7 and agreed with the sentiment one person one vote. To 
conclude Lars is a communitarian, committed to democracy, thought everyone shared a basic 
human dignity and he did not agree with open borders. He thought that would cause more 
problems and he could be described as a light cultural conservative, where he appreciates 
Norwegian culture and thinks it should be preserved.  
Participant C05 Pål Pålsen: 60-70 years, Vestland fylke, pensioner, rural   
Pål pålsen was perhaps the most enthusiastic about refugee rights and their human rights. To be 
sure, he is currently on old-age pension benefits, however, he has worked extensively with UDI 
prior in his life. Pål Pålsen was an ethnic Norwegian, left-wing and idealist. He was non-
religious and did not hold any religious beliefs. He did not believe in borders if they restrict 
refugees. I asked him “So do you think that refugees should be let in if they have had their 
human rights trodden upon?” He very much agreed and said that excluding such people through 
borders would be highly unjust. Pål was very trusting of refugees, and perhaps he has been 
coloured by his past of working with refugees extensively in UDI. Pål Pålsen thought that the 
Norwegian welfare state was not that universal and said “it tries to be, but it is not.” Moreover, 
he was highly appreciative of the welfare state, and he believed that everyone has the same 
fundamental human worth, we all share a “menneskeverd” or in English a human dignity. And 
of course, he believed that everyone deserved equal human rights and that one is entitled to 
better or more extensive human rights. To be sure, he also said espoused reciprocity of 
citizenship as well. However, he is more in line with Carens, and he thought that refugees should 
not be excluded in matters of the popular sovereignty principle. Moreover, he supported 
democracy, and thought a world without borders would be fairer. He did not agree with Carens’ 
social membership theory, he rather skirted over it and said that refugees deserve their human 
rights fulfilled and Norway has a duty in fulfilling their rights, so time did not matter for him. 
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It was not time that entitled refugees citizenship and time that made their claim stronger. He 
rather argued that have a claim and when we grant that claim their claim to Norway is just a 
strong as natives, therefore, refugees do not need to form strong social connections and it is not 
these connections that entitle refugees to citizenship in Pål’s view. Although, I could have 
questioned this further asking if it is worse to send home a refugee that just arrived in Norway 
or someone who came to Norway as a refugee a long time ago and has lived with her for 
decades. Indeed, it would make sense that the latter has more of a right because he has formed 
connections and perhaps started a family, and his children live here and go to school here. 
However, I think Pål, given his answer to the question, would still insist on both having the 
same entitlement to Norway and to live here. Pål perfectly aligns with Carens’ 
cosmopolitanism. Pål was supportive of irregular refugees (in popular debate people will often 
instead use terminology like “illegal refugee”, “illegal migrant”, or “undocumented migrant” 
or “undocumented refugee”) as well. Pål said that we should not use our popular sovereignty 
principle over borders to make it harder for such people to cross Norwegian borders and seek 
asylum because that would be overstepping our authority. This brings up an interesting dilemma 
Italian and European coastguards will actively avoid having migrants and those seeking asylum 
in Europe reach Europe, and European countries will pay African countries to have their 
coastguard return refugees at sea for example as reported by the Wall Street Journal 
(Abdulrahim 2019). Pål would find that to be problematic since he thinks that migrants should 
be allowed to arrive in a European country and make a claim and have their claim heard. 
However, to conclude Pål Pålsen, was a cosmopolitan rather than a communitarian. It is 
somewhat surprising. Miller argues that communitarianism is the mainstream and institutional 
view. Considering Pål has worked within the mainstream institutional framework of UDI it was 
somewhat a distortion of expectations. Indeed, I thought he would be steeped in the institutional 
view of this issue, however, he instead was more in line with Carens rather than the mainstream 
view of Miller. Although, it must be said that there is a massive overlap between the mainstream 
view and Carens’ view, however, Pål agreed with cosmopolitanism, and his youthful idealism 
came as a surprise considering he is a pensioner and of old age. Pål highly appreciated the 
welfare state at a rank of 8, he was inconclusive on popular sovereignty, although as discussed, 
he did not consider time to be relevant in terms of citizenship and thought that they equally 
deserved it regardless of time. He agreed with Norwegian democratic values at 9, he considered 
himself a 4 on the left-right spectrum and he agreed completely and fully with social 
membership theory at 10. And of course, finally, he thought that everyone regardless of 
ethnicity or any other characteristic, if they had Norwegian citizenship, deserve equal welfare 
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rights. Although, not to mention that he thought asylum seekers deserved access to the same 
welfare rights. However, moving on to participant C06.  
Participant C06 Silje Thorsen: 35-45 years, Vestland fylke, health sector worker, rural  
Silje Thorsen is an ethnic Norwegian, and non-religious. She is slightly left of centre, and she 
situated herself as a 4 on the left-right spectrum. She described the welfare state as universal 
but agreed that “…some elements of the welfare state hit unequally and different and not 
everyone gets equal treatment.” The most important part of the welfare state for her is “Health… 
but also the amount of freedom. When I think about the welfare state I often think about the 
number of vacations, and leisure and the opportunity to move freely around in this country. We 
have a relatively high degree of freedom [due to the welfare state], those are the most important 
parts for me.” Further, she ranked her appreciation for the welfare state as 10 and justified it 
with “It has been shown that we have such a good safety net when such things [the pandemic 
and the economic crisis] hits for the vast majority of people, but of course in the service sector 
it has not been like that, however, I think there are good systems that cover everyone’s needs.” 
She ranked her agreement with social membership theory at 8, however, she added the caveat 
of “It is, of course, a bit contingent upon that they participate and get into work, that they learn 
Norwegian… they contribute to society, thereafter as well enjoy [the same welfare].” Indeed, 
Silje did not think that the welfare state should remain exclusive to natives but that when 
refugees contribute and participate in society, they should also get the same rights. Although, 
she did not ascribe any time dimension, however, she did say that refugees should meet certain 
requirements, which makes her a communitarian rather than a cosmopolitan. She favoured 
democracy at 7 though she recognized that Norwegian democracy and the values of Norwegian 
democracy had their flaws she overall appreciated Norwegian democracy and its values.  I 
summarize Silje as being a communitarian.  
Participant C07 Linda Hansen: 50-55 years, Vestland, children and youth worker, rural  
She is an ethnic Norwegian, and she is non-religious. She sympathizes with the labour party 
since she likes “small differences” in her words, which means less inequality. She put herself 
as a 5 on the left-right spectrum but insisted that she was a centrist politically with a slight 
favouring of the Labour Party.  When asked to describe the welfare state she said: “Norway is 
a very good country to live in and a very good country to grow up in.” I asked her about the 
universality of the welfare state and if she thought this was good. She said: “Very good. It is 
60 
 
important to get children in kindergarten especially if we are talking about immigration. They 
need to learn the language and learn how to participate in society.” I interpret her as saying the 
welfare state is universal although she did not use those exact words to describe the welfare 
state. She thought that it was important for Norway to stay in control in her own words. She did 
not consider any of the individual parts of the welfare state to be the most important for her 
rather it was the totality of the welfare state. “It is important that everyone is heard and seen,” 
she said. She said that she ranked her appreciation for the welfare state at 6, while before I 
clarified that the question was about her appreciation for the welfare state throughout the 
pandemic she said: “Norway has tried to do the best it can considering the situation but take in 
immigrants, labour migrants that bring Covid-19, that is a bit scary.” Although, she was an 
older lady, and she was scared about Covid-19 and she thought that Norway could have had 
more lockdowns to prevent the spread of Covid-19, thus her main gripe was that the welfare 
state was not being used actively enough. To be sure, this might seem that she against migrants 
coming to Norway, but this was not the case as she continued: “… I think those migrants that 
arrive in Norway should be quarantined immediately for 10 days to stop the spread of Covid-
19.” Although I asked her So, you do you appreciate the welfare state fully, but you thought it 
was not being used actively enough?” She said, “Yes.” This contradicts her earlier statement 
thus I am not quite sure what to make of her earlier answer but the fact that she does appreciate 
the welfare state more than what she perhaps lead onto in her earlier answer. Due to her 
occupation as a child and youth worker, she was sympathetic to child refugees, and she thought 
that Norway should be doing more to help those. She did say that Covid-19 should make us 
reconsider the support we give to refugees, but she as well thought that Norway should do more 
to help refugees. She appreciates equality and egalitarianism and thought that we all ought to 
have the same rights to the lands of the world. She said, “It is important that treat people equally 
and that we do not look down upon others. She thought that people had the same 
“menneskeverd” or human dignity. She disagreed slightly with free movement and ranked her 
agreement with 5 and said: “Because I, it is a bit strange to think about, I think it is important 
to have borders and think about who you let into the country, and where we can move in other 
countries.” She did not agree with social membership theory, moreover, she put her agreement 
with the popular sovereignty principle over borders at 10 and thought that Norway should be in 
control. Linda insisted on many questions that there should be order and control. She was 
overall a communitarian she is fully committed to democracy and ranked her agreement with 
Norwegian democratic values at 10. Linda Hansen was concerned about Covid-19 but not to an 
extent where it went against the rights of refugees nor their welfare. To conclude Linda framed 
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the debate in terms of national self-determination and popular sovereignty principles, where she 
thought that democratically one should be able to exclude refugees and migrants but she was 
overall positive towards refugees. Moving on to participant C08.  
Participant C08 Kristin Pettersen: 30-35 years, Vestland fylke, teacher, rural   
Kristin Pettersen is a non-religious ethnic Norwegian. She moreover had formal education 
within sociology, and she came very thoughtful and considerate answers. She described herself 
as a green socialist. She said she sympathised with many parties on single issues such as the 
Labour Party, MDG/The Greens and the Socialist Left Party. She did not rank herself on the 
left-right spectrum from 0-10, thus this is left inconclusive. While Pål Pålsen could be 
characterized as the idealist of the group, Kristin Pettersen was a realist and her thinking and 
reasoning were grounded in pragmatism. To be sure, she appreciated the welfare state at a 9. 
She explains: “I don’t want to give it a full score because I know there are some elements of 
the welfare state that are… or structures that can be ineffective and does not necessarily 
incentivise those things should work perfectly.” She continued: “…but I think that the welfare 
state is as good as it could be in many ways, but of course, there are many things that I disagree 
with such for example how the government decides to spend money on things that we don’t 
know why should spend money on or that people agree that should spend money on. And 
especially in these corona times where the government quickly pushes through welfare 
legislation but ends up enriching some at the detriment of others.”  She thought the welfare state 
worked well and she characterized it as universal and made the point that the welfare state draws 
its legitimacy from its universality. Indeed, she gave a very technical and academic description 
of the welfare state. She was supportive of refugees and thought Norway could give refuge to 
more refugees, however, she was afraid of the nationalist right-wing, and that they would gain 
support due to such decisions. To be sure, she wanted to limit the number of refugees and 
migrants so that Norway did not turn into a socially conservative, economically liberal and 
nationalist country. On social membership theory, she said “To a very large extent I agree, but 
if we forget about the technicalities of citizenship such as some not wanting citizenship, and 
refugees are a type of group which makes it natural to think that after a certain period then, yes, 
equal rights and equal citizenship rights. But I would not say that I am 100 per cent in agreement 
because I think that one should be able to pass certain qualification criteria to for example vote. 
They should have a certain degree of understanding and knowledge about partaking in a 
democracy so that they don’t become vulnerable to external pressures from other people. It is 
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not that I think that vote-buying could become a problem in Norway, but I know this is a 
problem in other countries because they lack the knowledge to know what they are voting for 
and what they are doing. But I am to a very large extent sympathetic with that claim [social 
membership theory].” To be sure, participant Kristin Pettersen made it abundantly clear in her 
statement that she is a communitarian because she is concerned with obligations and duties of 
refugees, and full citizenship (this includes political citizenship) she does not agree. She thinks 
that refugees should meet some criteria before they gain full citizenship. One cannot separate 
political citizenship and citizenship itself in Norway, if you have Norwegian citizenship then 
you are eligible to vote, one person one vote. To be sure, if one separates citizenship from 
political citizenship i.e the right to vote and partake in democracy, then one has created a 
parallel society similar to what the African-Americans experienced during segregation. Indeed, 
look at chapter 6 about citizenship. Bellamy clearly explains how segregation is essentially 
about two different types of citizenship. Firstly, those with full rights, and those without full 
rights. Those without full rights thereby are second class citizens. Indeed, why should one group 
have the right to full citizenship and another group not? Carens and Miller both argue that such 
citizenship is unjust, however, welfare chauvinists do not. They argue that essentially in favour 
of two types of different citizenships. Where a group have more rights than others, and welfare 
chauvinists frame it in welfare terms. Indeed, I argued earlier that welfare chauvinism is not 
simply about welfare but it is segregation of citizenship, and this Miller and Carens argues is 
unjust because they are cosmopolitans and liberal universalists. Both philosophies argue that 
any such distinction based on a background such as race, ethnicity is unjust, while welfare 
chauvinists do not think so. They think natives should have more rights than refugees or 
migrants. However, as Kristin notes: “The discussion of citizenship would take a lot more time 
and I have here.” Thus, moving on. Kristin did think we should re-evaluate the support given 
to refugees, however, not to their detriment but rather to their betterment. She also insisted that: 
“Well, it should be better but generally not due to Corona.” She valued Norwegian democratic 
values at 9, and she is a left-wing communitarian who limits herself in her positivity to refugees 
in the sense that she does not want to have a nationalist and conservative takeover of Norway, 
where those refugees are thereby excluded or sent home from Norway. However, moving on. 
Participant C09 Jonathan Bergsland – 23-26 years, Viken fylke, music industry, rural  
Jonathan Bergsland is an ethnic Norwegian and non-religious. He did not give a conclusive 
answer on 0 to 10 from left to right, although he had left-wing sympathies and right-wing 
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sympathies. He liked the Agrarian Party and the Conservative Party the most. He keenly and 
openly understood the social membership theory and he had an example where a migrant had 
settled down somewhere and created an emotional attachment to the area and the people living 
there had as well. Although he recognized this he still ranked his agreement with it at 6 since 
he thought attaining citizenship like that would be too easy, and he could not agree with that. 
This is a common theme throughout the control group, while most agree with it on some level 
they add caveats to it and they have this idea in their head that citizenship should have 
requirements and that one should meet some criteria. A very common theme throughout was 
language and one could argue that through social membership theory migrants naturally attain 
the language skills required but the participants did not make that connection. He is committed 
to Norwegian democratic values at 10, he did somewhat agree with free movement due to 
Norway’s involvement in Schengen, so he ranked it at 6. He described the welfare state as 
universal and appreciated the welfare state at 8 and he ranked his agreement with the popular 
sovereignty principle over borders at 10. This person can be described as a communitarian that 
leans to the right in Norwegian party politics, he is a soft culture conservative, and this is a 
thread in the rural population of my groups. They seemed to be more keenly aware of culture, 
and integration, while those who grew up in cities are more attuned to multiculturalism. To 
conclude, Jonathan is a communitarian to the centre right-wing, he values culture and 
integration and he was supportive of refugees and their human rights. Moving on.  
Participant C10 Geir Stordal: 25-30 years old, Trøndelag fylke, public transportation worker, 
rural  
Geir was perhaps one of the more interesting participants in the control group. Geir Stordal is 
of Jewish heritage and the only participant of the Jewish faith. Furthermore, He is a centre-left, 
but he sympathizes the most with the Centre Party/Agrarian Party. He situated himself as a 4 
on the political spectrum from 0-10. He is ethnically Norwegian, and he did say that his Jewish 
heritage has influenced his attitudes towards refugees. He said, “… my background and in our 
family history as a Jewish person, we know how it is like to be refugees… So, I sympathize 
with refugees to a very large extent.” And indeed, this reflects Carens argument that any justice 
regarding migrants should be viewed in the shadow of the holocaust, and this is the mainstream 
view as well. Human rights came as a direct consequence of world war and the Nazi treatment 
of Jewish people in Europe during the time. The Overton window had shifted quite heavily, and 
people saw the need for international conventions that are there to protect the human rights of 
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all people to make sure that another Holocaust would happen again. Of course, this also a 
heavily Western liberal view considering the current treatment of the Uyghurs in China, where 
human rights are not respected in the same way.  International non-governmental organizations 
and governments have not been able to hinder the Chinese in their treatment of the Chinese 
Muslim Uyghurs. To be sure, it shows that when it matters in terms of human rights 
international organizations lack teeth to punish those who perpetrate such crimes and especially 
those powerful nation-states such as China. He did admit that his Jewish faith did have an 
impact upon how he viewed the Israel-Palestine conflict. The participant was very supportive 
of the welfare state, and he said: “The welfare state is well-functioning on many points, and it 
works for the vast majority, but of course, for some, it does not work.” He was unsure whether 
he would describe it as universal and he said, “It is so rigid and inflexible so that when you 
have a person that is treading the line between two rules or legal authorities then they fall 
outside.” The element he appreciated the most about the welfare state was in his words: 
“Universal health help. And not just for myself, but for others too. If they need help, then they 
get help.” By universal health help, he means universal single-payer healthcare. He appreciated 
the welfare state at 7, and his reasoning for this was fascinating: “For me, it has been so that I 
have gone between being a student and beginning to work, and I had to do that because I lost 
my part-time job. I had to do that because [there was no economic support for students] to hold 
myself above water economically and stop studying and that was what happened to me.” I asked 
him: “So one of your problems was that students did not receive unemployment benefits?” He 
responded with: “Exactly.” Indeed, Oline made the same points as Geir. This is very interesting 
because this person has had a real economic impact upon himself, so even if he is in the control 
group and did not receive the information, I expected him to be somewhat of a welfare 
chauvinist or be more nationalist. However, that was not the case. Geir agreed with social 
membership theory said, “That I agree with. If you live long enough in Norway, then you are 
Norwegian.” He continues: “Yes [refugees should receive the same welfare benefits]. Although 
refugees and migrants do tend to get more in welfare benefits, that is because they need it, and 
I don’t see that is negative that they get more when we are trying to integrate them into society.” 
I asked: “If Norwegians suddenly got the need for it, they would also get more, so it is this 
universality that you appreciate?” He answered with: “Absolutely.” This harkens back to the 
prior question about universality, so Geir does view the welfare state as universal, though he 
indicates that he thinks that is not as universal as it could be. He did not give a specific rank to 
this question, but he gave a solid answer that he agrees with Carens and cosmopolitans on social 
membership theory. He slightly favoured free movement and said: “We should perhaps have a 
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right to move and live where you want, but that is not the reality and it is not always the correct 
thing. Today, our world is separated into nation-states and now it is like that [those nation-
states] can accept migrants or not, and that is how it is.” Moreover, he agreed with the principle 
of popular sovereignty over borders and ranked his agreement as 9, and said: “One should have 
that right, but concerning our closest partners Denmark, Norway, Sweden, I agree that there 
should a freer flow of people.” He was also committed to democracy as well and ranked his 
agreement with Norwegian democratic values as a 9. Overall, Geir can be summarized as a 
communitarian due to the reasons outlined above. Moving on. Let us summarize the control 
group, and thereafter move on to the treatment group.  
Section 8.2: Findings of the Treatment Group  
 
In this section, I will present each of the participants from the treatment group. Although,  I pay 
more keen attention to three participants and I expand those the most.  Those three participants 
are participant T01, Petter Pettersen, T02 Lars Viggo, participant T04 Pitar Pitarsen and 
participant T10 Henrik Ibsen. I spotted a slight difference in the rest of the treatment group 
compared to the control group. The rest can be characterised as communitarians who were 
committed to the rights of refugees. However, Lars Viggo and Henrik Ibsen came close to 
having more sceptical, hesitant and negative attitudes towards refugees.  Moreover, Petter said 
we might want to grant refuge to fewer refugees although when confronted directly he said no. 
However, Henrik backpaddled later in the interview, and Lars Viggo did not commit to welfare 
chauvinism. The only participant that was sympathetic to FrP– the Progress Party, also known 
as the populist radical right party in Norway, was Kristianne (T05). However, she also 
supported the liberals, a libertarian party, therefore, she did not delve into welfare chauvinism. 
Jon Jonson, participant T07, did delve into it somewhat however he did not fully commit. T05, 
T06, TO7, T02 and T02 were the most negative, hesitant and sceptical. Meaning 30 per cent of 
participants were negative, while almost half of the sample was negative. This is an interesting 
finding and I shall delve into the participants now.  
 
Participant T01 Petter Pettersen: 18-25, Innlandet Fylke, property worker for disabled 
persons, rural  
Petter Pettersen is a centre-right wing communitarian, who supports the Agrarian Party first and 
the Conservative Party second. He situated himself as 6 on the left-right spectrum. He said that 
the welfare state wants to be universal but it is not. The most important part of the welfare state 
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for Petter was health and education however he did stress the totality of the welfare state being 
important in minimizing inequality and giving opportunities. He appreciated the welfare state 
at 7 and he cited health as being important in minimizing Covid-19 deaths moreover he cited 
that due to excessive lockdowns Norway is going to struggle with mental health and 
unemployment in the future. He agreed with social membership theory at 10 although he also 
added that refugees deserve the same welfare rights if they participate and contribute to society. 
He agreed at 6 with freedom of movement because he thought it would cause problems for 
richer nations that would suddenly receive a lot of immigrants. He agreed at 7 with the popular 
sovereignty principle as he thought the state should able to decide who is allowed to migrate to 
Norway. Not only this he further stated that Norway should be allowed to decide which refugees 
to permit refuge and where they come from. He did become somewhat nationalistic where he 
said that it might become more important to help citizens, however, did not become welfare 
chauvinistic – thought that refugees should have the same welfare benefits. I asked him if 
Norway should take in fewer refugees in the future and he said no and added that more money 
should be spent on integration so refugees “can come out in society and contribute”. Moreover, 
he was committed to democracy at 7 and thought that the bureaucracy needed to be updated but 
was grateful to rule of law. He also became sceptical of how much of say Norwegians have in 
democracy, and this suggests that the argument from NHO might have affected him as this was 
considered as well. He appreciated the welfare state however the two arguments did seem to 
affect his attitudes here. Moving on.  
Participant T02 Lars Viggo: 18-25, Vestfold & Telemark fylke, Construction worker, rural  
Lars Viggo is an ethnic Norwegian and non-religious. Lars Viggo can be described as a political 
centrist, and he slightly favoured the conservative party. He was the only participant that veered 
cautiously into welfare chauvinism. He said “Maybe” to my question if refugees should have 
to wait until the pandemic is over and the economic recession is over. However, he seemed to 
not be committed to this idea. He was more committed to personal responsibility. When asked 
to describe the Norwegian welfare state he said: “Well, I like the Norwegian welfare state a 
lot.” He described the Norwegian welfare state as universal, and he said: “… I think that it [the 
Norwegian welfare state] takes care of everyone in Norway. I think that it gives Norwegians a 
high standard of living… quality of life.” When asked about the most important part of the 
welfare state for him he said: “That’s a difficult question, I must think about this. Yes… that is 
fair, it is a fair distribution of money and taxation. That the rich pay a bit more in tax than poor 
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people, and that it is not a big difference between the rich and the poor.” He was asked about 
whether he appreciated the health comportment of the welfare state more due to Covid-19 and 
he said: “No, not really for me. I have not felt it.” When asked about how much he appreciated 
the welfare state he said: “Yes, yes, I support it completely. 10. No, so, I think that the 
Norwegian system is very good, one of the best in the world, so there aren’t that much better 
examples out there in the world.” On social membership theory, he said: “That is… If they have 
come here and worked and contributed to the welfare state then I think they have full right to 
citizenship.” Moreover, I challenged him slightly and asked: “But what if they do not work?” 
Lars Viggo then said: “Well, I don’t think we should take away their citizenship but they do 
then have less of personal right.” However, this was not welfare chauvinistic in principle but 
rather from a universalist principle. He argued that one should take personal responsibility and 
that if you do not work regardless of whether one is a refugee or native they had a lower personal 
right. His argument stemmed from a place of libertarian justice, as in personal responsibility 
rather than from a point of welfare chauvinism. He agreed at a 7 with social membership theory, 
however, with those caveats added above. On the question of free movement, he said: “I must 
say I disagree with that. I don’t think that you can just waltz into someone else’s country, I 
think that you must have something that you can offer that country. You can’t just go there and 
live on NAV. You know just take our money.” However, here he slightly changed gears and 
added: “I think that we must avoid putting people with very different cultures and religions 
together.” I asked then: “Do you think that culture is very important in deciding who to let into 
Norway?” He said: “No, I like that we are a multicultural society, of course, but is that 
integrating people into society is what we must look at. If you don’t then we are not going to 
work together, function together as a society.” Here he seems to suggest that people with a very 
different religion and culture will have a harder time with integration and seems to suggest that 
we should be very conscious about this. Culture mattered to Lars Viggo and once more, culture 
to the rural population in my data were more concerned about culture than that of those in cities. 
On the popular sovereignty principle over borders he agreed and said: “Yes, I think that… I 
think that Norway should be allowed to control that and that is fair. I think that every country 
should be allowed to do that and that I do not think that any country should take in someone 
that they do not want to have. Someone that does not fit into their system.” He ranked his 
agreement at 9.” When asked if Covid should make us rethink Norwegian support to refugees 
he said: “We should not decrease the money we use on refugees.” I asked him then if he would 
agree to have a separate welfare state for natives and refugees, and he replied with: “No… I do 
not think we should receive more just because we are natives and they are refugees.” Although, 
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he reemphasized a sense of urgency and said: “If they integrate quickly into society and work 
then I don’t think they should be treated any differently. Optimally, we would not take in any 
refugees that cannot integrate and work… but I feel like it becomes immoral not give them the 
same because they have come to Norway.” I further asked him about his commitment to 
democracy and he was very supportive and he said: “10. I completely agree.” When asked why 
he said: “I think that is a fair way of doing things.” He thought that a world without borders 
would be more unfair and said: “If there were no countries then there might one ruler.” He 
continued: “No, I do not think it would be that fair you can see that on many dictatorships.” 
Here he adds a connotation that open borders would come with one-world government and this 
would be dictatorial however that might not necessarily be the case. Overall, Lars Viggo is a 
communitarian, he is not against the welfare of refugees, and he did not think that Norway 
should have a welfare chauvinist regime, and he valued participation in society and integration. 
He did not think that Norway should give less welfare to refugees, and he did not think that 
Norway should grant refuge to fewer refugees. He was also supportive of child refugees. 
However, Lars was the most negative and sceptical of refugees than any other of the participants 
from the treatment group. However, moving on to Pitar, who was the most positive.  
Participant T03 Emily Olsen: 20-25, Vestland Fylke, Student, rural  
Emily Olsen is centre right-wing, and she favoured parties like the Conservatives, MDG (the 
Green Party), and the Liberal Party (Venstre). She thought that the welfare state is universal, 
and she situated herself as a 5 on the political spectrum. She valued education as one the most 
important parts of the welfare state for her and that citizens received equal opportunities. 
Moreover, health was important for her as well. Free education, inexpensive healthcare and 
equal opportunities. Emily acknowledged that Covid made her more appreciative of healthcare. 
She appreciated the welfare state at 10 and thought it to be good. She agreed with social 
membership theory at 10, while saying that they should participate and when they get 
citizenship they are just as equal and as deserving as natives to welfare rights because they are 
humans as well. Therefore, Emily comes from a point of defending human rights and the rights 
of refugees. She also added refugees have baggage, meaning they have escaped from war and 
they might struggle with mental health and physical capabilities [like missing a limb] that make 
it understandable that they cannot work. She noted that those must be taken care of but then she 
stresses integration further says that it would be unlucky if none of them can contribute and get 
out into society because then they become a big load for the welfare state to take care of. She 
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brought up an example of there not being enough psychologists to treat natives, ethnic 
Norwegians and then we do not have enough psychologists because Norway is a small country 
with few people. She noted that granting refuge must be sustainable and take into account what 
kind of capacity Norway has for integrating refugees and how many we can help based upon 
how many Norwegians there are according to Emily. She agreed with freedom of movement at 
5 because she only “halfway” agreed because it was in her view unsustainable since the wealthy 
nations would be a pulling magnet attracting people to live there and that it is better if people 
live spread out over the globe. She noted that it would be unfair for others to come to another 
country where people have lived for generations and say: “No, here is where we are going to 
live.” She did not agree with the inherent right and that one should show regard to others. She 
agreed with the popular sovereignty principle over borders at 8. Emily did think that the Covid-
19 pandemic should make us reconsider the support for refugees she said they might need more 
support. She said that support should not be reduced. I reminded her of the argument from NHO 
and she immediately questioned the validity of this and said it is not a problem because Norway 
could always innovate and produce growth in the economy that allows for helping refugees. 
She noted that cuts to the welfare state could help more refugees, although that it would make 
the welfare insufficient for natives and refugees, therefore she was not in favour of this. She 
was committed to democracy at 9. Emily is communitarian and did not show any tendency for 
welfare chauvinism.  
Participant T04 Pitar Pitarsen: 60-70, Vestland fylke, pensioner, city 
Pitar Pitarsen retired as a municipal worker within IT. He is now a pensioner, he is an ethnic 
Norwegian and is non-religious. He is a political left-winger, and he sympathises with Rødt. 
He favoured democracy and he was committed to democracy as well. He thought that there 
ought to be more democracy and advocated for a form of socialism, whereby the workplace is 
also an arena for democracy, which runs contrary to the current capitalist design. It is interesting 
considering that over time Norway has become more and neoliberal and parties such as Rødt 
has become social democrats to the left of the Labour Party. What is interesting about Pitar is 
that he immediately criticized the theoretical cut to the welfare state as unnecessary, and said 
that it is all about priorities and he criticized NHO for already having a conclusion and ideology. 
Pitar was uncompromising on refugees’ human rights. He describes the Norwegian welfare 
state as: “The welfare state generally, the Nordic welfare state, has been important for unity in 
society, quality of life, to reduce contradictions and so on. This is despite the Norwegian welfare 
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state… it has been changed in the later decades and gradually weakened but it [the Norwegian 
welfare state] is still important and has given Norway and Scandinavia considerable advantages 
compared to other countries.” He continued to highlight the redistributive function of the 
welfare state and its universality. The most important part of the welfare state for Pitar he says 
is: “In my view, it is the combination. The moment you start picking which part is the most 
important then you are making it easier to weaken to the welfare state or make 
inequalities/differences between groups that weaken unity or the wholeness of society.” He 
continued to say: “If you are asking me about the principle of the welfare state, then 10, I would 
support it fully but if you are asking me about how it has functioned in Norway during the last 
year then 5. This is because there have been large groups that have fallen to the wayside, outside 
of the welfare state and they have been treated very differently between… Like for example, 
these big… Let us say Stordalen, those hotel and property businessmen. They get enormous 
sums of money with a very low degree of documentation but those who need the money the 
most must document much more and it takes a lot longer. The government has made it much 
harder for those that are weakest in society. We can thank Stortinget [The Norwegian 
Parliament] for those changes that were made early on in the pandemic that bettered people’s 
lives more than the current government.” Indeed, while Pitar is left-wing he was highly critical 
of the welfare state’s performance during the last year. However, it also had an element of being 
very critical towards the current Conservative government as well. I gave Pitar the information 
and he said: “Yes, I understand what you are saying.” He agreed somewhat with social 
membership theory and said: “10 because the welfare state should be universal and count for 
everyone. And this is connected to the long reasoning that you cited from NHO. There there 
are many underlying political principles that steer that conclusion. Like for example these 
prognoses that go ‘all the way’ to 2060, that is to say, 40 years from now. If we go 40 years 
back from now, you can look at what was forecast then it is ‘totally’ meaningless. Nobody 
knows what the future will be like. When you have has a premise that you cannot afford it if 
we are going to give that many billions (billions of NOK) in tax breaks but the situation is that 
Norwegian productivity increases each year, so if we keep ‘quality of life’ on bit lower growth 
then you can still grow without these issues arising if we let go off the assumption that tax 
breaks are needed on the wealthiest. Of course, they have built up a right to citizenship. We 
cannot have people that come here and work for little money, and thereafter get sent out again. 
At the same time, we have these schemes where low-paid foreign seasonal workers come here 
and pick strawberries… and Norwegian youth do not want to have those jobs not because they 
are too labour intensive but the problem is that they cannot be bothered with the intensive labour 
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at such a low wage.” He outlines this as well in the freedom of movement question. On freedom 
of movement: “I agree with that. It can be thought that there some limits but mainly I agree so 
if we are not going to go into detail then I say 10.” I asked him if there is an obligation to give 
back to that society in terms of taxation, following the laws, and learning the language and he 
said: “But of course.  Rights should be same but the obligations should also be the same.” On 
the popular sovereignty principle, he said: “That is true as well. Democratically elected officials 
must of course have control over our borders but there does not need to be a contradiction 
between this value and granting rights to refugees or labour migrants because it is the same 
people who say the welfare state is being eroded because we are not birthing enough children. 
If you look at the health sector, then a considerable amount of those working there are 
immigrants. So if those who work in the health sector… where they are born or who they have 
as parents that do not have any importance as long as there are not enough people in Norway. 
The blame goes partly on a [downward] wage pressure.” He did not rank this question on a 
scale from 0-10. When asked about whether covid should make us reconsider he said: “… the 
question thinks that because we used so much money now then we cannot afford to give money 
to refugees? We do need to use three-numbered amounts of billions [NOK] to buy new 
expensive military-grade jets? Do we need to give tax cuts to the rich? Do we need to build 
highways way into the countryside and build new railroads? We must look at the whole and 
just parts. Why can we not increase the width of the welfare state and also include refugees? It 
is a very common political strategy to take one group that a lot of people have issues with and 
put them up against others without looking at the fact that there underlying economic ideology 
and reasons for this.” Pitar was committed to democracy as well but he was not satisfied he 
wanted more democracy. He ranked his commitment to Norwegian democracy at 6 because he 
thought it was simply not good enough.  Overall, Pitar was communitarian, who simply rejected 
the theoretical cut to the welfare state and said that Norway can do both. It was just about 
different priorities for Pitar, he prioritised the rights and welfare of refugees more than he did 
the Norwegian government buying fighter jets, and tax cuts to the rich.  
Moving on.  
Participant T05 Kristianne Kristensen: 40-45, Viken fylke, health worker, city  
Kristianne Kristensen is a right-winger and she supports the Liberalists (a Libertarian Party) 
and she supports the Progress Party. She did not situate herself on the left-right political 
spectrum, although, I would situate her solidly on the right-wing if compared to the other 
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participants. She thought the welfare state was really good but she was scared for the future due 
to Coronavirus and due to increased immigration. She did not describe the welfare state as 
universal nor means-tested, separate welfare rights. She appreciated the health part of the 
welfare state and that is relatively inexpensive to get healthcare and sickness pay. She 
appreciated the welfare state at 10 and said liked the way it is right now but is scared of the bill 
that Norwegians must pay at the end of the pandemic which might result in a weakening of the 
welfare state in her words. She thinks that cuts to the welfare state are inevitable. She agrees 
with the social membership theory at 8 and she says that she does not want refugees to come 
and just receive benefits immediately that are better than natives and she said that natives and 
refugees should be treated universally in terms of welfare rights. She thinks that refugees need 
to participate, contribute and partake in society before they can pensions. She agreed with free 
movement at 10 because she thought that should be allowed if you are going to participate in 
the country that you are going to. She agreed with the popular sovereignty principle over 
borders at 10 and she said this is because she thought that Norway should be allowed to restrict 
refugees. After all, Norway must have the capacity to take care of each according to her. She 
thought that Norway should reconsider its support for refugees and receive fewer refugees. She 
did not agree with welfare chauvinism and she said that if refugees that come to Norway on the 
right basis, persecution, not an economic migrant, they should receive the same welfare rights. 
She added that refugees who have been in Norway for a long time and their country of origin 
is now safe to return to then they should be sent back to their country of origin. Some people 
need help she said and Norway cannot completely shut its borders and help no one. It’s about 
balancing these things in her words. She says that Norway has never taken in fewer refugees 
than currently but that we should not take in more than we do currently. Indeed, she was very 
sceptical and compared to the other participants negative towards refugees. She also noted that 
one refugee is simply not one refugee since refugees have rights they are entitled to a family 
reunion in Norway and therefore “chain migration” occurs in her view. She said that of course, 
Norway should protect those that flee from war but not those that are just trying to seek their 
fortune elsewhere (economic migrants). She argues that she is very positive about refugees but 
not economic migrants because to take care of refugees and make sure that resources go to 
refugees those economic migrants must be excluded. I asked her about child refugees and she 
said: “Oh that is a tough one.” She continued to say that children are vulnerable and that if they 
do not have parents to take care of them then Norway should. She said she would prioritize 
children first. Thus in one way earlier she was negative about refugees but considering that half 
of the refugees in the world fleeing are children I would say that she is positive about a certain 
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group of, particularly vulnerable refugees. Overall, Kristianne was a communitarian with 
somewhat negative but also positive views of refugees. She supported relocating refugees to 
Norway but also giving aid to refugees in camps and elsewhere. Although, she did also 
comment that Norway might need to cut and reconsider foreign aid. Her views can be explained 
to some extent that she likes the Progress Party, and the two arguments provided does not 
necessarily explain Karianne’s views as she already mentioned before the two arguments that 
she was concerned about migration and immigration. Although, she was definitely on some 
level affected by the two arguments provided. Moving on to Kari Hansen.  
Participant T06 Kari Hansen: 18-25, Innlandet fylke, children & youth worker, city 
Kari Hansen was religious and contrary to C02, Erik Andre, she did not think religion affected 
her attitudes towards refugees and asylum seekers. She did not describe the welfare state as 
universal as it treats people differently according to their needs. She said that Covid-19 made 
her appreciate the health part of the welfare state more. She appreciated the welfare state at 8 
because it took care of people. She agreed with social membership theory at 5 (she stressed that 
she was neither in favour nor against it) although she highlighted that refugees should contribute 
and work up a right. Although she was very uncertain as she thought it was a difficult question. 
On freedom of movement, she said that she agreed at 10. She thought that everyone should 
equal rights no matter where they live. I asked her once more and she said that she agreed with 
people moving to Norway and she said she completely agreed. On the popular sovereignty 
principle, she agreed at 6 and thought that refugees should come to Norway if they need help. 
She did not know whether Covid should make Norway reevaluate the support it gives for 
refugees and asylum seekers. I asked her if Norway should take in fewer refugees until the 
Covid-19 pandemic is resolved, and she said: “Maybe.” She said she was committed to 
democracy at 5 and she said she does not have any thoughts on it. To conclude, she was a 
communitarian that was very uncertain about her beliefs. She became a bit more negative about 
refugees. 
Moving on to participant Jon.  
Participant T07 Jon Jonson: 28-32, Vestland fylke, music worker, rural  
Jon Jonson is centre right-wing and situated himself as 5 on the political spectrum. He described 
the welfare state as universal but noted that refugees had some advantages because they often 
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have a harder time getting work. He noted that the most important part of the welfare state for 
him was the safety net if everything goes to “hell” in his own words. He explained that he had 
gone unemployed for longer periods and that he felt grateful for the welfare state was there for 
him. He appreciated the welfare state at 8 because he thought that it worked well but thought it 
could improve and continued that NAV and its bureaucracy was very hard and complicated for 
him. He did not agree with the structure of NAV and said: “it is a bit that [NAV] makes it so… 
difficult.” On social membership theory, he was inconclusive in his ranking but he did say if 
they work they should have the same rights just as natives. If they did not work, he said that it 
is difficult to say since not everyone has the same resources and the same ability to contribute 
to society. I referred back to the argument presented earlier and he said that he did not know 
and it is difficult to say but if they worked they should receive the same. I did not sense any 
welfare chauvinism in Jon. He agreed with freedom of movement at 7 and he said that everyone 
should not have that right such as economic migrants and terrorists.  On the principle of popular 
sovereignty, he says that: “We must have control over borders otherwise everything goes to 
hell. I’m not saying we should not take in anyone but we must have control. Have the capacity 
to integrate people.” I detected some degree of welfare protectionism here when asked if we 
should take in fewer refugees, and he said if it is the detriment of citizens then perhaps Norway 
should. When asked if natives should receive better welfare rights than natives he said that in a 
way that would be fair but in another way not because if they become integrated even then they 
might struggle with getting work and currently refugees do receive better welfare rights. Jon 
said that refugees should receive the same welfare benefits (universality) but also receive more 
follow-up from the government and also receive welfare that might result in employment like 
a driver’s license (active labour market policies). Regarding child refugees and asylum seekers, 
he had little to add because he felt like he did not know enough. He was committed to 
democracy and was committed to one person one vote. He thought it worked well and placed 
his agreement at 9. Overall, he was communitarian with somewhat negative views towards 
refugees but he did not fully commit and said it was an option rather than what Norway should 
do. He was very close to welfare chauvinism, however, due to him not answering some 
questions and not having very strong convictions I cannot label him as a welfare chauvinist 
although it was close. He is a communitarian who got somewhat more negative views regarding 
refugees such as them having to wait until the pandemic is over and he thought that we should 
prioritize natives over refugees if for example pensions were to be cut.  
Moving on.  
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Participant T08 Susan Nordmann: 50-60, Vestfold & Telemark fylke, municipal health worker, 
rural 
She is centre-right on the political spectrum and she situated herself at 5. She favoured the 
Conservative Party although she also liked the Labour Party and the Liberal Party (Venstre). 
She thought that the welfare state is good and helps the ones who need it like if they get sick 
and become unemployed. She thought that the welfare state was universal but highlighted that 
refugees are a special group and that they get a separate pension scheme where they do not have 
to work to get pension rights. She thought the most important part was health and free education 
and she said that Covid made her appreciate health a bit more than before. She appreciated the 
welfare state at 10 and she added the pandemic had made more appreciate the welfare state 
more than before just like with health. She said she agreed with social membership theory at 8, 
however, she as well added caveats of integration, learning the language and contributing to 
society. She very much disagreed with freedom of movement at 2, while she agreed with the 
popular sovereignty principle at 10. She did not think that Covid should make Norway 
reevaluate its support of refugees she instead said that the Norwegian economy is doing so well 
currently therefore it would not be needed to have cuts in the welfare state and she remained 
positive to the rights and welfare of refugees. She thought without borders the rich nation would 
receive a lot of migrants and therefore this system would be unsustainable. She was committed 
to democracy at 7 because she thought it was an imperfect system and criticized elements like 
minority coalition governments and that there could be a lot of unlucky results due to 
democracy. To conclude, she was a communitarian but she was committed to the rights and 
welfare of refugees.  
Participant T09 Tobias Hermansen: 20-25, Vestland fylke, student, city 
He is participant T09, and he is a left-wing communitarian with some tendencies towards 
cosmopolitanism, although, due to his left-wing tendencies and he situated himself at 1 in the 
left-right spectrum. He supports Rødt (the Red Party) and the Socialist Left Party. He valued 
the community and participation and therefore he cannot be characterized as a cosmopolitan. 
Tobias thought the welfare state was good because it diminished inequalities through tax and 
welfare such as universal single-payer healthcare, education, NAV with unemployment benefits 
and so on. The most important aspect of the welfare state for Tobias was healthcare and 
education. He appreciated healthcare more after the effects of Covid. He appreciated the welfare 
state at 9 because he recognized the flaws of the welfare state and thought it could be better. He 
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gave the example of himself being made redundant and not receiving unemployment benefits. 
He agreed with social membership theory at 10 and he thought that everyone who comes to 
Norway and contributes and participates in society should receive the same welfare benefits. 
Therefore, Tobias is a communitarian. He agreed with free movement at 8 and said that people 
should have the right to move where they wanted with caveats that the following law and 
integrating into society. He was also very positive about refugees, and I did not think that the 
Covid crisis should make Norway give refugees worse benefits. The theoretical cut to the 
welfare state did not impact his views. He was not a welfare chauvinist. He was committed to 
democracy at 10. Tobias valued the popular sovereignty principle over borders at 10 although 
recognizes that Norway is obligated to grant refuge to those who need it. Tobias is overall a 
communitarian with positive attitudes to refugees.  
Moving on to Henrik Ibsen, the last participant of the treatment group.  
Participant T10 Henrik Ibsen: 20-30, Vestland fylke, stevedore, city  
Henrik Ibsen (not the national and cultural icon) but the participant in this interview who 
decided his pseudonym be the same as Henrik Ibsen. Although, he used very colourful language 
as well. He is a left-winger, and he likes Rødt, the Red Party. He placed himself as a 0 on the 
political spectrum, and he thought the welfare state to be universal. He committed himself to 
democracy at 8 because he thought it could be better and he wanted more democracy.  
 
He said: “It functions better than it does in other countries but one of my worries is that is slowly 
and surely more and more parts of the welfare state is sneak-privatized. That is what I’m afraid 
of.” He continues: “Well, that is the universality principle [that the welfare state operates on].” 
When asked about the most important part of the welfare state for him he said: “Well, education, 
that is the most important in doing away with the generational cleavages.” He appreciated the 
Norwegian welfare state at 9 and said: “Well, that is a difficult question. I do appreciate the 
welfare state but I would like to make changes to it – make the welfare state stronger. I would 
like to have dental health covered by the welfare state, that is one element.” On social 
membership theory, he agreed at 10 but then explains: “It does not matter where if they are 
from Asia, middle-east or somewhere else. I do not care that much about culture but if they a 
job and they contribute to the community then they must receive back if not it is bad for 
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integration.” I asked him: “But what if they do not contribute?” He answered: “I don’t know. It 
is very difficult to put large socio-economic needs above humanitarian regards without 
sounding like a psychopath. But yes, I do understand the argument [the argument that refugees 
and migrants are an economic burden], I do understand that.” On the freedom of movement 
question, he said: “3… 4. I do not believe in inherent rights. But I don’t know. I don’t have 
particularly strong beliefs in this field. Very weak beliefs.” On the commitment to the popular 
sovereignty principle, he said: “Yes, 10, like what? That’s the national sovereignty principle 
and that is a principle that is worth having. You don’t need to go completely overboard with it 
but controlling our borders must be allowed.”  
When asked whether Covid-19 should make us reconsider the support we give to refugees he 
said: “Yes… I think it is possible… if you mean by change making it more efficient then yes. 
We should always look at efficiency measures but if it is at the detriment of integration like 
language courses then it is just going to cause more issues down the line in the future. We 
should always have a long-term plan.” I further investigated his answer and asked: “Do you 
think natives and refugees should have different welfare rights?” He replied with: “No… no, I 
don’t think that.” Further, I asked him: “Do you think that refugees should have to wait until 
the economic recession and pandemic in Norway is over until they come here?” He said: “Yes, 
I think the government should be far stricter on border control from day one because of the 
pandemic and that must also apply to refugees but not just them but tourists, labour migrants, 
business travels and such as well.”   
He thought that the resources of the world should belong to everyone in the sense that he said: 
“I think there should be global planning of resources [so that everyone benefits] and there 
should no opening for capitalists and big corporations to make a profit on those resources. That 
should be highly illegal and discouraged. Send them to jail.” Indeed, he had socialist tendencies 
and he did think that the resources of the world should belong to the people and be fairly 
distributed. This is a very Norwegian idea as well where the oil resources and natural resources 
are supposed to belong to the people although, with a caveat that capitalists can make a profit 
as well.  Moreover, he reiterated his commitment to universality when I asked him whether 
refugees should receive better welfare rights than natives since they are a vulnerable group he 
said: “No, the same. We must have a sustainable integration policy, that at the same time while 
it integrates does not provoke the local population because then you just right-wing extremism 
on the rise.”  
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He now takes back his earlier statement, where he veered into welfare chauvinism. He now saw 
the implications of what he said earlier when I asked him about child refugees. He said: “Offer 
them adoption in Norway… That could be a solution.” I asked him about his earlier statement 
and if this applied to children as well and he said: “No, that is, all of that is contingent upon 
Covid-19 testing capacity, and if they test negative then that must be alright but I think everyone 
that that comes to Norway should be tested.” I asked him if he retracts his earlier statement 
about refugees having to wait until the pandemic and economic crisis is over and he said: “Yes, 
I do.”  Therefore, Henrik Ibsen is a communitarian and he is a communitarian. He values 
participation, contribution and he does not agree with cosmopolitans since he does not believe 
in inherent rights and secondly, he believes that the community triumphs individuals and that 
refugees should be integrated into society because that is the best for them and society in his 
opinion.  
However, as I have shown with Pitar and Henrik, placement on the political spectrum seems to 
not play as big of a role in whether someone is susceptible to welfare chauvinism. Henrik almost 
agreed before he backtracked while Pitar outright disputed those claims and calmly asserted his 
opinions. Henrik like participant C08 was concerned about far-right extremism, and he thought 
one must help refugees in ways that do not endanger refugees. That was a common tread with 
some left-wing candidates, where they wanted to help refugees, although they were limited by 
far-right extremist parties. Henrik solved this conundrum by having a long-term plan and 
solution to those issues, and as stated he argued that one should limit conflict between locals 
and the new Norwegian citizens that are refugees. Henrik limited his positive attitudes to 
refugees due to fears of far-right extremism, therefore he was also pragmatic as well. Indeed, 
the two arguments did seem to affect 3 of the participants. T05, T07 and T02 since they came 
noticeably more negative about receiving more refugees. 
However, let us now compare and summarise.  
Section 9.2: Cultural Chauvinism but no Welfare Chauvinism in 
Norway?  
Indeed, Norwegians are some of the most culturally chauvinist Europeans, so therefore, why is 
it not so that this might also feed into a sense of welfare chauvinism in this case? This statistic 
was found according to Pew Research Center (2018), and it asked different Europeans about 
whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: “Our people are not perfect but 
our culture is superior to others.” Indeed, Norwegians were the most culturally chauvinist out 
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of the three Scandinavian countries where 58 per cent of Norwegians said they agreed with this 
statement. Finland at 49 per cent, Denmark at 44 per cent, Sweden at 26 per cent. To be sure, 
the only countries that surpassed Norway was Russia at 69 per cent, Greece at 89 per cent, 
Bulgaria at 69 per cent, Romania at 66 per cent, Serbia at 65 per cent, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
at 68 per cent and Croatia at 65 per cent. Indeed, Norway is an anomaly. While it may not 
surprise people that the Balkans and Eastern European countries rank highly on cultural 
chauvinism and in part one might suspect this has something to do with the fall of the Soviet 
Union, and Russia’s can be explained by its history of the Soviet Union and its imperialism in 
opposition to the United States of America during the cold war. In addition, how Eastern 
European countries tend to have a strong anti-migrant outlook, especially towards migrants and 
refugees of Muslim/middle eastern backgrounds. The explanation does exist in the data I have 
provided with the interviews. Participant CO5 for example warned of the dangers of parallel 
societies and a lack of integration. Indeed, cultural chauvinism is an expression against 
multiculturalism on some level, however, they argued for more integration so that refugees do 
not fall out of society. Therefore, cultural chauvinism can mean that they want refugees to 
participate in Norwegian culture and that they should learn our culture, our language and the 
Norwegian way of life. However, a participant addressing the need for integration in terms of 
culture, language, way of life, politics and society does not run contrary to multiculturalism. 
Participant C01 made a similar point when he answered his question on the most important part 
of the welfare state, where he said that education is very important to teach us how to be good 
citizens and to have a common understanding of Norway. Indeed, cultural chauvinism makes it 
so that citizens want refugees to become Norwegian and see that we have some good values 
while acknowledging that they as well have good cultural elements. To be sure, 
multiculturalism without understanding each other through culture, and language hinders 
cultures from mixing. As mentioned earlier in the findings chapter, the participants who lived 
rurally were the ones who were concerned the most outspoken about culture, however, those in 
cities were also concerned about this as well. Furthermore, it can be explained by how the 
participants valued universality in terms of the welfare state and how Norwegian democratic 
values were valued highly as well. This may indicate that they want refugees to become like 
Norwegians and adopt Norwegian values, although not completely none of the participants 
came out against multiculturalism but regarded parallel societies as a problem, and as discussed 
in the chapter on Carens and cosmopolitanism. I make his hermit scenario more realistic and 
frame it instead in terms of parallel societies, which occurs in many societies and has occurred 
in some places in Norway as well. Therefore, a rejection of social membership theory, and if 
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one adds caveats such as: “they must learn the language or work” et cetera makes those 
participants communitarians. One can see it quite clearly when cultures clash and values clash. 
Indeed, Norwegians are also very accepting of minorities, where 82% said that they would be 
willing to accept a Muslim as a family member. This reemphasizes and underscores the point 
being made, Norwegians are cultural chauvinist at 58% but that does not mean that do not 
accept other cultures as valid to the contrary. Norwegian culture is also about accepting others 
for their differences and be inclusive. Norwegians are multicultural while also being cultural 
chauvinists because multiculturalism is a key part of Norwegian values and culture. A very 
common Norwegian phrase is: “Det er typisk Norsk å være God.” Gro Harlem Brundtland, 
Norway’s first female prime minister, said this in 1992 during her new years’ speech. This 
translates to: “It is typical Norwegian to be good.” Norwegians are proud of their political 
system and culture since they have made much progress in human rights, feminism, 
egalitarianism and the rights of workers. What this explains is that when those two arguments 
were made about having to make cuts to the welfare state and having to be less generous in 
Norwegian humanitarianism regarding refugees this made the participants in the treatment 
group this made Norwegians lose faith in NHO but also the political system. What I found in 
both groups regarding culture was that those who lived in the countryside or rurally were more 
concerned with culture and integration, though those living in cities also thought this to be 
important but not as much as those who lived rurally. For example, C04 made comments about 
parallel societies and participant T02 made comments about being careful of culture and that 
we should consider the cultural differences between natives and refugees to give some 
examples. Meaning that Norwegians think that refugees should become Norwegian and 
embrace Norwegian values such as language, valuing fairness in the sense that if someone 
works and participates in society, they should receive the same treatment. This is because they 
value universalist principles. Indeed, everyone can become Norwegian according to the 
participants in my research it is not bound to race or ethnicity. Indeed, no one remarked that 
refugees cannot receive citizenship because they are of a different race, ethnicity or religion 
than the natives. However, I would also like to discuss the methodology and the sample size.  
 
Section 8.3: Summary of the Control Group & the Treatment Group: 
Comparison  
However, to summarize the control group and the treatment group and to compare them. 
However, firstly, to discuss the religious variable. There was only one person with religious 
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beliefs in this group, and it turned out that his religion had a lot of influence on his politics. 
Outside of the recording, he revealed that he had recently become religious. However, another 
person in the T06, Kari Hansen, said she was religious and it said that it did not affect her 
attitudes and perspective on refugees and refuge. Overall, Kari was a lot less politically 
conscious than C02. He was a lot more interested in politics and he took a greater interest, while 
Kari was relatively apolitical. Therefore, it is hard to make a concrete judgment on whether the 
religious variable had any effect. Norwegian society is non-religious and this was represented 
in my sample, where 18 of the participants were non-religious, and 1 of those 18 was Jewish 
and he said that his outlook on refugees was coloured by his Jewish heritage. Due to the 
relatively small number of religious people in my sample, it makes it hard to conclude in any 
one direction.  
Overall, this group was in line with the mainstream view, as most of the participants were 
communitarians. See the table below.  
 
 Cosmopolitan  Communitarian Welfare chauvinist 
Participants  1: C05 (Pål Pålsen) 9: C01, C02, C03, 
C04, C06, C07, C08, 
C09 and C10 
0: None of the 
participants were 
welfare chauvinist  
Figure 8.1: Distribution of cosmopolitans, communitarians and welfare chauvinists in the control group  
 
While this table is simplistic, but it does nicely summarize the control group. To be sure, this 
reemphasizes and underscores Miller’s point about communitarianism being the mainstream 
and institutional view and this trend can be found in my data as well. The figure below shows 
the treatment group.  
 
 Cosmopolitan  Communitarian Welfare chauvinist 
Participants  0: None of the 
participants was 
cosmopolitans 
10: T01, T02, T03, T04, 
T05, T06, T07, T08, 
T09 and T10 
0: None of the 
participants was 
welfare chauvinists  




None of the participants outright supported welfare chauvinism or differentiated citizenship in 
terms of legal rights. Most of the participants thought that citizenship mattered and they thought 
that it is not just legal rights, but in exchange for those rights, one has duties and obligations to 
fulfil. Indeed, citizenship, as discussed is first and foremost a community of people enter into a 
social contract. This contract gives citizens their rights and freedoms, but also they need to grant 
other citizens those rights through obligations and duties. Pål was of course the only 
cosmopolitan, and this is very interesting because it is not immediately obvious as to why 
thought these things. Of course, he agreed with democracy, thought human beings have the 
same moral worth. To be sure, he is an outlier, while the rest were situated as communitarians. 
One could theorize and hypothesise reasons as to what could explain Pål’s attitudes, as we shall 
discuss this more in the discussion chapter. However, for now, he is an outlier. Moreover, the 
control group did not think that we should change how we treat refugees, and when asked about 
whether Covid-19 should make us reevaluate the support Norway offer to refugees, no one said 
that we should give refugees less. On the contrary, they thought it should stay the same or we 
need to help refugees more. Indeed, participant C05’s response still echos that they need more 
information and they need to given safer housing. No one thought that refugees should be 
excluded because they thought that refugees bring Covid-19 into Norway and that we should 
be careful about this. Overall, the group had a diversity of political opinions. See the table 
below. Once more, 0 is to the left in Norwegian party politics, while 10 is the furthest right-


































0: Furthest to the left. 10: Furthest to the right. 
Left to Right in Norwegian Party Politics
Control group Treatment group
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Figure 8.3: Distribution of Left-Right Norewgian Politics in the control & treatment group. Note: 2 participants 
from the control group and 1 participant from the treatment group did not answer.  
 
In the treatment group, there was a tendency towards the far left in Norwegian politics however 
as discussed on participant T10 it did not seem that ideology or placement on the left-right scale 
can explain positive attitudes towards refugees. Although, it is noticeable that left-wingers tend 
to be closer to cosmopolitanism, although, only one of those could be characterised as a 
cosmopolitan. Moreover, one of the participants in the T group did not give a definitive answer 
however she liked the far right-wing Progress Party, and the Liberalists (a libertarian party). In 
both groups, there was a tendency towards the mean, and it did not seem like placement on the 
left-right spectrum mattered since T10 was 0 and he almost turned to welfare chauvinism. 
Although, he did comment on it feels sociopathic about having to decide between humanitarian 
issues and greater macroeconomic dilemma. He also pointed out that NHO had an ideology and 
had a conclusion that they wanted to realise. However, he never went close to having a separate 
welfare state for refugees, and natives, although he did say that maybe refugees need to wait 
until the economic crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic is over. However, at the mention of child 
refugees, he switched and I asked: “Do you take back your earlier statement then?” and he said: 
“yes.” Although, his limiting factor in taking in refugees and helping refugees was the threat of 
the nationalist far-right. The same as participant C08. Moreover, below is the normal 
distribution of the control group on the appreciation of the Norwegian welfare state.  
 
 
Figure 8.4: Appreciation of the Norwegian Welfare State. Note the y axis simply denotes the number of participants 



































Agreement from 0 to 10
Appreciation of the Welfare state 




As you can see, if one creates a dummy variable here, every single participant appreciated the 
welfare state. Note the participant that ranked the welfare state 5 also said that he in principle 
ranks the welfare state as a 10 but due to its poor performance throughout gave it a rank of 5. 
This is very interesting. This tells me that every single participant appreciates the welfare state 
and this is true from across the entirety of the political spectrum.  
However, let us take a look at social membership theory and if there is a significant shift in 
attitudes.  
 
Figure 8.5: Agreement with social membership theory in the Control Group & Treatment Group. Note: 3 
participants from the control group did not give an answer and 1 participant from the treatment group did not 
answer.  
 
This comparison chart may seem promising, although, in the opposite direction since the 
treatment group is far more positive. However, I am inclined to somewhat dismiss this figure. 
The reasoning for this is most of the participants did not agree with social membership theory 
instead they added caveats such as integration in terms of culture and language. Thus it is not 
about time and forming deep and meaningful connections that entitle one to citizenship the 
participants and it was a hard and philosophical question and 3 participants from the control 
group gave no definitive answer, but their answers indicated that they did not agree with social 
membership theory. Their agreement with social membership theory is somewhat misleading 
here. While most of the participants said they agreed they then continued and explained why 
and they added caveats like integration, language and working a job. Moreover, there was a 
clear political dimension here, where those on the further left-wing ranked their agreement 
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Agreement from 0  to 10
Social Membership Theory
Control group Treatment group
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higher and those who had libertarian sympathies ranked it higher. Those to the centre ranked 
their agreement lower. However, one of the more interesting variables is that of the popular 
sovereignty principles and this should be contrasted with social membership theory.  
 
 
Figure 8.6: Commitment to the popular sovereignty principle over borders. Note: 1 participant from the control 
group and 2 participants from the treatment group did not answer.  
 
Both groups were about as equally committed to the popular sovereignty principle over borders, 
and this means that both groups recognized the need for borders to help refugees. They were 
not cosmopolitans, except Pål who overall was an outlier. As one can see participants in the 
treatment group are a tad more committed since two participants from the control group 
answered lower than the lowest from the treatment group. Therefore, the variance is greater in 
the control group but one more participant from the control group answered 10. Although, it 
should be noted that one more person answered in the control group. Overall, they are very 
similar with an overwhelming tendency to favour the popular sovereignty principle over 
borders. Not a single participant did not say that they did not favour borders and each of the 
participants liked the control that it gave the state and citizens. Many of the participants took 
this principle as an axiom, as a given, it is the way the world is and they thought that this should 
be upheld. However, what seems to have been influenced is the commitment to democracy.  
and as one can see there is no significant shift from the treatment group to the control group. 
Although, one can see a significant shift in commitment to democracy. 
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Figure 8.7: Commitment to democracy in the control & treatment group. Note: 1 participant in the control group 
did not answer.  
 
Both groups were committed to democracy, but the treatment group appreciated democracy less 
and were less committed to democratic values. Moreover, the participant in the control group 
that did not answer 0-10 was involved in youth politics, thus can be expected that his 
commitment to democracy would be high. His answer suggested that he was committed to 
democracy and valued Norwegian democratic values highly. This is interesting because those 
two arguments seem to have made the participants less favourable to democracy.  
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Figure 8.8: Freedom of movement. Note: 1 participant from the treatment group did not answer.  
 
This shows that the treatment group is more volatile/greater variance. Overall, it was interesting 
to see how they responded to this question, however, it does not explain as well as other figures 
such as 8.6 which gives a better explanation. What should be noted the most is figure 8.7, this 
figure shows that some in the treatment group were committed to the idea of freedom of 
movement higher than the control group. It can also be explained by ideology from T05, who 
was a libertarian and a socialist did not agree with it whatsoever, while another socialist, Pitar 
(T04) agreed with it at 10. However, let us analyse these findings.  
 
Chapter 9: Discussion and Analysis   
In this chapter, I shall discuss how I interpret the findings in chapter 8. I shall discuss which 
theories help explain this. Indeed, while it ran against the hypothesis of this paper, where I 
thought there would be a bigger impact it did impact two of the participants from the T group, 
and indeed, even a Marxist in the T group did show some welfare chauvinism until he got to 
the question about child refugees were he walked back his previous statement. The two 
arguments had limited effects, where two of the participants were affected the most, although 
T05 was certainly influenced by her political affiliation to the Progress Party, and T07 was 
conservative and it had a very limiting effect upon T02 who leaned conservative. There is a 
quite clear ideological divide, and 2 of those participants were from cities. This is interesting 
because those who live in cities are the ones that are exposed to multiculturalism (Aarebrot and 
Evjen 2014, 85-100).  Thus, although, I did see some tendency towards welfare chauvinism this 
is not convincing enough. Moreover, I did also catch some variance in the group. It was clear 
that TO5, T06 and T07 became more negative due to the arguments about the welfare state. 
Moreover, T02 was  Hypothesis 1 built upon Rokkan’s cleavages, which I argued resulted in 
an egalitarian solidarity mindset in the Norwegian population. I initially thought that this 
egalitarian solidarity with refugees would break down if the welfare-state were threatened, but 
that was not the be case. Overall, the findings were that most Norwegians agree with 
communitarianism, the mainstream view, however, the idea of the world being fairer if borders 
were done away with could be seen in many of the participants. Indeed, this suggests what 
Carens argues for and that is that people are slowly coming to a cosmopolitan point of view, 
and as he argues, there is a big overlap between the two. However, it is undeniable, that most 
Norwegians agreed with the popular sovereignty principle over borders. Moreover, I witness a 
very small shift, where 1 participant in the control group was cosmopolitan in the treatment 
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group none were. I do capture a tendency towards welfare chauvinism in one participant, and it 
seems like Enabling Theory does explain the small shift in negativity towards refugees and 
asylum seekers. Moreover, there was one cosmopolitan in the control group, Pål, and there was 
none in the T group, and I capture a rightward shift towards welfare chauvinism. To be sure, 
the treatment group is situated further to the right on the continuum between cosmopolitanism, 
communitarianism and welfare chauvinism. The research thought that if the welfare state were 
under threat and it was linked towards refugees this would make some Norwegians become 
welfare chauvinists. This is somewhat the case, and it occurs across the political spectrum, 
Participant T10, Henrik, almost went along with the idea until the question of child refugees 
was brought up and thereafter, he backtracked. T07 said that welfare chauvinism in a way would 
be fair but also in other ways not. Although, Henrik, after he took back his earlier statement 
was very positive towards refugees and asylum seekers.  I capture a clear ideological divide, 
those on the left show little tendency towards welfare chauvinism, while those on the centre-
right to right-wing show a clear tendency to be more negative about refugees and asylum 
seekers than the rest of the group. Although, a question surrounding refugees and immigration 
is that of political correctness. Are the participants answering what they think and not giving 
the answers they think I want?  
 
Section 9.1: Political Correctness surrounding refugees: Does it 
Muddle the Results?  
An ever-on-going discussion and debate surrounding interviews are: “Are they answering 
honestly and are they not just answering the politically correct answer?” However, with the 
process of pseudonymization conducted in the thesis essay, I doubt this to the case. Indeed, my 
thesis and my questions were solely around the question of refugees and their welfare and 
human rights. The reason I doubt this to be the case is that the interviews were completely 
voluntary, and there was a monetary incentive (the reimbursement), and it was anonymous. 
Indeed, I made it clear to all participants that I would not challenge their views directly, and I 
would rather ask clarification questions. Indeed, I provided a safe space where the participants 
could express themselves freely. Therefore, I would argue that political correctness and 
reflexivity in this sense is not an issue as precautions were taken to minimize such effects.  
Although, in interviews, one should be careful of reflexivity, as my presence as a researcher 
could influence their answers. Though, herein lies one of the strengths of my questions. They 
were difficult and philosophical questions, and it would be hard to fake answers to such 
questions, many spent some time thinking about what to say and what their views were. I, 
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therefore, doubt that the participants in this research were being dishonest in their beliefs, 
especially on the question of “social membership theory”, it was a hard question, and they gave 
thoughtful and insightful responses. It would become apparent if they did not believe what we 
were saying as I was asking follow-up questions to get them to elaborate as to why they believed 
something. Norway has indeed been politically correct regarding the topic of refugees and 
immigration although I do not think this is the case today and it has not been the case since the 
Progress Party entered government with the Conservative Party in 2013. Indeed, the participant 
that supported the Progress Party was very vocal about her concerns about immigration and 
refugees. To be sure, and since anonymity was a part of the interviews it is unlikely that 
participants did not tell me their honest and true opinions and thoughts on the subject. 
Moreover, the Syrian refugee crisis of 2015 did spark debate as well and throughout that time 
it was hotly discussed between the political parties and the Progress Party being a part of the 
coalition government at the time was bold and strong in their rhetoric against Norway granting 
refuge to those refugees and migrants trying to seek the safety of Europe. This, in my view, 
emboldened Norwegians to be honest about their thoughts and their beliefs surrounding the 
topic. Moreover, due to the pseudonymization process and the reimbursement incentives, I 
think my participants were honest. Moreover,  political correctness surrounding such sensitive 
topics occurs often due to backlash and accusations of racism, xenophobia and more. However, 
I reassured my participants that I would not argue with what they were saying but rather ask 
clarifying questions. Of course, one can never be certain that the participants and respondents 
answered what they believed and that they gave me the answer I wanted. Of course, there are 
ways the researcher can influence the participants through issues of reflexivity, however, I tried 
to minimize this and ask clarifying questions to make sure that the framing of the question did 
not cause unintended consequences. For example, the question of popular sovereignty over 
borders was born out of the issue of framing the questions since otherwise, it might have seemed 
as if Norwegians were overall very positive towards refugees, while it is not entirely the case, 
as in the research could have become misleading and given inadequate data.  
 
However, what is interesting is that I find no welfare chauvinism but according to Pew Research 
Center, Norwegians are culture chauvinists (2018). This is interesting and I would like to 




Section 9.3: A Discussion of the Sample Size & Methodology: 
Concerns and Considerations  
Another topic is the sample size. The sample size for this research is comparatively very low, 
indeed, if you compare it to other studies about migrants such as Muriaas and Cappelen’s piece 
on Polish labour migrants, their research had over 60 participants, while mine only had 20 
(2018, 167-175).  Although this is also connected to the feasibility of my study, and my study 
does not handle the randomness, as well as other studies with larger sample size, where there is 
a tendency towards the mean, while mine had a deviation on the treatment group were many 
who were left-wing in the treatment group, although, I do not think this was an issue. Participant 
T10 for example was on the left wing and regarded himself as a Marxist, however, he at first 
showed welfare chauvinistic tendencies, however, when the question of child refugees came 
up, he changed position and backtracked. Meaning that even left-wing people can become 
welfare chauvinistic, but participant C03 for example she argued that she would never forsake 
the welfare and human rights of refugees even if Norway was not doing well in economic terms. 
Therefore, it’s hard to pin down ideology being the main key distinguishing factor between the 
group, of course, those on the left-wing the control group were closer to Carens, but only one 
can be characterized as a cosmopolitan, therefore, I do not think the sample size is a problem, 
while of course, my questionnaire could have been made into a survey, and I could have gotten 
many more participants and it could have been quantified, although, I would argue that this 
would be have been a methodological blunder because it does not capture the depth of the 
answers, which will give more context, and explain more. To give an example, participant C10, 
Geir argued that the Norwegian welfare state was not universal, but in a later statement, he 
explained how the welfare state was universal, and that he appreciated that. His views and 
attitudes came closer to the view it is not fully universal, but leans more toward universality 
than means-tested separate schemes like one would have in the U.S. To be sure, the participants 
could give thoughtful answers and speak freely, which is the main strength of this method in 
comparison to a survey method, and for example, Oline ranked highly on Carens’ social 
membership theory, however, when she explained herself, it came clear that she was not 
cosmopolitan on this point but rather a communitarian. The methodology used in this research 
gave a conclusive answer and it is in line with the previous literature (Cappelen and Midtbø 
2016, 691-703). In their article, they explored how the influx of labour migrants to Norway 
from EU countries has affected public support for the welfare state. Cappelen and Midtbø argue 
that intra-EU labour immigration may pose a challenge to welfare state legitimacy. They 
conduct survey experiments to measure welfare chauvinistic attitudes towards labour 
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immigrants and try to identify causal effects of intra-EU labour immigration on attitudes 
towards welfare spending. They found a high degree of manifest and concealed welfare 
chauvinism. The tendency is especially strong among women. They identify a negative effect 
of intra-EU labour migration on social spending preferences, which suggests that tendencies 
already reported in the United States may have started to surface in Europe as well. However, 
they also present that it is not refugees that make people develop welfare chauvinistic attitudes, 
and I find that even if they are an economic burden upon the Norwegian welfare state and they 
do not work to pay back society, which my experiments suggest somewhat but some did become 
negative, sceptical and hesitant towards refugees. Cornelius Cappelen and Yvette Peters’ 
research on intra-EU migration and the impact of its impact on welfare chauvinism shows a 
negative relation (2017a, 389-417). What this means is that there is a difference between labour 
migrants, economic migrants and refugees. Furthermore, the higher the percentage of East 
European immigrants compared to other EU immigrants, the higher the level of welfare 
chauvinism is what they find, however, they also find that countries with higher EU migration 
have lower tendencies to welfare chauvinism, which supports the intergroup contact theory. It 
is therefore not as simple to say that intra-EU labour migration causes welfare chauvinism, it 
more complex. However, with labour migrants it is different. The Norwegian welfare state does 
seem to influence preferences around refugees and their human rights in my research. This is 
interesting, therefore, even with a theoretical cut to the welfare state Norwegians seem to be 
positive towards refugees (some became negative) but those who were positive towards 
refugees did not think it to be an issue that they did not work and took time to become integrated 
into Norwegian society. In my research, I find as well that Norwegians appreciate the welfare 
state, and if you use the grading system I used and instead of a create a dummy variable, then 
every single participant said they appreciated the welfare state and this regardless of where they 
stood on the political spectrum. The data suggest and the findings in my research do not align 
with the neoliberal view. Norwegians are positive towards refugees, and even with a theoretical 
cut to the welfare state, they do not change to welfare chauvinistic attitudes. However, they 
become more sceptical, hesitant and negative. I use a very fine grading system from 0-10 and 
in hindsight, this may not have been necessary, and instead, I could have used a system of 1-4 
or from “fully agree”, “agree”, “disagree”, “fully disagree”. However, I tried to minimize 
neutral answers because it is not very interesting if participants answer with “unsure or neutral.” 
Although, with my finer grading I capture some interesting patterns that would otherwise go 
unnoticed, therefore, it was the right choice to use the finer grading system. I have now 
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expounded and discussed issues with sample size and taken into account methodological 
concerns, however, I would like to discuss Rokkan’s cleavages in light of these findings.  
 
Section 9.4: A Discussion of Rokkan’s Cleavage Theory and the 
Findings  
I would like to discuss how my findings fit with Rokkan’s cleavage theories. Can I explain my 
findings with Rokkan’s cleavage theories? This is hard to answer because I suspected 
Communitarianism to be the mainstream view in the control group, and the research suggests 
that it is the case since only one participant could be characterised as a cosmopolitan, while the 
rest can be characterised as communitarian and there were no welfare chauvinists.  However, 
as I explained earlier, the reasoning as to why I suspected Norwegians to hold communitarian 
ideas and not cosmopolitan ideas is due to Norwegian class and rural cleavages forming the 
institutions and the ideas it left imprinted into people. Indeed, there is a clear cleavage between 
those who were born and raised in cities and those who were born and raised rurally. Those 
rurally are more concerned about cultural integration and parallel societies than those who live 
in the city. Two participants in the C group supported the Agrarian Party, which is a liberal 
nationalist party and they favour economic nationalism and protectionism. However, they also 
favour decentralisation, however, they are also a soft culture conservative party, who often talk 
about Norwegian Christian humanist values (Heidar 2013, 10-29; Senterpartiet 2017). 
Furthermore, participant T01 from the treatment group supported the Agrarian Party. 
Participants that supported the Agrarian Party were concerned about culture more so than those 
living in cities and participant T02 was also concerned with Norwegian culture. T02 was blunt 
and he said that culture should be taken into consideration when picking and choosing which 
refugees to help. C04 mentioned parallel societies as something that must be dealt with and 
how those refugees live separately from natives. Stein Rokkan’s theory of the Labour-Captial 
cleavage resulted in “egalitarian solidarity”. Egalitarian solidarity arises through institutions 
such as trade unions this idea of cooperation and formalizing a pattern of conflict through 
dialogue has made it so that Norwegians have developed an idea of egalitarian solidarity. In 
other words, it is not the welfare state itself but rather it is the ideas behind the welfare state. 
The ideology of social democracy brought about the Nordic model. Egalitarian solidarity, that 
meaning everyone being equal and having equal “menneskeverd” or human dignity and the idea 
that one should have solidarity with the most vulnerable in the world. Inclusion of refugees and 
granting them equality of opportunity to become full citizens like natives and this being just 
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regardless of what economic situation Norway finds itself in. Moreover, it was those on the 
right to centre-right that was influenced while those who were more clearly defined as left-wing 
did not. This suggests an ideological divide. The religious affiliation variable seems to have not 
had the effect that the ideological divide did. One of the reasons for this is the small sample of 
religious participants in my research. The ideological divide is important to note, every single 
participant appreciated the welfare state however those who are most influenced by that 
ideology are those who are left-wing.  It should be noted that at least 3 of the participants in the 
treatment group became a bit more negative and this was influenced by cuts to the welfare state 
due to Covid-19 and the economic situation. It had somewhat limited effects and Norwegians 
did not become welfare chauvinistic. Moreover, in terms of city-rural cleavage, as hypothesized 
the rural sample is more concerned with culture and integration, while cities are not since as 
argued in section 2.1. are influenced by multiple cultures from the rural areas. However, I would 
like to discuss the implications for democracy.  
 
Section 9.5: A Discussion of the Implications for Democracy  
 
Firstly, I would like to touch upon the Enabling Theory. I tested the Enabling Theory and what 
can be learned from this is that the Enabling Theory seems to capture the following. Throughout 
the Covid-19 pandemic and the economic recession, the Welfare state has enabled Norwegians 
to have positive attitudes towards democracy, and my research then suggests that the Norwegian 
welfare state is an integral part of Norwegian democracy. To be sure, if not for the Norwegian 
welfare state enabling the social and economic welfare of citizens throughout the crisis in 
Norway in 2020 and 2021 my research seems to suggest that trust in Norwegian democracy 
would become undermined. It suggests that Enabling Theory may not work as intended in this 
research but still serves an explanatory purpose. The Enabling Theory is a general theory that 
can be applied in other contexts therefore the same experiment could be made elsewhere. Trust 
as a field within political science has been hotly discussed and written about (Cappelen and 
Dahlberg 2017, 438-440; Cappelen et al 2020, 250-258). Norway is a high-trust society, the 
welfare state builds on trust and the universal welfare state thereafter makes society more 
trusting. In other words, it is a positive feedback loop. Therefore, cuts to the welfare state and 
retrenching it while Norway is undergoing a pandemic and an economic crisis that it has so far 
managed to handle with Keynesian policies and a universal and generous welfare state creates 
a disconnect and therefore Norwegian lose trust in politicians and the political system 
(Cappelen et al 2018, 875-879). If one values democracy and values the welfare state this 
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research is pertinent and important to democracy and the welfare state. It suggests that trust in 
Norwegian democracy (which is a strong democracy and with a rich democratic legacy) may 
dimmish if cuts to the welfare state happen during a recession and a pandemic. This is 
interesting for the following reason: It suggests that the welfare state, and to extrapolate it 
further, the Keynesian stimulus serves a function during a recession where the trust in the 
democratic system and the trust in politicians are “enabled”. This is also in line with the theory 
of the welfare state that was presented in earlier chapters. The welfare state is not only there to 
diminish poverty and redistribute wealth, but it also shapes ideas. These ideas such as 
egalitarian solidarity, which I suggested could explain why Norwegians are so positive towards 
refugees. Indeed, and this brings back to Seymour Martin Lipset’s famous line: “the more well-
to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy” (Lipset 1959, 69-75). 
Indeed, the findings here then suggests that the welfare state and Keynesian stimulus are 
therefore tools of democracy and tools to maintain trust. While this theorem by Lipset has been 
used to justify modernization theory the approach of this thesis is that my research and findings 
seem to echo Lipset in the sense that it sustains and maintains democracy. Adam Przeworski in 
his seminal book “Crises of Democracy looks at what can cause a democratic crisis and one of 
these are economic causes (2019, 29-32). Przeworski notes:  
 
“Indeed, only three consolidated democracies fell following thus-defined economic crises: Germany in 1933, 
Ecuador in 1933 and Peru in 1990. Hence, transformations of economic into political crises are far from automatic. 
Lindvall compared the electoral effects of the economic crises of 1929-32 and 2008-11, finding that they were 
very similar. In both periods incumbents lost votes, and in both periods elections that occurred soon after the crisis 
favoured the Right, while those that occurred later generated no swing or a swing to the Left.”  
                                                                                                                                                 (Przeworski 2019, 31) 
 
To be sure, if one favours democracy and the welfare state, my research becomes important. 
While a democratic backslide is unlikely in Norway one cannot rule a crisis of legitimacy and 
a democratic crisis. Indeed, participant T07, questioned how much influence the electorate 
truly has on the political system and he was also the most negative towards refugees out of 
anyone in the treatment group therefore it could be argued that due to his welfare chauvinistic 
tendencies influences his democratic outlook as well. However, I do not think this captures 
the entirety since T06 was the most negative about democracy at 5 but she gave no 
explanation to her ranking when I asked her. She was very apolitical and very uncertain about 
her views. Moreover, figure 8.7 shows that Norwegians in the treatment group are a lot less 
willing to give full point on their commitment and T04, Pitar was a left-wing socialist, who 
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ranked his commitment to democracy at 6 and said that it was simply not good enough and 
wanted more democracy. To be sure, the sample does show a hidden latency towards the 
treatment group being less committed to democracy and this being due to the argument 
injected from NHO, which is known for its ties to the Conservative Party, made Norwegians 
less committed. Furthermore, I cannot say this for certain, however, it does fall in line with 
the previous literature (Keech 2013, 95-129). To be sure, the argument being made is that it is 
fundamentally about stability for Norwegians if the system that they have grown accustomed 
to and that is viewed as legitimate by Norwegians since everyone benefits (universality) this 
will cause Norwegians to be less committed to their democratic system but it also resulted not 
only in the breakdown of trust on the political level but participants as well became more 
hesitant, and more sceptical of refugees. My research points in that direction, however, further 
research is needed to confirm these patterns found here.  
 
 
Chapter 10: Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I am going to summarize the thesis, I shall as well conclude with the findings 
of the thesis, and what further research can be done, and perhaps what this research could have 
done differently to collect better findings and better data. In this research the first hypothesis 
(that Norwegians are of the communitarian/mainstream view)  seems to have been confirmed, 
although further research would be needed, to determine whether it applies in a larger context. 
My research points in the direction of confirming the second hypothesis, that rural participants 
were more concerned with culture, parallel societies, and integration. However, further research 
is needed. The research in this paper seems to suggest that the third hypothesis is rejected 
although since it does not make Norwegians welfare chauvinistic, however, it should be noted 
that Norwegians in the treatment group are more negative, hesitant and sceptical towards 
refugees and asylum seekers. For example, there were no cosmopolitans in the treatment group 
and none of the participants in the control group came close to be welfare chauvinism. However, 
in the treatment group participants, T07 came particularly close until he rejected this. He 
showed latent and concealed welfare chauvinism. He could develop into a welfare chauvinist 
with the right injection of information or given the right conditions. For example, if there was 
no pandemic and Norway did receive many refugees in his eyes then it could be possible for 
him to develop into a welfare chauvinist. Or maybe with the right cultural arguments that for 
example refugees are not sufficiently becoming integrated into society and partaking.  However,  
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t opens up the way for the Enabling Theory to explain that it might enable Norwegians to have 
positive attitudes towards refugees but not to the extent that they would become welfare 
chauvinistic. The Enabling Theory also seems to have enabled Norwegians to have positive 
attitudes and be committed to the democratic system. The treatment group does show a marked 
decline in commitment to democracy, which means that this research and the Enabling Theory 
could have implications for democracy. I have in this research outlined and described the 
Norwegian welfare state and what makes it so unique and worthwhile of study. I have described 
and created a narrative of cleavages to explain how the Norwegian welfare state developed and 
what kind of economic school of thought and ideology has shaped the Norwegian welfare state. 
Moreover, I discussed the main theories of justice surrounded refugees and gave a literature 
review on these theories such as Carens, Miller and others on cosmopolitan theory, and I 
discussed welfare chauvinism as well. However, the main aim of the thesis. The thesis included 
many different intricate theories, however, the focus was the large quantities of data that I 
collected on Norwegians during the Covid-19 pandemic and their attitudes regarding refugees. 
In comparison to other research in the same field of study, the data I collected and analyzed 
was not as large, but for a project conducted by one person, it was a large amount of data to 
process. Furthermore, the focus was as well on the experimentation. As in, whether a theoretical 
cut to the welfare state would shift their attitudes in some meaningful way. Remember, I asked 
a very important and central question about the Covid-19 pandemic, and it is the title of my 
research. Do we stand united to protect the human rights of refugees? The thesis question was:  
Does the Norwegian welfare state enable Norwegians to be concerned about the welfare and 
human rights of asylum seekers and refugees during an economic recession and the Covid-19 
crisis? The conclusion I come to is that the two arguments seem to have the following effect: It 
lowered the commitment to democracy in the treatment group, however, it did affect their 
commitment to refugee rights and their human rights while I compared the treatment group and 
the control group. The is most concerning are the effect on democracy and the effect of 
Norwegians becoming more negative and more hesitant towards the rights of refugees and 
asylum seekers. Norwegians are then committed to refugees and their human rights even during 
a pandemic, though, with some exceptions I did capture a rightward shift. I think this can be 
explained with Rokkan’s cleavage theory of egalitarian solidarity. Rokkan’s cleavages do not 
simply result in institutions such as parties and the welfare state, but ideas. I argue that the 
egalitarian solidarity and the strong sense of solidarity that the pandemic brought have made it 
so that Norwegians want to show solidarity with refugees. Refugees are a vulnerable group, and 
Norwegian have a high amount of trust in each other and towards refugees. The theory is that 
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Norwegians are trusting and this can also be seen in Cornelius Cappelen and Stefan Dahlberg’s 
article about trust (2017, 419-440). They seek to explain why Norwegians are so trusting, 
however, their article is inconclusive. I theorize that the institutionalization of patterns of 
conflict through the welfare state and the cooperation between cleavages have created a 
mechanism where conflicts can be resolved peacefully. This reinforces trust and understanding, 
and the egalitarian solidarity built up through the labour movement and the development of the 
welfare state with universalist principles reinforces and creates a positive feedback loop. 
Moreover, throughout the pandemic, a strong sense of solidarity has been built up through and 
this can explain why Norwegians are overall positive despite the rightward shift towards 
welfare chauvinism. The theoretical cut seems to manifest itself as a disappointment in the 
Norwegian democratic system as well. This is an interesting pattern. I do capture a pattern 
where the treatment group is less positive towards refugee rights and their human rights. I do 
capture a pattern that Norwegians are committed to democracy, they appreciate the welfare 
state fully, and the treatment group appreciates the freedom of movement more than the control 
group. I can explain the dip in commitment to democracy. It is interesting because the 
connection between the injection of two arguments, and the freedom of movement seem to be 
unrelated and when you take into consideration the popular sovereignty principle the point on 
free movement seems to become less important as the former explains more. I do not see a 
difference in the commitment to popular sovereignty between the two groups. The injection of 
the two arguments seems to have had the following effect: When introduced to this new 
information (the two arguments) the participants in the treatment group lost trust and their 
commitment to democracy due to NHO, a national organisation that Norwegians know has ties 
with the current Conservative Party, arguing that we must make cuts to the welfare state due to 
the overburdening of the system due to refugees, due to the Covid-19 pandemic and due to the 
economic crisis. This manifest disappointment in the democratic system has implications for 
democracy, firstly, Norwegians appreciate the welfare state and they seem to not be susceptible 
to the Neoliberal argument, and finally, they seem to not be susceptible to the welfare chauvinist 
argument. The implication is the following: if a government does cut back on the welfare state 
and does cut back on the rights of refugees and their human rights this can cause distrust 
between the electorate and the government. Indeed, and if any such government attempts cut to 
the welfare state and if this government attempts to cut back on refugee rights during the 
economic crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic, my research suggests that there would be 
resistance in the Norwegian population and it could cause Norwegians to lose faith in the 
democratic system. In this paper, I set out to find out if Norwegians would become more welfare 
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chauvinistic if I presented two arguments about cuts to the welfare state, and refugees being 
partially to blame during the Covid-19 pandemic and economic crisis rather I came across an 
unintended consequence which was that the treatment group lost faith in democracy. This is 
interesting, and this has implications for further research as well. The research could be done 
further, firstly, one could test this pattern in a different context, and one could test the Enabling 
theory and whether it affects other issues such as economic migrants and labour migrants. 
Moreover, one could as well test the pattern found here in a quantitative study in Norway, and 
perhaps one could compare different welfare states quantitatively. This would be interesting as 
one indirectly measures trust in the political system. Or perhaps the effect found here only 
applies to high-trust contexts. To finally answer the question of my headline. Do Norwegians 
stand united in protecting the rights of refugees and their human rights? The results are mixed, 
and three (T05, T06 and T07) of the participants were more negative towards refugees. 
Although participant T05’s ideology does explain, she supported the Progress Party, which 
played a role in her answers. There was a clear left-right divide as well, where those on the 
centre and the right were the ones who became negative, although, one should not dismiss T10, 
who said he was a socialist and he was staunchly left-wing on the political spectrum who also 
became negative until he took back his answer later but overall he was positive. Ideology 
explains those on the left wing were not susceptible while those on the centre. Those concerned 
with the rights of refugees and the rights of asylum seekers should therefore also consider the 
capacity and resources of a given country so that their welfare state is sustainable. The 
sustainability of the welfare state is tied to the Norwegians having positive attitudes towards 
refugees, although if theoretical cuts to the welfare state were made it would not result in the 
population becoming welfare chauvinistic. These results warrant further study and my research 
seems to point in that direction. However, the patterns that should be studied are; the welfare 
state and democracy during a crisis and the Enabling theory pattern found here. I suggest 
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